SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendant, SA-ENC Operator Holdings, LLC's (Citrus Gardens) Motion for Summary Judgment (
Plaintiff, Ronald Armbrust, was originally hired by Citrus Gardens as the Staff Developer (
In early September 2013, Armbrust began to experience pain in his abdominal area. Armbrust stated these symptoms were similar to symptoms he had previously experienced in 2010 which resulted in an earlier abdominal surgery. In late September 2013, Plaintiff spoke with Defendant's Citrus Gardens, human resources clerk, Lenora Aimes-Salmon, regarding his symptoms, possible need for medical leave and his FMLA rights and eligibility. (
On October 2, 2013, Armbrust met with his supervisor Susie Jensvold, a nurse consultant, with Citrus Gardens. Jensvold testified at her deposition that Armbrust informed her that his blood pressure and health was being affected by his responsibilities as Citrus Gardens' DON. (
On October 8, 2013, Armbrust informed Jensvold that he was experiencing very similar symptoms to the 2010 abdominal issue, and that if the symptoms continued he would need to seek medical treatment which may require an extended period of medical leave. (Doc. #38, ¶4). Also on October 8, 2013, Plaintiff informed Ms. Jensvold, that he would need surgery on October 18, 2013, and would be taking FMLA leave as soon as he became eligible. (Doc. #38, ¶¶ 6-7). On the morning of October 10, 2013, Plaintiff spoke with Ms. Aimes-Salmon in the Human Resources office at Citrus Gardens. Aimes-Salmon said she would prepare the FMLA paperwork and make arrangements for Plaintiff to sign it by the end of business on October 16, 2013. (Doc. #38, ¶ 8).
On October 14, 2013, Citrus Gardens made an offer to Phyllis Russ to become DON beginning on November 11, 2013.
On November 11, 2013, while Plaintiff was on FMLA leave, Russ commenced her employment with Citrus Gardens as permanent DON. (Doc. #31-1, 63:14-22). The new administrator, Mike Ward, also stated that when he met with Armbrust on December 6, 2013, that Armbrust said he was looking forward to resuming his position as Staff Developer. Nevertheless, on December 12, 2013, Armbrust sent a letter and medical release to Ward notifying him that he intended to return to work in his position as DON on January 13, 2014.
Ward testified that he called Armbrust two (2) times during the week of January 6, 2014, to arrange Armbrust's return to work. Ward stated that each time he left a message informing Armbrust that he was to report back to work on January 13, 2014, at 10:00am. Armbrust did not return Ward's calls.
Citrus Gardens' bereavement policy allows for three consecutive days off with pay to be used during the period between the day of death and the day following the burial of an immediate family member.
Ward told Armbrust when he spoke to him that he would inform the corporate office of Armbrust's request but states he never approved the bereavement leave from January 13, 2014, to January 16, 2014.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party.
The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact.
Among the substantive rights granted by the FMLA to eligible employees are the right to "[twelve] 12 work weeks of leave during any [twelve] 12-month period. . . . [b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee," 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1), and the right following leave "to be restored by the employer to the position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced" or to an equivalent position, 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). To preserve the availability of these rights, and to enforce them, the FMLA creates two types of claims: interference claims, in which an employee asserts that his employer denied or otherwise interfered with his substantive rights under the Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), and retaliation claims, in which an employee asserts that his employer discriminated against him because he engaged in activity protected by the Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) & (2); 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) ("An employer is prohibited from discriminating against employees . . . who have used FMLA leave."). To state a claim of interference with a substantive right, an employee need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to the benefit denied.
Armbrust's Complaint states two (2) counts against Citrus Garden. Count I alleges Citrus Gardens interfered with his rights under the FMLA and Count II states Citrus Gardens retaliated against him for taking leave time under the FMLA. Citrus Gardens argues summary judgment is proper as to Count I because the Plaintiff did not return to work at the end of the twelve (12) week FMLA leave period. Citrus Gardens states summary judgment must be granted as to Count II because Armbrust cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation or if he can then it had legitimate reasons for terminating his employment.
