ORDER DENYING PETITION

JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, District Judge.

Petitioner Curtis Lee Watson ("Petitioner"), proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1). Petitioner's amended petition is presently before this Court (Doc. 6). At the time he filed his petitions, Petitioner was an inmate at the Federal Correctional Complex in Coleman, Florida serving a sentence of thirty-years to life for convictions from the Superior Court for the District of Columbia ("D.C. Superior Court"). Petitioner challenges an order from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia that dismissed a civil rights complaint in which he asserted that the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") had no authority to recalculate his sentence and that an ex post facto violation occurred when the United States Parole Commission ("Commission") applied 1987 and 2000 guidelines at Petitioner's parole hearings (Doc. 6 at 6).

I. Background1

On August 10, 1978, the D.C. Superior Court sentenced Petitioner, in case number 91888-76, to: two terms of 5-15 years for burglary while armed (Counts A & D), running consecutively to each other; two additional 5-15 year terms for assault with a dangerous weapon (Counts F & I), running concurrent with each other and to Count D; and a 40-month to 10-year term for assault with intent to kill (Count C), running concurrently with Count A. The total aggregate term for this case was ten to thirty years of imprisonment.

Also on August 10, 1978, in case number 69971-77, the D.C. Superior Court sentenced Petitioner to a term of twenty years for murder in the first degree while armed; and a one-year sentence for carrying a pistol while armed. Both sentences were to run consecutively to the sentences imposed in case number 91888-76. Accordingly, Petitioner's sentences were aggregated to a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

On August 29, 1988, Petitioner escaped from confinement while serving his sentence at the D.C. Correctional Facility at Lorton.2 He was re-arrested by members of the United States Marshal Service for the District of Arizona on October 31, 1995. On March 15, 1996, Petitioner was sentenced in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to twelve months' incarceration for escape, to run consecutively to any other present or previous sentences.

Petitioner's first parole hearing took place in 2004 (Doc. 11-1 at 9-11). The hearing examiner determined that the guideline range was 334 to 348 months to be served before Petitioner was eligible for parole. Id. The Commission denied parole and continued the case for three years. Id. at 12-13. A Commission hearing examiner conducted the reconsideration hearing in October of 2007 and decided to grant Petitioner parole after the service of 353 months. Id at 19. However, because the BOP had mistakenly neglected to deduct time spent on escape status, the Commission voided the decision to grant parole. Id.

On October 21, 2011, a Commission hearing examiner conducted a new initial hearing (Doc. 11-1 at 20-23). The hearing examiner determined that Petitioner's parole guideline range was 346 to 360 months to be served. Id. On November 30, 2011, the Commission issued its decision to reconsider parole in October of 2014.3

II. Petition

It is difficult to decipher the claims set forth by Petitioner in this petition. The introductory statement to his five-page pleading reads:

(Doc. 1 at 1). Petitioner seems to take issue with the outcome of a case he filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the Commission in which he challenged the Commission's authority to grant or deny him parole and to apply its own parole guidelines to his case. In that case, the district court concluded that Petitioner also raised an ex post facto claim based upon the Commission's application of later-adopted parole laws instead of the parole laws that were in effect at the time he committed his offenses. Watson v. United States Parole Comm'n, 869 F.Supp.2d 145 (D.D.C. 2012). The complaint was dismissed. Id

Upon review of the instant pleading, it appears that Petitioner may seek to raise three claims: (1) the Commission unconstitutionally applied later-adopted laws to Petitioner's parole consideration instead of the laws that were in effect at the time he committed his offenses (ex post facto violation); (2) the BOP was not authorized to recalculate Petitioner's sentence; and (3) the BOP miscalculated his sentence (Doc. 1 at 1-5). Petitioner requests immediate release from prison. Id. at 5.

Respondent asserts that Petitioner is not entitled to relief (Doc. 11). Specifically, Respondent argues that: (1) the petition is successive and an abuse of the writ of habeas corpus; (2) the claims should be dismissed under principles of res judicata; and (3) the Commission is authorized by law to grant or deny parole for D.C. Code sentenced felons. Id. at 7-1.1.

In reply, Petitioner asserts that the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Peugh v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 2072 (2013) supports a conclusion that the United States Parole Commission committed an ex post facto violation when it considered Petitioner's parole under its own guidelines (Doc. 13).

III. Discussion

a. No ex post facto violation occurred when the Commission applied the 2000 guidelines at Petitioner's parole hearings

The United States Constitution prohibits the enactment of an ex post facto law. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3. The Ex Post Facto Clause bars enactments, which by retroactive application, increase the punishment for a crime that has already been committed. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990). The Supreme Court has found that a change to parole policy may violate the Ex Post Facto Clause if it "creates a significant risk of prolonging [an inmate's] incarceration." Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 251 (2000).

