ORDER

STEVEN D. MERRYDAY, District Judge.

Kevin L. Sosa applies for the writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1) and challenges the validity of his state conviction for armed burglary of a dwelling. Sosa alleges two grounds of trial court error and two grounds of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Numerous exhibits ("Respondent's Exhibit ___") support the response. (Doc. 18)

FACTS1

Sosa and the victim had a dispute over a debt. Sosa, armed with a gun, and co-defendant Steven Velez (both acquaintances of the victim) kicked down the front door of the victim's apartment and entered the apartment without permission. The victim barricaded himself in the bathroom. Velez "beat on the [bathroom] door" with a stick to try to get the door to open. Although he could not see Sosa or Velez, the victim heard and recognized their voices. The victim heard Velez tell Sosa to "kill [the victim]." Unable to get into the bathroom, Sosa and Velez fled the apartment. The victim left the bathroom and saw Sosa running away from the apartment. Sosa and Velez were arrested and charged with armed burglary. Velez pleaded guilty and testified against Sosa. A jury convicted Sosa of armed burglary and he serves twenty-five years imprisonment.

I. EXHAUSTION AND PROCEDURAL BAR

Grounds One and Four

In ground one Sosa contends that the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury on the elements of the "intended" crime.2 In ground four Sosa contends that the trial judge erred by giving a "combined instruction" that did not differentiate entering with permission from entering without permission. Sosa claims that both errors violated his federal right to due process. The respondent argues that both ground one and ground four are unexhausted and procedurally barred. Sosa in his reply (Doc. 21) denies that a procedural bar precludes federal review of the merits of both grounds.

First, to the extent Sosa argues that the trial judge erred under state law or state procedural rules, he cannot obtain relief. Subject matter jurisdiction does not lie to address either ground one or ground four because neither ground presents a federal constitutional question. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983) ("[T]he Due Process Clause does not permit the federal courts to engage in a finely tuned review of the wisdom of state evidentiary rules."), and Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) ("[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions."). The limitation on federal habeas review to a ground alleging a federal constitutional error applies with equal force when the ground, which actually involves a state law issue, is couched in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment due process violation. Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988); Willeford v. Estelle, 538 F.2d 1194, 1198 (5th Cir. 1976).3 Consequently, neither ground one nor ground four warrants relief.

Notwithstanding cognizability, a procedural bar precludes a merits review of each ground. Although he raised both grounds in his brief on direct appeal, Sosa argued a violation of only state law — not federal law — and cited only state cases. The failure to present a federal due process claim to the state court renders the claim unexhausted. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) and (b)(1)(C), before a federal court may grant relief, a federal habeas applicant must exhaust, either on direct appeal or in a state post-conviction motion, every available state court remedy for challenging his conviction. "[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas [application]." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). See also Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003) ("A state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief cannot raise a federal constitutional claim in federal court unless he first properly raised the issue in the state courts.") (citations omitted). To exhaust a claim, an applicant must present the state court with the particular legal basis for relief in addition to the facts supporting the claim. See Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Exhaustion of state remedies requires that the state prisoner `fairly presen[t] federal claims to the state courts in order to give the State the opportunity to pass on and correct alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights.'") (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)). The prohibition against raising an unexhausted claim in federal court extends to both the broad legal theory of relief and the specific factual contention that supports relief. Kelley v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1344 (11th Cir. 2004).

The requirement that a federal habeas corpus applicant exhaust available state court remedies as a prerequisite to federal review is satisfied if the applicant "fairly presents" his claim in each appropriate state court and alerts that court to the federal nature of the claim. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1971). An applicant may raise a federal claim in state court "by citing in conjunction with the claim the federal source of law on which he relies or a case deciding such claim on federal grounds, or by simply labeling the claim `federal.'" Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 32 (2004). An applicant must "do more than scatter some makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court record." McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302-03 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotations and citations omitted).

Sosa's failure to present to the state court the federal due process claims alleged in grounds one and four deprived the state court of a "full and fair opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." Boerckel, 526 U.S. at 845. See also Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 5-6 (1982) ("It is not enough that all the facts necessary to support the federal claim were before the state courts or that a somewhat similar state-law claim was made."). Consequently, the exhaustion requirement remains unsatisfied, Henry, 513 U.S. at 365, and renders grounds one and four procedurally defaulted.