Armbrust claims that Citrus Gardens refusal to return him to his position as DON upon his return from FMLA leave constitutes unlawful interference with his FMLA rights. According to the Eleventh Circuit, "[t]o state a claim of interference with a substantive right, an employee need only demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to the benefit denied."
Citrus Gardens states it did not interfere with Armbrust's FMLA rights by not reinstating him to his position as DON at the end of his FMLA leave time, because Armbrust did not return to his employment when his leave expired. According to Citrus Gardens, Armbrust's FMLA leave expired on January 9, 2014, however, it is undisputed that Armbrust received permission to return to work on January 13, 2014. Citrus Gardens argues that when Armbrust failed to return on January 10, 2014, he waived his right to reinstatement because the time from January 10, 2014, up to January 13, 2014, was not FMLA leave time but voluntary time given by Citrus Gardens—time not covered by the FMLA.
While Citrus Gardens maintains that Armbrust was scheduled to return on January 13, 2014, Armbrust states his return date was scheduled to be January 16, 2014. Armbrust bases his return date on the conversation he had with Ward on January 10, 2014. On January 10, 2014, Armbrust requested an additional three (3) days from January 13, 2014, through January 15, 2014, before returning to work on January 16, 2014, due to the death of his grandmother which occurred on January 5, 2014.
Employers may choose to give their employees more leave time than the FMLA mandates, but as the Eleventh Circuit has found that "[t]he statute does not suggest that the 12 week entitlement may be extended."
While Armbrust argues that he was denied his right to reinstatement under the FMLA to his prior position or its equivalent, he was given the full twelve (12) weeks of FMLA leave which expired on January 9, 2014. Whether Armbrust was scheduled to return to work on the January 13, 2014, or January 16, 2014, is irrelevant to his interference claim, because it is undisputed that he was given the full twelve (12) weeks under the FMLA and his termination occurred after his FMLA leave expired.
Armbrust cannot prove that he was denied any benefit to which he was entitled under the FMLA.
Citrus Gardens argues that summary judgment should be granted because the Plaintiff cannot prove retaliation under the FMLA. Armbrust argues that he met all of the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case of retaliation pursuant to the FMLA.
"Demonstrating a prima facie case is not onerous; it requires only that the plaintiff establish facts adequate to permit an inference of discrimination."
In this instance, Armbrust does not argue that he has direct evidence of discrimination against him. Instead he relies on the burden-shifting framework found the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas. "Under that framework, the plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination."
Armbrust argues he engaged in statutorily protected conduct by taking FMLA leave for a serious medical condition and by expressly asserting his right to reinstatement as DON in his December 12, 2014 letter to Citrus Gardens. It is undisputed that Armbrust qualified for FMLA as of October 18, 2013, and that he began his leave on that date. Thus, Armbrust has established that he engaged in protected activity.
Armbrust suffered an adverse employment action when he was terminated from his position as at Citrus Gardens on January 14, 2014.
Armbrust alleges that Citrus Gardens terminated his employment because he availed himself of a protected right under the FMLA. Citrus Gardens argues that Armbrust cannot prove causation because the time he applied for FMLA leave October 16, 2013, and the time he was terminated January 14, 2014, was over three (3) months. As such, Citrus Gardens contends that the temporal proximity from the alleged protected conduct, taking FMLA leave on October 18, 2013, and his termination on January 14, 2014, was too far removed in time to establish causation.
A review of the facts shows that Armbrust originally informed Citrus Gardens that he was considering taking FMLA leave as early as September 2013. Citrus Gardens begin the process of replacing Armbrust as DON in early October 2013. Armbrust's replacement was hired on November 11, 2013, while Armbrust was still on FMLA leave, only a few weeks after he began his leave under the FMLA on October 18, 2013. Citrus Gardens' action would therefore, prevent Armbrust from being reinstated.
