ORDER

JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, District Judge.

BEFORE THE COURT is Defendant City of St. Petersburg's Dispositive Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 3), and Plaintiffs response (Dkt. 7). Upon consideration, the motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Barbara Ann Lewis alleges the City of St. Petersburg, her former employer, discharged her because she complained of racial discrimination. (Dkt. 2 ¶¶ 25-27). Plaintiff brings two counts: Count I alleges violations of the Florida Civil Rights Act, Fla. Stat.§ 760 et. seq., and Count II alleges violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 (Id. ¶¶ 31, 36). This case was originally filed in state court, where Plaintiff initially raised only the FCRA claim, and Defendant's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment on the FCRA claim were denied. (Dkts. 7-3, 7-7). After the conclusion of summary judgment in state court, Plaintiff was permitted to amend her complaint to add the § 1983 claim, and Defendant thereafter removed the case to federal court. (Id.; Dkt. 1).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A complaint should contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a)(2). This Rule does not require detailed factual allegations, but a plaintiffs complaint must contain more than unadorned or conclusory accusations of harm. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint must "plead all facts establishing an entitlement to reliefwith more than `labels and conclusions' or a `formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.'" Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

All of the factual allegations in a complaint must be accepted as true for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, but this standard is "inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. at 678. "While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id. at 679. All reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiffs favor. St. George v. Pinellas Cnty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2002).

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to dismiss Count I, claiming Plaintiff has not pied a prima facie case of retaliation. As Plaintiff argues, however, this issue was raised and already decided in the state court proceeding, and Defendant has presented no argument that would require revisiting the state court's rulings on a matter of state law.2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1450 ("Whenever any action is removed from a State court to a district court of the United States. . . . All . . . orders, and other proceedings had in such action prior to its removal shall remain in full force and effect until dissolved or modified by the district court."). "After removal, the federal court `takes the case up where the State court left it off.'" Granny Goose Foods v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, 415 U.S. 423, 436 (U.S. 1974) (quoting Duncan v. Gegan, 101 U.S. 810, 812 (1879)); Savell v. Southern Ry., 93 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1937) ("[W]hen a case is removed[,] the federal court takes it as though everything done in the state court had in fact been done in the federal court.").3 This will not, however, preclude a close analysis of the parties' contentions at summary judgment.

Defendant also challenges Count II, in which Plaintiff raises a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.4 To state a claim against Defendant, Plaintiff must allege her injury resulted from a "policy or custom." Monell v. Dep't of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978); Kelly v. Broward Sheriff's Office, 560 Fed. Appx. 818, 821 (11th Cir. 2014). However, "a municipal official who has "final policy-making authority" in a certain area of the city's business may by his or her action subject the government to § 1983 liability when the challenged action falls within that authority." Brown v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 923 F.2d 1474, 1480 (11th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff adequately alleges that the City's policy, as executed by George Cassady, discriminated against her on the basis of race, in violation of the equal protection of the laws. (Dkt. 2 ¶¶ 14-18, 21-24, 26-28). See Thigpen v. Bibb County, Ga., Sheriff's Dept., 223 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2000) (overruled on other grounds).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly,

1) Defendant City of St. Petersburg's Dispositive Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 3) is DENIED.

2) Plaintiff's prayer for punitive damages in Count I is stricken. Count II will proceed as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

3) Defendant shall answer the complaint within fourteen (14) days.

DONE AND ORDERED.