Under regulations promulgated in 1972 and in effect at the time of Petitioner's crimes (the "1972 Regulations"), the D.C. Parole Board took into account some of the following factors in making its determination as to parole:

9 D.C.R.R. ch. 2, § 105.1 (1972). Under these rules, the D.C. Parole Board "operated with nearly complete discretion." Austin v. Reilly. 606 F.Supp.2d 4, 8 (D.D.C. 2009). Foster v. United States Bureau ofPrisons, Case No. 14-1188, 2014 WL 3512615, at *1 (D.D.C. July 15, 2014) ("[The 1972 parole] guidelines were open ended and left the decision of whether to grant parole almost entirely to the discretion of the D.C. Parole Board[.]").4

In 1985, the D.C. Board of Parole adopted guidelines to channel its discretion; these guidelines were published and codified in 1987 (the "1987 Regulations"). Sellmon v. Reilly, 551 F.Supp.2d 66, 69-71 (D.D.C. 2008); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 28, § 204 (1987). The 1987 regulations relied upon an analytical framework that looked at specific pre-incarceration and post-incarceration factors to arrive at a baseline point score upon which the parole board could rely when considering a prisoner's eligibility for parole. See Sellmon, 551 F.Supp.2d at 69-71.

Between 1998 and 2000, the Commission drafted new parole regulations and guidelines (the "2000 guidelines") that applied to any offender who received an initial parole hearing after August 5, 1998. Sellmon, 551 F.Supp.2d at 71. These regulations are currently in effect and enumerated at 28 C.F.R. § 2.80 (2010). Similar to the 1987 regulations, the 2000 guidelines use a point system to determine whether a candidate is presumptively suitable for parole. Sellmon, 551 F.Supp.2d at 72-73.

Petitioner broadly asserts that his right to be free from ex post facto laws has been violated because the change in parole policy has effectively abolished parole for old-law prisoners (Doc. 1 at 5). Petitioner contends that the recent Supreme Court ruling in Peugh supports his contention that the application of the 2000 guidelines to his parole "changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime, when committed[.]" (Doc. 13 at 1). Other than reasserting that the BOP miscalculated his minimum sentence, Petitioner does not explain how the application of the 2000 guidelines subjected him to a longer period of incarceration.

Petitioner raised an identical ex post facto claim in his District of Columbia suit against the Commission. See Watson v. United States Parole Corn'n, 869 F.Supp.2d at 145.5 District Judge John Bates compared the Commission's guidelines and the regulations promulgated by the former District of Columbia Board of Parole and dismissed the claim, observing:

Id. at 150 (internal citations omitted). This Court sees no reason to depart from Judge Bates' considered analysis and similarly concludes that the application of the 2000 guidelines to Plaintiffs parole does not create a significant risk of a longer period of incarceration than under the earlier regulations. See Garner, 529 U.S. at 255 ("When the rule does not by its own terms show a significant risk [of a longer period of incarceration], the [petitioner] must demonstrate, by evidence drawn from the rule's practical implementation by the agency charged with exercising discretion, that its retroactive application will result in a longer period of incarceration than under the earlier rule."); United States v. Wetherald, 636 F.3d 1315, 1323 (11th Cir. 2011) (recognizing that an ex post facto violation occurs only when application of later-imposed rules "results in a substantial risk of harsher punishment."). Likewise, Petitioner's reliance on Peugh is unavailing. There, unlike here, the retroactive application of sentencing guidelines did, in fact, subject the criminal defendant to a longer period of incarceration. See Peugh, 133 S. Ct. at 2084-85. Petitioner's ex post facto claim is without merit.

b. The Bureau of Prisons had authority to recalculate Petitioner's sentence

Under the National Capitalization Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997 (the "Revitalization Act"), the custody of inmates such as Petitioner who were initially incarcerated under the D.C. Code was transferred to the BOP. D.C. Code §§ 24-101(a), 24-131(a)(2); 111 Stat. 251, 734 (1997). The Revitalization Act further provided that the Lorton Correctional Complex, which had been the primary facility for the housing of D.C. Code offenders, would be closed. Specifically, the Revitalization Act includes a provision stating:

D.C. Code § 24-101(a) (emphasis added). Since the passage of the Revitalization Act, the BOP calculates the sentences of D.C. Code offenders and determines their release dates.

Petitioner argues that "when Congress created the National Capitol Revitalization Act in 1997, it only gave the B.O.P. the authority to house D.C. felons . . . never was the right to `convert' D.C. sentences was approved." (Doc. 1 at 3). Petitioner now asserts, without coherent explanation, that "the converting of D.C. sentences by the Bureau of Prisons is without any legal authority and for the first time is being challenged in a federal court of law." Id. at 2.6 To the extent Petitioner argues that the Revitalization Act did not authorize the BOP to recalculate his sentence or to grant or deny his parole, he is mistaken. As noted above, the Revitalization Act subjected D.C. Code offenders to the same laws and regulations as other BOP prisoners. Moreover, under D.C. Code §24-131, exclusive jurisdiction of parole matters over D.C. felons was transferred from the Board of Parole of the District of Columbia to the Commission. See Franklin v. District of Columbia, 163 F.3d 625, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Congress transferred the authority of the D.C. Board of Parole to the U.S. Parole Commission pursuant to the Revitalization Act); D.C. Code § 24-131(a)(1) ("Not later than one year after August 5, 1997, the United States Parole Commission shall assume the jurisdiction and authority of the Board of Parole of the District of Columbia to grant and deny parole, and to impose conditions upon an order of parole, in the case of any imprisoned felon who is eligible for parole or reparole under the District of Columbia Official Code."); United States v. Savage, 737 F.3d 304, 308-09 (4th Cir. 2013) ("The Revitalization Act was, by its plain terms, not a contractual provision for confinement, but the full vesting of all aspects of custody in the BOP over D.C. offenders.").

There is no merit to Petitioner's claim that the BOP has no legal authority to recalculate his sentence.

c. Petitioner's claim that the BOP miscalculated his sentenced is successive

In the past twelve years, Petitioner has filed numerous petitions and complaints with this Court and with other federal district courts, most of which challenge his continued confinement and the denial of parole.7 In 2009, while still incarcerated at FCC Coleman, Petitioner filed two § 2241 petitions, which were consolidated for disposition. In those petitions, Petitioner asserted that both his sentence and his parole eligibility date had been improperly calculated and that he was entitled to immediate release. See Watson v. Warden, FCC Coleman-USP I, Case Nos. 5:09-cv-112-Oc-10TBS, 5:09-cv-200-Oc-10TBS, 2012 WL 5465993, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla. May 3, 2012). This Court concluded that both Petitioner's D.C. sentence and parole eligibility date had been "properly computed." Id. at *2. On appeal, Petitioner argued that "his `old law sentences,' that is, the 1978 D.C. Superior Court sentences, were `converted to a federal term of lift.'" Watson v. Warden, FCC Coleman-USP I, 521 F. App'x at 903. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that "[n]othing in the record supports Watson's claim that his indefinite aggregate term of thirty years to life has been converted by the BOP to a definite term of life." Id. Petitioner also claimed that he was only required to serve "19 years and 8 months," and that he was entitled to immediate release. Id. However, the Eleventh Circuit noted that Petitioner was required to serve, at a minimum, thirty years of his D.C. aggregated sentence; that Petitioner had not completed that sentence; and that Petitioner had "yet to serve his consecutive twelve-month sentence for the 1996 escape conviction." Id.

Petitioner now asserts that all his sentences "maxed out at (20) years under old law" and that he is entitled to immediate release (Doc. 1 at 3). This claim has already been denied by this Court and by the Eleventh Circuit. Successive § 2241 petitions by federal prisoners are subject to threshold dismissal in the district courts. Antonelli v. Warden, USP Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a) provides:

Id. Moreover, federal courts have concluded that, notwithstanding any limitations on § 2244(a), a successive identical habeas petition may be subject to dismissal as an abuse of the writ. See, e.g., Davis v. Fechtel, 150 F.3d 486, 491 (5th Cir. 1998) ("we need not determine whether the gatekeeping provisions of the AEDPA [apply to Petitioner's third § 2241 petition] because it clearly constitutes an abuse of the writ either under our pre—or post—AEDPA jurisprudence."); Shore v. Warden, Stateville Prison, 942 F.2d 1117, 1123 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying the law of the case doctrine to successive habeas petitions); Raulerson v. Wainwright, 753 F.2d 869, 875 (11th Cir.1985) (same); see also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 482 (1991) (recognizing that where a petitioner has filed successive habeas petitions in more than one district court, the dismissal of the first habeas petition is of "vital relevance" to later court determinations of whether to consider similar petitions).

Because this claim has already been denied by this Court and by the Eleventh Circuit, the claim is successive and an abuse of the writ. This Court declines to re-examine Petitioner's arguments that the BOP miscalculated his sentence and that he is entitled to immediate release.

Any of Petitioner's allegations not specifically addressed herein have been found to be without merit.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED and DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending motions, close this case, and enter judgment accordingly.

DONE AND ORDERED.