Armbrust testified that he never told any of the staff members or supervisors at Citrus Gardens he wanted to return to his previous position as Staff Developer rather than as DON. In fact on December 12, 2013, Armbrust sent a letter to Ward, Citrus Garden's administrator, stating that he wanted to return to his position as DON upon the completion of his FMLA leave. As part of its rationale for terminating Armbrust, Citrus Gardens cited to his December 12, 2013 letter stating that he wanted to return to his position as DON after his FMLA leave expired because it contradicted his earlier statements that he wanted to step down as DON. His termination occurred within a few days of the expiration of his FMLA leave.
Looking at the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Citrus Gardens had advanced notice of Armbrust's intention to take FMLA leave and began to seek a replacement for the DON position. Citrus Gardens took action to replace Armbrust while he was out on FMLA leave and terminated his employment within a few days of same. Armbrust has set forth facts sufficient to permit an inference of causation connecting his termination and his FMLA leave. See
Citrus Gardens argues that it had a legitimate reasons to terminate Armbrust from his employment. Citrus Gardens contends Armbrust was terminated because: (1) he failed to return to work on January 13, 2014, as previously agreed, and (2) he insisted returning to work as DON—a position from which he had resigned and for which Citrus Gardens had hired a replacement prior to Plaintiff's FMLA leave—creating concerns for Citrus Gardens regarding his credibility. Terminating an individual's employment for failing to return to work as agreed after an extended medical leave and for credibility issues are both legitimate reasons to fire someone. Having found that Citrus Gardens reasons for terminating Armbrust are legitimate, the Court must now look to see if those reasons were merely a pretext.
Armbrust argues that Citrus Gardens' reasons for terminating him were a pretext for his taking FMLA leave. If the employer presents legitimate reasons for an employee's termination, the employee must then show that the employer's proffered reason was pretextual by presenting evidence "sufficient to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the reasons given by the employer were not the real reasons for the adverse employment decision."
Citrus Gardens contends that Armbrust cannot demonstrate pretext by arguing he was approved for bereavement leave up to January 16, 2014. Citrus Gardens states that Armbrust knew he was to return on January 13, 2014.
Contrary to Citrus Gardens' position, Armbrust argues that Ward approved his return date for January 16, 2014, when they spoke on the phone on January 10, 2014.
Citrus Gardens further argues that Armbrust was terminated because he had a credibility problem. As noted above, Citrus Gardens states that Armbrust stepped down as DON but then later claimed he did not. Contrary to Citrus Garden's position, Armbrust argues that he never informed anyone at Citrus Gardens that he was stepping down as DON. In fact, Armbrust had Skolnik list his position as DON on his FMLA leave application forms and wrote a letter on December 12, 2013, stating he would return to his position as DON when his leave was up.
The date of return and the position to which Armbrust would return create genuine issues of material fact that go directly to the pretext argument. Summary judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Therefore, the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count II is due to be denied.
Armbrust argues that Citrus Gardens should be equitably estopped from denying his reinstatement on the grounds that his FMLA leave had expired on January 9, 2014. Although most of the other Circuit Courts apply the equitable estoppel doctrine to the FMLA, the Eleventh Circuit has not adopted the equitable estoppel doctrine in the FMLA context.
Even if the Court was inclined to consider Armbrust's equitable estoppel argument, his position would not be well taken. Armbrust argues Ward misrepresented to him that he could return to work on January 16, 2014, however, at that time Armbrust's FMLA leave had already expired. Armbrust would have the Court apply his estoppel argument to his proposed bereavement leave which he claims was from January 13, 2014, up to January 16, 2014. Contrary to Armbrust's position, his FMLA benefits expired on January 9, 2014, and his bereavement leave could not, at that time, qualify as FMLA leave as he had used up his entire twelve (12) week FMLA leave time. Therefore, his FMLA equitable estoppel argument would fail.
Accordingly, it is now
The Defendant, SA-ENC Operator Holdings, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment