SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court upon a petition for habeas corpus relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Oscar Mejia-Rojo ("Petitioner") who is presently confined at the Okeechobee Correctional Institution in Okeechobee, Florida (
Upon due consideration of the pleadings and the state-court record, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief. Because the Court may resolve the petition on the basis of the record, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (if the record refutes the factual allegations in the petition or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary hearing).
On July 8, 2008, a jury found Petitioner guilty of attempted first degree murder with a firearm, improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon, and two counts of aggravated assault (Ex. 1A at 109-113).
On March 5, 2011, Petitioner filed a post-conviction motion pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 3.850 motion) (Ex. 3A). After an evidentiary hearing (Ex. 3B at 133-189), the motion was denied. Id. at 191-198. Florida's Second DCA per curiam affirmed (Ex. 4).
Pursuant to the AEDPA, federal habeas relief may not be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the claim:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is both mandatory and difficult to meet. White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). A state court's summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits which warrants deference. Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008). Notably, a state court's violation of
"Clearly established federal law" consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issued its decision. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702; Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)). That said, the Supreme Court has also explained that "the lack of a Supreme Court decision on nearly identical facts does not by itself mean that there is no clearly established federal law, since `a general standard' from [the Supreme Court's] cases can supply such law." Marshall v. Rodgers, 133 S.Ct. 1446, 1449 (2013) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). State courts "must reasonably apply the rules `squarely established' by [the Supreme] Court's holdings to the facts of each case. White, 134 S. Ct. at 1706 (quoting Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009)).
Even if there is clearly established federal law on point, habeas relief is only appropriate if the state court decision was "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of," that federal law. 29 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court either: (1) applied a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by Supreme Court case law; or (2) reached a different result from the Supreme Court when faced with materially indistinguishable facts. Ward v. Hall, 592 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir. 2010); Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 16 (2003).
A state court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of the Supreme Court's precedents if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle, but applies it to the facts of the petitioner's case in an objectively unreasonable manner, Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 134 (2005); Bottoson v. Moore, 234 F.3d 526, 531 (11th Cir. 2000), or "if the state court either unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court] precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply." Bottoson, 234 F.3d at 531 (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 406). The petitioner must show that the state court's ruling was "so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." White, 134 S. Ct. at 1702 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)). Moreover, "it is not an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law for a state court to decline to apply a specific legal rule that has not been squarely established by [the Supreme] Court." Knowles, 556 U.S. at 122.
Finally, when reviewing a claim under § 2254(d), a federal court must bear in mind that any "determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct[,]" and the petitioner bears "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) ("a decision adjudicated on the merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding") (dictum); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S.Ct. 10, 15-16 (2013) (same).
In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court established a two-part test for determining whether a convicted person is entitled to relief on the ground that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance. 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). A petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. This is a "doubly deferential" standard of review that gives both the state court and the petitioner's attorney the benefit of the doubt. Burt, 134 S. Ct. at 13 (citing Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011)).
The focus of inquiry under Strickland's performance prong is "reasonableness under prevailing professional norms." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89. In reviewing counsel's performance, a court must adhere to a strong presumption that "counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. Indeed, the petitioner bears the heavy burden to "prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's performance was unreasonable[.]" Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). A court must "judge the reasonableness of counsel's conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct," applying a "highly deferential" level of judicial scrutiny. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690).
As to the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, Petitioner's burden to demonstrate prejudice is high. Wellington v. Moore, 314 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002). Prejudice "requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. That is, "[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. At 694. A reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
The AEDPA precludes federal courts, absent exceptional circumstances, from granting habeas relief unless a petitioner has exhausted all means of available relief under state law. Specifically, the AEDPA provides, in pertinent part:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2012).
Exhaustion of state remedies requires that the state prisoner "fairly presen[t] federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights[.]" Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971)). The petitioner must apprise the state court of the federal constitutional issue, not just the underlying facts of the claim or a similar state law claim. Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732 (11th Cir. 1998). In addition, a federal habeas court is precluded from considering claims that are not exhausted but would clearly be barred if returned to state court. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 735 n.1 (1991) (if a petitioner has failed to exhaust state remedies and the state court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred, there is a procedural default for federal habeas purposes regardless of the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner actually presented his claims). Finally, a federal court must dismiss those claims or portions of claims that have been denied on adequate and independent procedural grounds under state law. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. If a petitioner attempts to raise a claim in a manner not permitted by state procedural rules, he is barred from pursuing the same claim in federal court. Alderman v. Zant, 22 F.3d 1541, 1549 (11th Cir. 1994).
