ORDER

ROY B. DALTON, Jr., District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on the following matters:

BACKGROUND

This Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. ("FCRA") action arises from Plaintiff Roberto Sevi's disputes concerning negative credit information about his home loan ("Loan") that appeared on credit reports starting in early 2012 ("Disputes"). (See Doc. 26.) Plaintiff contends that the negative information was furnished to consumer reporting agencies ("CRA") by his mortgage servicer, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC ("Defendant"), and despite receiving notices of Plaintiff's Disputes from Trans Union, LLC ("TU") and Experian Information Solutions, Inc. ("Experian"), Defendant never properly investigated the Disputes or corrected the information as required by 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b). (See id.) Plaintiff asserts two FCRA claims against Defendant for its purported willful and negligent conduct. (See id. ¶¶ 43-47 (willful violation claim ("Count Five")); id. ¶¶ 48-52 (negligent violation claim ("Count Six")).)

On December 11, 2013, the Court entered a Case Management and Scheduling Order ("CMSO"), which set deadlines and rules "to discourage wasteful pretrial activities, and to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the action." (See Doc. 27, pp. 1-2.) The CMSO's discovery deadline was August 29, 2014 (id. at 1); but, Plaintiff moved for a continuance. (See Doc. 48.) Absent opposition from Defendant, the Court granted the motion in part, extending the discovery deadline through September 30, 2014. (See Doc. 52.) On September 22, 2014, Plaintiff served Defendant with a subpoena noticing the Defendant's deposition pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) ("Subpoena").1 (See Doc. 101-2.) Defendant designated Sean Chibnik to testify on its behalf,2 and Plaintiff deposed him on September 30, 2014. (See Doc. 78.)

Plaintiff and Defendant filed Motions for Summary Judgment on October 31, 2014 ("SJ Motions") (see Docs. 80, 82), and they completed their summary judgment briefing on December 22, 2014 (see Docs. 84, 91, 95, 98, 99). Both parties cite testimony from the Chibnik Deposition to support their respective positions, and on December 8, 2014, Defendant also filed an Affidavit from Mr. Chibnik. (See Doc. 93-1.) In his Affidavit, Mr. Chibnik addresses matters he denied knowledge of during his Deposition. (See id.) Mr. Chibnik averred that he had refreshed his recollections after the Deposition by reviewing certain documents. (See id. at 3.) The documents—which comprised more than 100 pages—were made exhibits to the Affidavit.3 (See also id. at 4-79 (providing a redacted copy of documents produced to Plaintiff in discovery by Defendant titled "Collection History Profile"); id. at 80-110 (providing a copy of documents produced by TU in discovery titled "Consumer Relations, CRS3 ACDV Responses Automatically Updated").)

Since December 22, 2014, Plaintiff has filed three motions requesting that the Court strike the Chibnik Affidavit and reopen discovery. (See Docs. 100, 108, 114.) Plaintiff filed his first motion on December 22, 2014 (see Doc. 100), which Judge Spaulding denied because the relief requested was not permitted under the law Plaintiff cited—Rules 26(e), 37(c), and 56(d). (See Doc. 107, pp. 4-5.) Although she denied Plaintiff's Motion, Judge Spaulding agreed with Plaintiff that the Chibnik Affidavit included information that Mr. Chibnik improperly failed to provide during his deposition. (See id. at 2-4 (rejecting Defendant's argument that Plaintiff's motion was premised on an unfair, out-of-context reading of Mr. Chibnik's deposition testimony).) Plaintiff did not file Rule 72(a) objections to the Order denying his first motion.

On January 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed his second motion concerning the Chibnik Affidavit. (See Doc. 108.) This time, Plaintiff argued that Local Rule 3.09(a), the Court's CMSO, and Rule 56(e)(4) supported his request to strike, reopen discovery, and to require Defendant "to pay for all costs and fees associated with the new Rule 30(b)(6) deposition." (See id. at 1, 6 n.10, 7.) Defendant opposed (Doc. 112), and Judge Spaulding denied the Plaintiff's second Motion because: (1) Plaintiff's complaints concerning Mr. Chibnik's preparation for and responses during his deposition were untimely; (2) Plaintiff's request to reopen discovery would delay the trial, lead to further discovery disputes, and possibly moot the fully-briefed SJ Motions; and (3) the Chibnik Affidavit did not violate the requirements of Rule 56(c)(4) because Mr. Chibnik's averments were based on pertinent and detailed documents that were produced to Plaintiff in discovery, but were not used by Plaintiff during the 30(b)(6) deposition. (See Doc. 113, pp. 2-3.)

Two days after Judge Spaulding denied his second motion, Plaintiff filed a "Motion for Reconsideration" (see Doc. 114), which Defendant opposes. (Doc. 115.) Accordingly, the issue presently before the Court is whether it should strike the Chibnik Affidavit and reopen discovery to permit another Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Defendant, bearing in mind that such an Order would delay the trial that is set to commence on April 6, 2015.4 (See Doc. 110.)

DISCUSSION

As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration is appropriately considered to be a Rule 72(a) objection to Judge Spaulding's Order dated February 4, 2015. (See Docs. 113, 114.) Rule 72(a) requires that district judges "consider timely objections" to a Magistrate Judge's non-dispositive, pretrial order, "and modify or set aside any part of the order that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law." See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (permitting reconsideration of a pretrial matter "where it has been shown that the magistrate judge's order is clearly erroneous or contrary to law").

Plaintiff's specific objections are that Judge Spaulding erred in finding that: (1) Plaintiff could have promptly moved pursuant to Rule 37 to compel Defendant "to produce a corporate representative able to answer the questions at issue;" and (2) Plaintiff had ample opportunity to question Mr. Chibnik regarding the documents referenced in the Chibnik Affidavit. (See Doc. 114.) The Court does not find that either finding should be set aside as clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Rather, after careful review, the Court rejects Plaintiff's objections and affirms Magistrate Judge Spaulding's Orders in their entirety. (See Docs. 107, 113.)

First, the Court notes that Plaintiff's counsel deposed Mr. Chibnik for less than five hours,5 and he asked no questions about the available documents that Mr. Chibnik ultimately relied on in his Affidavit. Plaintiff's counsel also offered scant objection when Mr. Chibnik answered at least sixty questions with "I don't know" and answered at least another twenty-five questions by disclaiming any knowledge, awareness, or recollection of the matters queried.6 (See id. pp. 5-6, 10, 13-14, 16-33.) Rather than object, at the conclusion of his direct examination of Mr. Chibnik, or assert lack of adequate preparation of the witness, Plaintiff's counsel represented that he did not have any more questions "[s]ubject to reviewing documentation related to disputes provided to [Defendant] from [TU]." (See id. at 32.) Thus, Plaintiff's counsel did not comply with his duty to, at the time of the examination, "note on the record" any objections he may have "to a party's conduct . . ., to the manner of taking the deposition, or to any other aspect of the deposition." Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(c)(2).

Second, the Court notes that Plaintiff did not serve Defendant with the Subpoena until eight days before the extended discovery deadline (see Doc. 101-2), and the Subpoena noticed the deposition for the last day permitted for discovery—September 30, 2014 (see id). Thus, by his own actions, Plaintiff sharply limited the time he had available to remedy any problems with the Chibnik Deposition by filing a timely motion to compel deposition responses in accordance with Rules 37(a)(3)(B)(i) or (ii).7

Finally, the Court finds that Plaintiff's reliance on Local Rule 3.09(a) and the CMSO is misplaced. (See Doc. 108, p. 1 (relying on Local Rule 3.09(a), the Court's CMSO, and Rule 56(e)(4) to support his request to strike the Chibnik Affidavit and to reopen discovery).) Local Rule 3.09(a) provides that continuance of a trial "may be allowed by order of the Court for good cause shown." The Court's CMSO provides that motions to continue trial must comply with Local Rule 3.09, but "are generally denied." (Doc. 27, ¶ II.B.1.) Notably, none of Plaintiff's requests to reopen discovery (thereby necessitating a continuance of trial) complied with Local Rule 3.09(d) by including a certification from Plaintiff's counsel that Roberto Sevi had "been informed of the motion and [had] consented to it" (see Local Rule 3.09(d)). (See Docs. 100, 108, 114.) For these reasons as well, the Court agrees with Judge Spaulding's denial of Plaintiff's requests to reopen discovery and continue these proceedings.

After careful review of the record, the Court fully agrees with Judge Spaulding that Mr. Chibnik was not an adequately prepared or knowledgeable deponent as required by Rule 30(b)(6). (See Doc. 107, pp. 2-4.) However, the Court also agrees that the Plaintiff did not properly preserve his objections or file timely motions to remedy the problems that should have been evident to counsel without reference to the Chibnik Affidavit. Although the Court has no desire to reward Defendant for Mr. Chibnik's deposition conduct, the Court finds no grounds to modify or set aside any part of Judge Spaulding's Orders. Thus, the Plaintiff's objections are due to be rejected, and Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 114) is due to be denied.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:

DONE AND ORDERED.