JAMES S. MOODY, Jr., District Judge.
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Petitioner's pro se
Petitioner filed a timely § 2255 petition on May 7, 2012, raising nine grounds for relief. (CR Doc. 66). The Court denied Grounds 3 through 9 of the petition, but scheduled an evidentiary hearing as to Grounds 1 and 2. (CR Doc. 71). Following the evidentiary hearing, the Court granted Ground 1 of the petition, permitting Petitioner to file an out-of-time appeal, and denied Ground 2. (CR Doc. 73). Petitioner subsequently filed a notice of appeal raising two issues: (1) the government failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut beyond a reasonable doubt his defense of entrapment; and (2) the court erred in setting his offense level as an armed career criminal at 34 under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) based on its conclusion that he possessed a gun in connection with a drug offense. (CR Doc. 74). The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's convictions and sentences. (CR Doc. 82). Petitioner then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, but the petition was denied. (CR Doc. 84).
Petitioner timely filed the current petition under § 2255 on April 17, 2015, raising six grounds for relief: (1) trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate, interview, and subpoena witnesses; (2) trial counsel was ineffective by failing to move to strike a juror who made a biased comment during voir dire and appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on direct appeal;
Generally, under § 2255, a petitioner is permitted to file a single petition and is barred from filing a successive petition. See Stewart v. United States, 646 F.3d 856, 859 (11th Cir. 2011). If a petition is deemed successive, the petitioner must seek certification from the appropriate court of appeals that the petition contains
§ 2255(h). However, "the phrase `second or successive' is not self-defining and does not refer to all habeas applications filed second or successively in time." Stewart, 646 F.3d at 859. "`[C]laims based on a factual predicate not previously discoverable are successive,' but `[i]f . . . the purported defect did not arise, or the claim did not ripen, until after the conclusion of the previous petition, the later petition based on that defect may be non-successive.'" Id. at 863 (quoting Leal Garcia v. Quarterman, 573 F.3d 214, 221, 222 (5th Cir. 2009)).
In his present petition, Petitioner raises several grounds that are barred by the prohibition on successive habeas petitions. Namely, Grounds 1, 2, 5, and, 6, which allege claims for ineffective assistance of trial counsel, are based upon facts known to Petitioner at the time he filed his first § 2255 petition and are therefore barred as successive. Grounds 2, 3, 4, and 6, however, also raise claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Petitioner was permitted to file an appeal as a result of his original § 2255 petition. Thus, any claims related to that appeal did not ripen until after the original § 2255 petition had been considered. Because the basis for these claims did not arise until after Petitioner filed his original § 2255 petition, they are not barred as successive.
Accordingly, it is therefore
1. Grounds 1 and 5 of the petition (CV Docs. 1, 2) are
2. Grounds 2 and 6 of the petition (CV Docs. 1, 2) are
3. The Government shall show cause within
4. As part of the initial pleading required by paragraph three (3) of this Order, the Government shall also
5. Henceforth, Petitioner shall mail one copy of every pleading, exhibit, and/or correspondence, along with a certificate of service indicating the date an accurate copy was mailed, to the Government attorney listed as counsel of record in this case.
6. Petitioner shall advise the Court of any change of address. Failure to do so will result in the case being dismissed for failure to prosecute.
7. Petitioner may have