Procedural default will be excused only in two narrow circumstances. First, a petitioner may obtain federal review of a procedurally defaulted claim if he can show both "cause" for the default and actual "prejudice" resulting from the default. "To establish cause for procedural default, a petitioner must demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the claim properly in state court." Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show that there is at least a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003).
The second exception, known as the fundamental miscarriage of justice, only occurs in an extraordinary case, where a "constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent[.]" Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 479-80 (1986). Actual innocence means factual innocence, not legal insufficiency. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998). To meet this standard, a petitioner must "show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him" of the underlying offense. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). In addition, "[t]o be credible, a claim of actual innocence must be based on [new] reliable evidence not presented at trial." Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 559 (1998) (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324).
Petitioner argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for a judgment of acquittal (
The trial court record shows that defense counsel made a motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's case (T. at 468). In support of the motion, defense counsel asserted that, although Petitioner had made threats against the victim prior to the date of the shooting, nobody had testified as to the precise date on which those threats were made. Id. at 469. Counsel also argued that the state had not proven aggravated assault against any of the remaining victims. Id. at 469-472. In response, the prosecutor argued:
Id. at 473-74. The motion for a judgment of acquittal was denied. Id. at 478.
A denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal ordinarily presents an issue of state law. It only presents a claim of constitutional dimension when the petitioner asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, and as a result of the deficiency, there was a violation of due process of law. Respondent argues that Petitioner advanced no argument at the state level indicating that he suffered a due process violation (
Even assuming arguendo that Claim One was exhausted in the state courts, Petitioner is not entitled to relief because his assertions are without merit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) ("An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be denied on the merits, notwithstanding the failure of the applicant to exhaust the remedies available in the courts of the state."). On federal habeas review, the question for this Court concerning the sufficiency of evidence in a state court proceeding is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Petitioner cannot meet this burden.
Under Florida law, premeditation is the essential element that distinguishes first-degree murder from second-degree murder. See Green v. State, 715 So.2d 940, 943 (Fla. 1998). Premeditation is defined as:
Wilson v. State, 493 So.2d 1019, 1021 (Fla. 1986), receded from on other grounds by Evans v. State, 838 So.2d 1090 (Fla. 2002).
At Petitioner's trial, the victim testified that after she ended her relationship with Petitioner, she sought to obtain child support for their son (T. at 259). Petitioner came to the victim's home and asked about a paper he had received regarding his obligation to pay child support. Id. at 261. When the victim refused to explain, Petitioner told her that he was going to kill her in front of her grandmother's house so that she would die in front of her family. Id. at 262. Two days later, Petitioner came to the home of the victim's grandmother (where the victim was staying) and began arguing with her about the child support papers. Id. at 263. Before the argument, he turned his son's car seat to face away from the room. Id. at 269. He forced the victim to sit in a chair and pulled a handgun from his pocket. Id. at 267. The victim was frightened and told Petitioner that she would not seek child support. Id. Petitioner pushed the victim down in the chair and shot her in the head in front of the victim's children, her two sisters, and her three-year-old niece. Id. at 267-68, 269.
The victim's sister, Angelica Faustino ("Faustino"), testified that after Petitioner came to the house on the day of the shooting, he became angry with the victim and began hitting her (T. at 288). He eventually pushed the victim down on a chair and shot her in the head. Id. at 289. He told Faustino that she was going to watch her sister die and that she would be responsible for the victim's children. Id. Another sister, Elizabeth Ibarra ("Ibarra"), testified that prior to the shooting, she overheard Petitioner tell the victim that he would kill her at her grandmother's house. Id. at 309. She watched Petitioner shoot the victim in the head. Id.
Given Petitioner's prior threat to kill the victim and his actions of putting the gun to the victim's head and telling Faustino that she was going to watch her die, a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner's shooting of the victim was premeditated. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Pagan v. State, 830 So.2d 792 (Fla. 2002) (a defendant's statement of his intent to kill may be direct evidence of premeditation). Moreover, given that three witnesses testified that Petitioner shot the victim, a rational trier of fact could have concluded that Petitioner was the actual shooter. Petitioner has not stated a due process violation based on insufficiency of the evidence. In addition to being unexhausted, Claim One is denied on the merits.
Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to call Gerardo Gonzalez and Erick Mejia as defense witnesses at his trial (
Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion, and after an evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied the claim:
(Ex. 3B at 195). The post-conviction court's adjudication of this claim was affirmed by Florida's Second District Court of Appeal (Ex. 4). A review of the record supports the state courts' denial of this claim.
At the evidentiary hearing on this issue, Petitioner testified that he told both of his defense attorneys that Gonazlez and Mejia needed to be called as witnesses on his behalf, but that he was met with refusal and no explanation (Ex. 3B at 150-51). In contrast, defense attorney Mary Fletcher ("Fletcher") testified that Petitioner had never mentioned Gonzalez or Mejia. Id. at 162. Likewise, defense attorney Giancarlo Nicolosi ("Nicolosi") testified that he never heard Petitioner mention Gonzalez or Mejia. Id. at 173. Moreover, prior to trial, a Nelson hearing was conducted on a motion in which Petitioner claimed that defense counsel was ineffective (Ex. 3A at 78). At the hearing, Petitioner complained that Fletcher was generally unprepared, but when asked what Petitioner had asked her to do, he replied, "To talk to me about my case, to come to see me, to find out what was going on, but she never answered. . . . I cannot go to trial with her because every time she comes to see me or she (inaudible) apologize. And she wants me to take a contract to avoid going to trial, and I cannot do that." Id. at 83. Despite being provided an opportunity to explain counsel's alleged deficiencies in detail, Petitioner made no mention at the Nelson hearing that he had asked Fletcher to call Gonzalez and Mejia as defense witnesses or that she had refused to do so.
The post-conviction court recognized that Petitioner's testimony was in direct conflict with that of Fletcher and Nicolosi, but explicitly found counsels' testimony to be more credible (Ex. 3B at 195). Questions of the credibility and demeanor of a witness are questions of fact. Freund v. Butterworth, 165 F.3d 839, 862 (11th Cir. 1999). The AEDPA affords a presumption of correctness to a factual determination made by a state court, and the habeas petitioner has the burden of overcoming the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). Moreover, determining the credibility of a witness, "is the province and function of the state courts, not a federal court engaging in habeas review." Consalvo v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 664 F.3d 842, 845 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Gore v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 492 F.3d 1273, 1300 (11th Cir. 2007) (recognizing that while reviewing court also gives a certain amount of deference to credibility determinations, that deference is heightened on habeas review) (citing Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2006) ("[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might disagree about the [witness'] credibility, but on habeas review that does not suffice to supersede the trial court's credibility determination")). Federal habeas courts have "no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but not by them." Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983).
Petitioner has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state court unreasonably determined that Petitioner's testimony was not credible. Therefore, the post-conviction court reasonably concluded that Petitioner had not informed Fletcher or Nicolosi of these putative witnesses. Counsel's performance is not deficient for failing to call a witness of whom he or she is unaware. Petitioner has not satisfied the first prong of Strickland, and he is not entitled to federal habeas relief on Claim Two. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (Because the petitioner bears the burden of satisfying both prongs of the test, the Court need not "address both components of the inquiry if the [petitioner] makes an insufficient showing on one.").
Petitioner asserts that counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare and present a defense (
Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion (Ex. 3A at 11-15). However, the post-conviction court explained to Plaintiff that his claim, as currently presented, offered "no more than conclusory statements, does not point to any facts or law which support the claim, [and does not] demonstrate a deficiency in performance that prejudiced the defense." Id. at 51. The post-conviction dismissed this claim with leave to amend pursuant to Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754 (Fla. 2007). Id. at 52. Petitioner failed to file an amended Rule 3.850 motion within the allotted time, and Claim Two was dismissed with a notice that Petitioner was foreclosed from reasserting the claim (Ex. 3B at 192; Ex. 3A at 125). Petitioner did not appeal the post-conviction court's dismissal of this claim.
Respondent urges that Claim Three is unexhausted because, although Petitioner raised it in his Rule 3.850 motion, he did not reference the claim in his brief on appeal (
Pursuant to Rule 9.141(b)(3) of the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure, failure to fully brief and argue points on appeal after receiving an evidentiary hearing on a Rule 3.850 motion constitutes a waiver of those claims. See Leonard v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 807, 808 (5th Cir. 1979) (Florida prisoner must appeal denial of Rule 3.850 relief to exhaust remedies);
Petitioner does not contend that he specifically appealed the issues raised in Claim Three. Nor has he shown cause for and actual prejudice from the default or presented new and reliable evidence to demonstrate that he is actually innocent of the underlying offense. Rather, he argues only that the post-conviction court erred by not addressing this claim because "as written in Petitioner's 3.850 motion, [it] is far from insufficient." (
Any further attempt at exhaustion in Florida courts would be futile because a second appeal would be untimely and procedurally barred under Florida law. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(k) (allowing 30 days for an appeal of a post-conviction court's rejection of a Rule 3.850 motion); Parker v. Dugger, 876 F.2d 1470 (11th Cir. 1989) (where dismissal to allow exhaustion of unexhausted claims would be futile due to state procedural bar, claims are considered procedurally barred in federal court), rev'd on other grounds, 498 U.S. 308 (1991). Claims Three is dismissed as unexhausted and procedurally barred.
Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a proper hearing pursuant to Nelson v. State, 274 So.2d 256 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973) (
Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion, and the post-conviction court dismissed the claim as procedurally barred because "[a] rule 3.850 motion cannot be used to review ordinary trial errors reviewable by means of direct appeal, and cannot be used to provide a second appeal or to provide an alternative to direct appeal." (Ex. 3A at 52). The dismissal was per curiam affirmed by Florida's Second District Court of Appeal (Ex. 4).
A petitioner requesting a federal court to issue a writ of habeas corpus must present his claims to the state courts in a procedurally correct manner. Upshaw v. Singletary, 70 F.3d 576, 579 (11th Cir. 1995). The procedurally correct way to raise a claim of trial court error in the Florida state courts is by direct appeal. See Sampson v. State, 845 So.2d 271, 272 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (claims of trial court error should be raised on direct appeal); Hampton v. State, 886 So.2d 319 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) (a trial court's decision on a defendant's request to have counsel removed is reviewable upon direct appeal).
In Florida, a District Court of Appeal's per curiam affirmance of a circuit court's ruling explicitly based on procedural default "is a clear and express statement of its reliance on an independent and adequate state ground which bars consideration by the federal courts." Harmon v. Barton, 894 F.2d 1268, 1273 (11th Cir. 1990). Because Petitioner failed to properly raise in appropriate state court proceedings a claim of trial court error based upon his allegedly unfair Nelson hearing, resulting in the application of a procedural bar by the state courts, the claim is likewise procedurally barred from review in this Court. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate cause for not raising this claim in the state courts or actual prejudice resulting from the error of which he complains. Nor has Petitioner presented new and reliable evidence to demonstrate that he is actually innocent of the underlying offense. Therefore, Petitioner cannot overcome the bar, and Claim Four is dismissed as unexhausted and procedurally barred.
Petitioner asserts that he was offered a plea of twenty-five years in prison on the morning of trial, but that Nicolosi
Petitioner raised this claim in his Rule 3.850 motion, and an evidentiary hearing was held on the claim (Ex. 3B). After the hearing, the post-conviction court denied the claim:
Id. at 196-197. The post-conviction court's rejection of this claim was per curiam affirmed by Florida's Second District Court of Appeal (Ex. 4). The post-conviction court's factual findings are supported by the record.
At the evidentiary hearing on this claim, Petitioner testified that before the week of trial, Fletcher tried very hard to get him to accept a twenty-five year offer from the state (Ex. 3B at 154). He said that Fletcher told him that the maximum he would receive if convicted was thirty years in prison. Id. He told the post-conviction court that, had he realized that the maximum was life, he would have accepted the offer. Id. at 157. In contrast, Fletcher testified that she told Petitioner that the maximum sentence he faced was life in prison. Id. at 163. She testified that she had tried to negotiate something with the prosecutor, but the only offer she ever received was life in prison. Id. at 164. Nicolosi also testified that Petitioner was told the maximum sentence he faced was life in prison. Id. at 173. Nicolosi said that he discussed a possible twenty-five year sentence with Petitioner in hopes that he could negotiate such with the prosecutor, but that the state attorney never agreed to anything but a life sentence. Id. at 175-176.
By concluding that this claim lacked merit, the post-conviction court implicitly found that counsels' versions of events were more reliable than Petitioner's. See Marshall, 459 U.S. 422, 433 (1983) (applying the presumption of correctness to implicit finding against the defendant's credibility, where that finding was necessarily part of the court's rejection of the defendant's claim). Petitioner has offered no clear and convincing evidence to rebut the state court's credibility finding. Moreover, even had counsel misadvised Petitioner about his maximum sentence, and even had Petitioner misunderstood Nicolosi's discussions regarding a possible twenty-five year sentence, Petitioner has not shown that an offer was, in fact, made by the state. Accordingly, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice from any alleged mis-advice or misunderstanding.
Petitioner has failed to satisfy the second prong of Strickland and is denied pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Petitioner asserts that he was denied a fair trial, due process, and equal protection of the law from the cumulative effect of counsel's ineffectiveness (
Any of Petitioner's allegations not specifically addressed herein have been found to be without merit.
Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court must first issue a certificate of appealability ("COA"). "A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, Petitioner must demonstrate that "reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that "the issues presented were `adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.'" Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 335-36. Petitioner has not made the requisite showing in these circumstances.
Because Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.
Accordingly, it is hereby
1. The Florida Attorney General is
2. Claims One, Three, and Four of the 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for habeas corpus relief filed by Oscar Mejia-Rojo (
3. Petitioner is
4. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending motions, enter judgment accordingly, and close this case.