Under the procedural default doctrine, "[i]f the [applicant] has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief, unless either the cause and prejudice or the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is applicable." Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001). To establish cause for a procedural default, an applicant "must demonstrate that some objective factor external to the defense impeded the effort to raise the claim properly in state court." Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999). To show prejudice, an applicant must demonstrate not only that the errors at his trial created the possibility of prejudice but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage and infected the entire trial with error of constitutional dimension. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982). In other words, an applicant must show at least a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892.

Without a showing of cause and prejudice, an applicant may obtain federal habeas review of a procedurally defaulted claim only if review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986). A fundamental miscarriage of justice occurs in an extraordinary case if a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995); Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. This exception requires an applicant's "actual" innocence. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2001). To meet this standard, an applicant must show a reasonable likelihood of acquittal absent the constitutional error. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327.

Sosa fails to demonstrate cause and prejudice excusing the default of his federal due process claims. Carpenter, 529 U.S. at 451; Carrier, 477 U.S. at 495-96. He neither alleges nor shows that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception applies. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. Because Sosa fails to proffer specific facts showing an exception to procedural default, grounds one and four are procedurally barred from federal review.

II. MERITS

Sosa's remaining two grounds are exhausted and entitled to review on the merits.

Standard of Review

The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states in pertinent part:

In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:

"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 526 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) ("It is the objective reasonableness, not the correctness per se, of the state court decision that we are to decide."). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.

The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the state case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas `retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Cone, 535 U.S. at 693. A federal court must afford due deference to a state court's decision. "AEDPA prevents defendants — and federal courts — from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) ("This is a `difficult to meet,' . . . and `highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt'. . . .") (citations omitted).

In a per curiam decision without a written opinion the state appellate court affirmed the denial of Sosa's Rule 3.850 motion to vacate. (Respondent's Exhibit 11) The state appellate court's per curiam affirmance warrants deference under Section 2254(d)(1) because "the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due." Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 278 F.3d 1245 (2002), cert. denied sub nom Wright v. Crosby, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). See also Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 784-85 ("When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.").

Review of the state court decision is limited to the record that was before the state court.

Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. Sosa bears the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence a state court factual determination. "[A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption of correctness applies to a finding of fact but not to a mixed determination of law and fact. Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 836 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1046 (2001). The state court's rejection of Sosa's post-conviction claims warrants deference in this case.

Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Sosa claims ineffective assistance of counsel, a difficult claim to sustain. "[T]he cases in which habeas [applicant]s can properly prevail on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel are few and far between." Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (quoting Rogers v. Zant, 13 F.3d 384, 386 (11th Cir. 1994)). Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), governs an ineffective assistance of counsel claim:

Sims v. Singletary, 155 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir. 1998).

Strickland requires proof of both deficient performance and consequent prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 ("There is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one."); Sims, 155 F.3d at 1305 ("When applying Strickland, we are free to dispose of ineffectiveness claims on either of its two grounds."). "[C]ounsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. "[A] court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct." 466 U.S. at 690. Strickland requires that "in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." 466 U.S. at 690.

Sosa must demonstrate that counsel's alleged error prejudiced the defense because "[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment." 466 U.S. at 691-92. To meet this burden, Sosa must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 466 U.S. at 694.

Strickland cautions that "strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation." 466 U.S. at 690-91. Sosa cannot meet his burden merely by showing that the avenue chosen by counsel proved unsuccessful.

White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992). Accord Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) ("To state the obvious: the trial lawyers, in every case, could have done something more or something different. So, omissions are inevitable. . . . [T]he issue is not what is possible or `what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is constitutionally compelled.'") (en banc) (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)). See also Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (counsel has no duty to raise a frivolous claim).

Sosa must prove that the state court's decision was "(1) . . . contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States or (2) . . . based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Sustaining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is very difficult because "[t]he standards created by Strickland and § 2254(d) are both `highly deferential,' and when the two apply in tandem, review is `doubly' so." Richter, 526 U.S. at 105. See also Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1410 (An applicant must overcome this "`doubly deferential' standard of Strickland and the AEDPA."), and Johnson v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 643 F.3d 907, 911 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Double deference is doubly difficult for a[n] [applicant] to overcome, and it will be a rare case in which an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits in state court is found to merit relief in a federal habeas proceeding.").

Ground Two

During his investigation Detective Russell Hassell developed Sosa as a suspect. Detective Hassell contacted Sosa and asked him to come to the sheriff's office for questioning. Sosa, who was then seventeen years old, went to the sheriff's office accompanied by his father. Sosa claims that he asked Detective Hassell to allow Sosa's father to be present during questioning. Sosa further claims that his father also asked Detective Hassell to accompany his son in the interview. Detective Hassell denied both requests. Sosa alleges that he became nervous when Detective Hassell "kept yelling and screaming" at him and that he "gave his statements after being intimidated by Detective Hassell's emotional outburst." (Doc. 1, p. 7) Sosa contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not moving to suppress Sosa's statements4 on the ground that Sosa's "legal right to have his father present at questioning was violated by Detective Hassell's denials of both the requests of . . . [Sosa] and his father." (Doc. 1, p. 8)

The state post-conviction court conducted an evidentiary hearing on this ground. Trial counsel testified that Sosa never told him either that he wanted his father present during the interview or that the police kept his father out of the interview. (Respondent's Exhibit 11, Vol. III, pp. 14-15) Sosa testified at the evidentiary hearing that he did not know that he had the right to have his father present during the interview and that he twice told the police during the interview that he wanted his father with him. (Respondent's Exhibit 11, Vol. III, p. 48) Sosa acknowledged at the evidentiary hearing that he never discussed with trial counsel that he wanted his father present during the interview.

The state post-conviction court rejected Sosa's ground of ineffective assistance of counsel after the evidentiary hearing:

(Respondent's Exhibit 10, pp. 6-7) (court's record citations omitted)

Contrary to Sosa's contention, neither his age nor the absence of his father in the interview room during police questioning automatically renders involuntary Sosa's statements to the police.5 See Hall v. Thomas, 611 F.3d 1259, 1289 (11th Cir. 2010) ("Regardless of what [Florida] law requires, there is no clearly established federal constitutional requirement: (1) that police officers advise juveniles, suspected of state crimes, of a right to have a parent present during questioning, or (2) that interrogation cease upon a juvenile's request for the presence of a parent or guardian.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). Even assuming that an examination of the totality of the circumstances of the police interview results in the conclusion that Sosa's statements were involuntary, see Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979),6 and further assuming that trial counsel performed deficiently by not moving to suppress Sosa's statements, Sosa cannot establish his ground of ineffective assistance of counsel because he shows no resulting prejudice.

Sosa's co-defendant testified at trial that he accompanied Sosa to the victim's apartment. Sosa, armed with a gun, kicked in the front door and entered the victim's apartment without permission. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Vol. II, pp. 139-43) The victim, who knew Sosa, testified at trial that he barricaded himself in the bathroom of the apartment when he heard the perpetrators kick down the front door. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Vol. II, pp. 116-17) The victim heard the perpetrators talking as they tried to kick in the bathroom door, and he recognized Sosa's voice. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Vol. II, pp. 117-19) Once he heard the perpetrators trying to flee the apartment, the victim left the bathroom and saw Sosa running away. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Vol. II, pp. 119-20) Another eyewitness, the victim's next-door neighbor who had seen Sosa at the victim's residence on previous occasions, testified that he saw Sosa flee from the victim's apartment with a gun in his hand. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Vol. II, pp. 173-77)

In light of the testimony adduced at trial, even if trial counsel performed deficiently by not moving to suppress Sosa's conflicting statements from the police interview, Sosa presents no evidence establishing a reasonable probability exists of a different outcome at trial if his statements were suppressed. See e.g., Dingle v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 480 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Even if counsel's decision appears to have been unwise in retrospect, the decision will be held to have been ineffective assistance only if it was `so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen it.'"). Sosa fails to meet his burden of proving that the state court either unreasonably applied controlling Supreme Court precedent or unreasonably determined the facts in rejecting this ground of ineffective assistance of counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

Ground Three

On the day the trial began counsel recognized a potential discovery problem and explained to the trial judge (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Vol. II, pp, 94-95):

The prosecutor advised the judge that he would not argue a Richardson7 violation and the trial began.

After the trial judge denied counsel's motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the state's case and before the defense presented its case, counsel again explained (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Vol. II, pp. 210-14):

Hefty was the defense's first witness. Hefty testified that on the night of the crime she was outside her apartment walking her dog. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Vol. II, pp. 215-16) She saw three men walk past her. Moments later she heard an apartment door "crash open" and saw "three guys standing there with the guy in the middle's foot . . . forward." Hefty next heard a gunshot. The three men fled. Hefty testified that one of the men ran into the apartment next-door to the victim's apartment and the other two men ran past her. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Vol. II, p. 221) Hefty identified Sosa in court both as one of the three men who walked past her on the way to the victim's apartment on the night of the crime and as the man who fled into the next-door apartment. (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Vol. II, pp. 220-21)

Counsel further inquired of Hefty about the photopack (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Vol. II, pp. 291-20):

Sosa testified on his own behalf. He averred that he was at the apartment complex on the night of the crime where he "heard gunshots and . . . s[aw] a black man running into a house." (Respondent's Exhibit 1, Vol. II, p. 248) Sosa denied having a gun on the night of the crime and denied entering the victim's apartment.

Sosa contends in the federal application that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by calling Hefty as a defense witness because her testimony was "wholly inconsistent" with both the theory of defense and Sosa's testimony. Sosa further alleges that Hefty's "inculpatory testimony . . . far outweighed and [was more] prejudicial than [any] exculpatory evidence/testimony that she could provide." (Doc. 1, p. 9)

The state post-conviction court rejected this ground of ineffective assistance of counsel in Sosa's Rule 3.850 motion:

(Respondent's Exhibit 9, pp. 3-4) (court's record citations omitted)

"The inquiry into whether a lawyer has provided effective assistance is an objective one: a[n] [applicant] must establish that no objectively competent lawyer would have taken the action that his lawyer did take." Van Poyck v. Fla. Dep't of Corr., 290 F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2002). Trial counsel must decide which strategic and tactical option to pursue. Sosa cannot meet his burden of satisfying Strickland's requirements merely by showing that the avenue chosen by counsel proved unsuccessful. See e.g., Minton v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 271 Fed. App'x 916, 918 (11th Cir. 2008)8 ("The Supreme Court has `declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct and instead has emphasized that the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.'") (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003)), and Dingle v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 480 F.3d 1092, 1099 (11th Cir. 2007) ("Even if counsel's decision appears to have been unwise in retrospect, the decision will be held to have been ineffective assistance only if it was `so patently unreasonable that no competent attorney would have chosen it.'") (quoting Adams v. Wainwright, 709 F.2d 1443, 1445 (11th Cir. 1983)). A habeas applicant must overcome a presumption that counsel's challenged conduct was a matter of strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; United States v. Perry, 908 F.2d 56, 59 (6th Cir. 1990). A defendant's disagreement with counsel's tactics or strategy will not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1995) (en banc) ("[W]hich witnesses, if any, to call, and when to call them, is the epitome of a strategic decision."); Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1314 (finding that counsel is not incompetent for performing in a particular way in a case as long as the approach taken "might be considered sound trial strategy").

Sosa fails to overcome the presumption that trial counsel's decision to call Hefty as a witness was anything other than trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Perry, 908 F.2d at 59. Sosa has not established that the outcome of the trial would have been different if counsel had foregone calling Hefty. Absent a showing of prejudice, Sosa's ground warrants no federal habeas relief because Strickland's requirements remain unsatisfied. Sosa fails to meet his burden of proving that the state court unreasonably applied controlling Supreme Court precedent or unreasonably determined the facts in rejecting ground three. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2).

Accordingly, Sosa's application for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is DENIED. The clerk must enter a judgment against Sosa and close this action.

DENIAL OF BOTH A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Sosa is not entitled to a certificate of appealability ("COA"). A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his application. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court must first issue a COA. Section 2253(c)(2) permits issuing a COA "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." To merit a COA, Sosa must show that reasonable jurists would find debatable both (1) the merits of the underlying claims and (2) the procedural issues he seeks to raise. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir. 2001). Because he fails to show that reasonable jurists would debate either the merits of the claims or the procedural issues, Sosa is entitled to neither a certificate of appealability nor an appeal in forma pauperis.

Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. Leave to appeal in forma pauperis is DENIED. Sosa must obtain permission from the circuit court to appeal in forma pauperis.