GREGORY J. KELLY, Magistrate Judge.
The Plaintiff Stephen Lee Tanner (the "Plaintiff") brings this action on behalf of the Claimant Michelle Bonnain Tanner (the "Claimant"), who passed away after this action was filed (see Doc. No. 15 at 1-3), pursuant to the Social Security Act (the "Act"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") denying the Claimant's applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). Doc. Nos. 1, 11, 15, 16.
On June 7, 2010, Claimant filed an application for a period of disability and DIB, alleging an onset of disability beginning January 1, 2010. R. 14, 133-36. On May 17, 2012, the Administrative Law Judge (the "ALJ") issued a decision finding Claimant not disabled from January 1, 2010 through the date of the ALJ's decision. R. 14-24. On June 12, 2012, Claimant requested review of the ALJ's decision from the Appeals Council. R. 9. On September 6, 2013, the Appeals Council denied Claimant's request for review. R. 1-6.
In its order denying Claimant's request for review, the Appeals Council states the following under the heading "What We Considered":
R. 2 (emphasis added). The Appeals Council's order does two things. First, it states that the Appeals Council considered the reasons why Claimant disagrees with the ALJ's decision and "additional evidence" from Dr. Lockett. R. 2. The Appeals Council concludes that "this information does not provide a basis for changing the [ALJ's] decision." R. 2.
Second, the Appeals Council states that it "
The Appeals Council's order correctly states that Dr. Goldman's reports are dated October 29, 2012 (Doc. No. 16-3 at 1) and November 16, 2012 (Doc. No. 16-2 at 1). R. 2. Based on the date of Dr. Goldman's respective reports, the Appeals Council concludes that they do not affect the ALJ's decision because they were issued after date of the ALJ's May 17, 2012 decision. However, the October 29, 2012 report clearly states that "the earliest date that the description of symptoms and limitations [contained] in this questionnaire applies" is January 21, 2010, which is prior to the ALJ's decision and during the relevant period at issue — January 1, 2010 through May 17, 2012. Doc. No. 16-3 at 7; R. 14, 24. Similarly, Dr. Goldman's November 16, 2012 report (Doc. No. 16-2 at 1-7) includes a review of Claimant's medical condition and treatment records from at least February 3, 2009 (Doc. No. 16-2 at 4) (discussing EMG study from 2009) through October 29, 2012, a contemporaneous physical examination, and a medical opinion that the alleged onset date of Claimant's limitations is January 21, 2010, which is within the relevant time period. Doc. No. 16-2 at 1-7. Thus, both of Dr. Goldman's reports constitute retrospective medical opinions relating to the relevant time period before the ALJ's decision. Doc. Nos. 16-2; 16-3.
A claimant is entitled to present new evidence at each stage of the administrative proceedings, including on appeal to the District Court. See Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1261. The Appeals Council is require to consider new and material evidence presented to it for the first time if it relates to the period on or before the date of the ALJ's decision. See Keeton v. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994); Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1261; 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b), 416.1470(b) ("Appeals council shall evaluate the entire record including the new and material evidence submitted to it
In Carey v. Colvin, No. 8:12-cv-2362-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 7788475, at *3-5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2014), the court was presented with factually analogous circumstances. There, the ALJ decided the case on July 8, 2011. Carey, 2014 WL 7788475, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2014). The claimant presented new evidence to the Appeals Council, some of which was not contained in the certified administrative record to the district court on appeal, but which was provided by the claimant in his briefing to the district court. Id. at *4 n.3 (providing that the December 6, 2011 medical source statement given to the Appeals Council was not contained in the record but was submitted by the claimant). The key piece of evidence submitted to the Appeals Council, but not contained in the record was a medical source statement dated December 6, 2011, which post-dated the ALJ's decision. Id. at *4. "The Appeals Council determined that [the December 6, 2011 medical source statement] related to the time period after the ALJ rendered his opinion and did not pertain to the ALJ's decision regarding disability before July 8, 2011." Id. The Court found that the Appeals Council's determination was erroneous because the medical source statement "referred to [the claimant's] mental symptoms before July 8, 2011." Id. at *4-5.
In Carey, the Court held that the Appeals Council's determination was erroneous but, moreover, its failure "to include in the administrative record all of the new evidence it reviewed .. . makes it impossible for the district court to determine whether the Appeals Council correctly rejected the evidence submitted after the ALJ's decision." Id. at *5. The Court concluded that remand was necessary under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The Court finds Carey persuasive, warranting the same result. In this case, the Claimant submitted new evidence to the Appeals Council, which includes medical opinions from Dr. Goldman that relate to the relevant time period and which, if credited, provide more restrictive limitations than those determined by the ALJ. See R. 2, 17 (the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment); Doc. Nos. 16-2 at 5-7 (Dr. Goldman's medical opinion reflecting more severe limitations); 16-3 at 1-7 (same). The Appeals Council incorrectly determined that Dr. Goldman's records did not relate to the time period before the ALJ's decision, failed to make those records part of the administrative record, and denied Claimant's request for review without considering Dr. Goldman's opinions. R. 2, 5-6. The Court finds that the Appeals Council's actions with respect to Dr. Goldman's records constitute an error of law requiring reversal under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). See Keeton, 21 F.3d at 1066; Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1260 ("failure to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates reversal); Carey, 2014 WL 7788475, at *4-5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2014).
For the reasons stated above, it is