PHILIP R. LAMMENS, Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff FLCM ACQ VIII LLC's motion for entry of default judgment as to Defendant Taos Ventures, LLC. (Doc. 47). Taos has not filed a response to the motion, and its time for doing so has passed. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that FLCM is entitled to default judgment, but has failed to provide an adequate basis for the damages, fees, and costs requested.
PNC Equipment Finance, LLC ("PNC") sued Taos Ventures, LLC ("Taos"), Ravindra Kolaventy, and Don Bovell, alleging that they defaulted under two equipment leases and now owe FLCM all rent payments and other sums due.
On October 25, 2014, FLCM filed its Complaint (Doc. 1), and summonses were issued as to all Defendants (Doc. 2). The Returns of Service (Docs. 19, 20, & 24), show that Dr. Kolaventy and Dr. Bovell were served on December 19, 2013, and Taos was served on January 9, 2014. After Taos failed to file a responsive pleading, FLCM filed a motion for entry of clerk's default against Taos (Doc. 45), which was entered on September 15, 2014. (Doc. 46). To date, Taos has not sought to vacate the default or otherwise appear and defend this action. On November 20, 2014, FLCM filed the instant motion for default judgment (Doc. 47) and the supporting affidavit of Santosh Govindaraju, the chief executive officer and managing member of Convergent Management LLC
In this Circuit, "there is a strong policy of determining cases on their merits and we therefore view defaults with disfavor." In re Worldwide Web Systems, Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2003). Where, as here, a defendant has failed to appear or otherwise acknowledge the pendency of a lawsuit after being served, entry of default judgment is appropriate. Indeed, Rule 55 provides for the entry of default and default judgment where a defendant "has failed to plead or otherwise defend." Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). In a variety of contexts, courts have entered default judgments against defendants who have failed to appear and defend in a timely manner following proper service of process. In short, "[w]hile modern courts do not favor default judgments, they are certainly appropriate when the adversary process has been halted because of an essentially unresponsive party." Flynn v. Angelucci Bros. & Sons, Inc., 448 F.Supp.2d 193, 195 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation omitted). That is precisely what Taos has done here. Despite being served with process in January 2014, Taos has declined to appear or defend, and has effectively prevented this litigation from proceeding.
The law is clear, however, that Taos's failure to appear and the Clerk's Entry of Default (Doc. 46) do not automatically entitle FLCM to a default judgment in the requested (or any) amount. Indeed, a default is not "an absolute confession by the defendant of his liability and of the plaintiff's right to recover," but is instead merely "an admission of the facts cited in the Complaint, which by themselves may or may not be sufficient to establish a defendant's liability." Pitts ex rel. Pitts v. Seneca Sports, Inc., 321 F.Supp.2d 1353, 1357 (S.D. Ga. 2004); Descent v. Kolitsidas, 396 F.Supp.2d 1315, 1316 (M.D. Fla. 2005) ("the defendants' default notwithstanding, the plaintiff is entitled to a default judgment only if the complaint states a claim for relief"). Stated differently, "a default judgment cannot stand on a complaint that fails to state a claim." Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1370 n. 41 (11th Cir. 1997).
After considering the well-pled allegations and the record evidence in this case, the Court finds that FLCM's averments offer a sufficient basis for the entry of a default judgment. The Court has reviewed the Complaint and is satisfied that it sets forth a viable breach of contract claim against Taos under Alabama law.
Notwithstanding the propriety of default judgment against Taos, it remains incumbent on FLCM to prove its damages. "While well-pleaded facts in the complaint are deemed admitted, plaintiffs' allegations relating to the amount of damages are not admitted by virtue of default; rather, the court must determine both the amount and character of damages." Virgin Records America, Inc. v. Lacey, 510 F.Supp.2d 588, 593 n. 5 (S.D. Ala. 2007). Even in the default judgment context, "[a] court has an obligation to assure that there is a legitimate basis for any damage award it enters." Anheuser Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003); see also Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism and the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that damages may be awarded on default judgment only if the record adequately reflects the basis for award). "Rather than merely telling the Court in summary fashion what its damages are, a plaintiff seeking default judgment must show the Court what those damages are, how they are calculated, and where they come from." PNCEF, 740 F.Supp.2d at 1294.
To prove its damages, FLCM has submitted the Affidavit of Santosh Govindaraju. (Doc. 48). In the affidavit, FLCM claims it is entitled to a total of $327,805.10 under Lease No. 1, and $229,225.24 under Lease No. 2. (Doc. 28, p. 5). While FLCM has attached the Master Lease Agreement and supporting Schedules as exhibits, it has not laid out precisely how it calculated the total amounts requested. Accordingly, the Court directs FLCM to identify each basis and a calculation for each sum total of its damages on or before December 18, 2014.
Finally, FLCM requests its attorney's fees and costs against Taos.
In light of the foregoing, FLCM is ordered, on or before