ORDER

CHARLENE EDWARDS HONEYWELL, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court upon the Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification of Collective Action and Issuance of Notice (Doc. 75) and Defendant's response thereto (Doc. 101). A hearing was held on the motion on May 20, 2015 and supplemental briefing was submitted following that hearing. See Docs. 130-133. The parties have also submitted proposed notices to the class. See Docs. 134 and 136. The Court, having considered the parties' submissions and arguments, will grant in part and deny in part Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification of Collective Action and Issuance of Notice.

I. Background

A. Plaintiffs' Allegations

On December 24, 2014, Plaintiffs David Czopek, David Easlick, Christopher Knott, Lawrence Leveson, and Jonathan Red (collectively "the Named Plaintiffs") filed the currently operative Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 73) ("the Complaint") against Defendant TBC Retail Group, Inc. d/b/a Tire Kingdom ("TBC"). The Complaint is labeled a "216B Collective Action and Rule 23 Class Action Complaint" and asserts four counts:

According to the Complaint, the Named Plaintiffs sought to represent three collective action classes:

Doc. 73 ¶ 83. The Motion to Certify, however, seeks certification of three slightly different classes:

Doc. 75 ¶ 42. For purposes of this Order, the class definitions set forth in the Motion to Certify will control.

The Plaintiffs' factual allegations relating to each proposed class are summarized below.

1. Off-the-Clock/Time Shaving — Hourly Employee Class

Plaintiffs allege that TBC forced or permitted Service Managers, Sales Associates and Tire Techs (together as a group "Hourly Employees") to work "off the clock" without overtime compensation by requiring, coercing and/or allowing employees to work through lunch and after clocking out, or by "shaving" Hourly Employees' hours to reduce Defendant's labor cost obligations. Doc. 73 ¶¶ 62, 64-67; Doc. 75 ¶ 8. TBC maintains an official policy that employees are prohibited from working "off the clock" and that managers are not allowed to adjust employee time records without express authorization from the employees. Doc. 75 ¶ 9. However, the Plaintiffs allege that TBC maintains an unwritten policy of requiring and permitting off-the-clock work and time-shaving. Doc. 75 ¶ 10; Doc. 77 ¶ 10; Doc. 78 ¶ 10.

2. Violations of Minimum Wage — Tire Tech Class

Plaintiffs allege that TBC failed or refused to pay Tire Techs the legally required minimum wage. Doc. 73 ¶ 77; Doc. 75 ¶ 21. Tire Kingdom paid Tire Techs $6.40 per hour in addition to SPIFFs (commissions on certain job activities). Doc. 73 ¶ 77; Doc. 75 ¶ 21. Plaintiffs allege that (a) Tire Techs often did not earn sufficient weekly SPIFFs to meet the minimum wage requirements and that (b) Tire Techs were required to provide their own tools and transportation for the benefit of Tire Kingdom which reduced their compensation to below minimum wage. Doc. 73 ¶¶ 77-78; Doc. 75 ¶ 21.

3. Access to Wages — The Debit Card Class

Plaintiffs allege that TBC violated the FLSA by requiring hourly and flat-rate employees to accept their wages on payroll debit cards (instead of cash or checks) that are/were subject to excessive transaction fees. Doc. 73 ¶ 69; Doc. 75 ¶ 29. Under the FLSA, wages cannot be considered to have been paid by the employer and received by the employee unless they are paid finally and unconditionally or "free and clear." See 29 C.F.R. § 531.35. Plaintiffs allege that, by issuing the payroll debit cards that were not redeemable for cash and were subject to substantial transaction fees, TBC failed to comply with 29 C.F.R. § 531.27(a) (requiring that all wage payments are to be made in cash or negotiable instrument). Doc. 73 ¶ 79; Doc. 75 ¶ 29. Further, Plaintiffs claim that TBC failed to disclose the fees associated with the payroll debit cards; failed to offer employees the option of obtaining a paper check or cash in lieu of the debit card; and did not list the name and address of an established place of business in the State of Florida at which employees could receive cash on demand in exchange for the payroll debit cards. Doc. 75 ¶ 29.

B. The Named Plaintiffs

1. DAVID CZOPEK ("Czopek")

Czopek has been employed by TBC since April of 2011 as a Service Manager at the following locations: Dale Mabry, Henderson Blvd., North Palmetto, Pinellas Park, Lutz, Wesley Chapel, Holiday, Plant City, and Highway 301. Doc. 73 ¶ 18; Doc. 79. Czopek was paid $12.00 per hour in addition to non-discretionary incentive awards including SPIFFs, sales commissions, and monthly bonuses. Id. ¶ 19. Czopek worked sixty to eighty hours per work week but claims that he was subjected to time shaving and regularly required to work off-the-clock (including through lunch breaks) without compensation. Id. ¶¶ 20-21. Czopek further alleges that he was paid wages through Defendant's use of a debit card system, for which he was subjected to fees, surcharges and limitations on his ability to use his wages. Id. ¶ 22.

2. LAWRENCE LEVESON ("Leveson")

Leveson was employed by TBC from June 2010 through November 2012 as a Service Manager at several of TBC's retail store locations including Palm River and Plant City. Id. ¶ 26. Leveson was paid $12.00 per hour in addition to non-discretionary incentive awards including SPIFFs, sales commissions, and monthly bonuses. Id. ¶ 27. Leveson worked sixty to eighty hours per work week but claims that he was subjected to time shaving and regularly required to work off-the-clock (including through lunch breaks) without compensation. Id. ¶¶ 28-29. Leveson further alleges that he was paid wages through Defendant's use of a debit card system, for which he was subjected to fees, surcharges and limitations on his ability to use his wages. Id. ¶ 30.

3. CHRISTOPHER KNOTT ("Knott")

Knott was employed by TBC as a Flat Rate Technician (i.e. mechanic) at TBC's Plant City location from September 2011 through August 2013. Id. ¶ 34.2 Knott was paid through Defendant's debit card system, for which he was subjected to fees, surcharges and limitations on his ability to use his wages. Id. ¶ 35. Knott was not given a choice to receive his wages via direct deposit or physical check and was unable to fully access his wages free and clear at his demand. Id. ¶¶ 36-37.

4. DAVID EASLICK ("Easlick")

Easlick was employed at TBC's Palm River location as a Tire Technician ("Tire Tech") from May 2012 through December 2012, and then as a Sales Associate until September 3, 2013. Id. ¶ 41; Doc. 84. As a Tire Tech, Easlick was paid $6.40 per hour plus SPIFFs and $9.60 per hour for overtime. Doc. 73 ¶¶ 42-43. As a Sales Associate, he was paid $8.00 per hour plus sales commissions. Id. ¶ 44. Easlick claims that he was subjected to time shaving and regularly required to work off-the-clock (including through lunch breaks) without compensation. Id. ¶ 45. Easlick was also paid through Defendant's debit card system, for which he was subjected to fees, surcharges and limitations on his ability to use his wages. Id. ¶ 47.

5. JONATHAN RED ("Red")

Red was employed by TBC as a Sales Associate at five different retail store locations between February 2006 and September 2013. Id. ¶ 50. Red was paid $8.00 per hour in addition to non-discretionary incentive awards including SPIFFs, sales commissions, and monthly bonuses. Id. ¶ 51. Red regularly worked sixty hours per week but claims that he was subjected to time shaving and regularly required to work off-the-clock (including through lunch breaks) without compensation. Id. ¶¶ 52-53. Red further alleges that he was paid wages through Defendant's use of a debit card system, for which he was subjected to fees, surcharges and limitations on his ability to use his wages. Id. ¶ 54.

C. The Opt-In Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs have filed consents to join and/or declarations executed by 36 present and former TBC employees, including the five Named Plaintiffs. Some of these individuals are automatically excluded from the proposed classes:

This leaves us with 31 potential plaintiffs, including the five Named Plaintiffs. Only one of them, Troy Bair, worked at a TBC location outside of the Middle District of Florida.

II. Standard of Review

The decision to conditionally certify a collective FLSA action lies within the sound discretion of the Court. Hipp v. Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co., 252 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 2001). However, the Court "should satisfy itself" that there are similarly situated employees who desire to opt-in before certifying a collective action. Dybach v. State of Fla. Dept. of Corrections, 942 F.2d 1562, 1567-68 (11th Cir. 1991). Within the Eleventh Circuit, district courts are encouraged, but not required to adopt a two-tiered approach to certification of classes in an FLSA case. Hipp, 252 F.3d at 1219.

Under this two-tiered approach, the court's initial decision to conditionally certify a collective action often comes early in the case. In making this decision, the court must first "satisfy itself that there are other employees ... [(1)] who desire to `opt-in' and [(2)] who are `similarly situated' with respect to their job requirements and with regard to their pay provisions." Chung v. Affordable Battery, Inc., Case No. 12-60612-CIV, 2012 WL 3759029, 1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 29, 2012) (quoting Dybach, 942 F.2d and 1567). At the first tier, the Court's certification decision is based primarily on pleadings and affidavits, and the Court applies a "fairly lenient standard" in determining whether the plaintiffs are similarly situated. Anderson v. Cagle's Inc., 488 F.3d 945, 953 (11th Cir. 2007).

At this early stage, the named plaintiff carries the burden of demonstrating that notice of the action should be given to other employees. Although this burden is low and can often be met by "detailed allegations supported by affidavits," Grayson v. K Mart Corp., 79 F.3d 1086, 1097 (11th Cir. 1996), it is not "invisible" and cannot be based on the conclusory allegations of a few employees. Brooks v. Rainaldi Plumbing, Inc., Case No. 06-CV-631, 2006 WL 3544737, 2 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2006); see also Simpkins v. Pulte Home Corp., Case No. 08-CV-130, 2008 WL 3927275, 2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 21, 2008). At a minimum, the named plaintiff should offer affidavits or declarations of consent to join by other individuals stating they are similarly situated and wish to join the suit. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, Case No. 06:06-CV-1811, 2007 WL 809666, 2 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 14, 2007). When there are ambiguities in the papers seeking collective action status, the court must draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff at the preliminary certification stage. Mendoza v. Ashiya Sushi 5, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 8629(KPF), 2013 WL 5211839, 3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2013).

Here, TBC argues that a stricter standard should be applied to Plaintiff's motion because, unlike in Hipp, there has been extensive discovery here and the Court has been presented with numerous declarations by both sides. "In White [v. Osmose, Inc., 204 F.Supp.2d 1309, 1313 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 2002)], Chief Judge Albritton wrote that because the plaintiff had had extensive discovery with respect to the defendant's policies, `the court deems it necessary to carefully consider the submissions of the parties with respect to the class allegations.'" Davis v. Charoen Pokphand (USA), Inc., 303 F.Supp.2d 1272, 1276 (M.D. Ala. 2004). This Court agrees that the evidence presented by all parties should be considered carefully, but a careful review of the evidence does not change the standard to be applied. The Court is still tasked with deciding whether notice is appropriate, but conceivably has more evidence — from both sides — to consider when making the decision.

III. Discussion

"[A]t the conditional-certification stage, the question before the Court is (1) whether other employees of the defendant employer desire to opt-in; and (2) whether these other employees are `"similarly situated' with respect to their job requirements and with regard to their pay provisions.'" Rojas v. Garda CL Southeast, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 669, 675 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (citing Bennett v. Hayes Robertson Group, Inc., 880 F.Supp.2d 1270, 1282-83 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Dybach, 942 F.2d at 1567-68. "[I]n making a determination in whether to conditionally certify a proposed class for notification purposes only, courts do not review the underlying merits of the action." Pares v. Kendall Lakes Auto., LLC, No. 13-20317, 2013 WL 3279803, 3 (S.D. Fla. June 27, 2013).

Gonzalez v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., Case No. 14-20792-CIV-ALTONAGA, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130930, 7-8 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2014) (internal citations omitted).

A. The Hourly Employee Class

As previously noted, the proposed "Hourly Employee Class" consists of all current or former Service Managers, Sales Associates and Tire Techs who were employed by Defendant within the State of Florida during the past three years preceding this lawsuit who were forced or permitted to work "off the clock" without overtime compensation during any given workweek and elect to opt-in to this action pursuant to FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).

The Named Plaintiffs that fall within this class are Czopek (service manager), Easlick (tire tech and sales associate), Red (sales associate), and Leveson (service manager). These Named Plaintiffs worked at the following locations: 103 (Palm River), 95 (Plant City), 3 (Dale Mabry), 10 (Henderson Blvd.), 13 (North Palmetto), 30 (Pinellas Park), 158 (Lutz), 199 (Wesley Chapel), 102 (Highway 301), 90 (Brandon), 64 (Winter Haven), 49 (South Lakeland), 201 (Auburndale) and 164 (Seffner).

The proposed class would have the same job titles as the Named Plaintiffs during the same general time frame as the Named Plaintiffs. The proposed class has also been limited by the type of violation — off-the-clock work — so that the putative class members and the Named Plaintiffs all assert similar alleged violations. However, the proposed class covers a much larger geographic area than is represented by the Named Plaintiffs. The proposed class encompasses the entire state of Florida, but the named Plaintiffs worked only in the west-central Florida area. Thus, the geographic scope of the class must be limited. The Defendant has indicated that the State of Florida is broken up into three regions and eighteen districts. However, neither party has informed the Court which stores fall within which regions or districts.

Plaintiffs' evidence indicates that store managers received direction from district managers to allow or force employees to work off-the-clock. See Doc. 77 at ¶ 10; Doc. 78 ¶ 10. Accordingly, the Court will limit this class to the district or districts that encompass the stores worked in by the named Plaintiffs, which are: 103 (Palm River), 95 (Plant City), 3 (Dale Mabry), 10 (Henderson Blvd.), 13 (North Palmetto), 30 (Pinellas Park), 158 (Lutz), 199 (Wesley Chapel), 102 (Highway 301), 90 (Brandon), 64 (Winter Haven), 49 (South Lakeland), 201 (Auburndale) and 164 (Seffner). This limitation should also increase the likelihood that the putative class members and the Named Plaintiffs were subject to the same policies and practices, and whether these policies and practices were established in the same manner and by the same decision-maker — the relevant decision-makers, because Plaintiffs' allegations suggest that district managers instructed store managers to violate TBC's policies by allowing off-the-clock work and shaving time. See e.g., Robbins-Pagel v. Puckett, Inc., No. 6:05-cv-1582-Orl-31DAB, 2006 WL 3393706, 3 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (limiting class to one county).

Defendant has argued that Plaintiffs have not shown enough interest by other current and former employees to warrant conditional certification. According to Defendant, Plaintiffs have submitted consents to join of less than 1% of the proposed class (35/6600 = 0.53%). Doc. 101 at p. 5. However, while Defendant has filed a greater number of affidavits from potential members of the proposed classes stating that they do not want to join, that number is still less than 1% of the entire proposed class (59/6600 = 0.89%). Furthermore, with the geographic limitations imposed by this Court, the proposed class should be substantially less than 6,600 people, making Plaintiffs' percentage more substantial. In any event, there is no magical number of interested individuals that an FLSA plaintiff has to find to support conditional certification. In fact, other courts have concluded that the submission of a single affidavit or consent to join the case by one other similarly situated individual can be sufficient. See Guerra v. Big Johnson Concrete Pumping, Inc., No. 05-14237-CIV, 2006 WL 2290512, at *4 (S.D. Fla. May 17, 2006) (finding a single affidavit from another individual than the named plaintiff was sufficient to establish "a minimum quantum of evidence to warrant the creation of a collective [action]."); Gonzalez v. Go Relax Travel, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106523 (S.D. Fla. 2009). See also Robbins-Pagel v. Puckett, No. 6:05-cv-1582-Orl-31DAB, 2006 WL 3393706, 2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2006) (finding two affidavits sufficient).

One other issue remains — a number of putative class members have executed the same arbitration agreements that former opt-in plaintiffs Sharpe and McClelland have executed. This Court has already ruled that those agreements are valid and prohibit participation in this lawsuit. Accordingly, any class must exclude employees who have signed such agreements. Plaintiffs argue that only employees who signed the agreements on or after March 13, 2014 should be excluded from the class, because that was the date that TBC rolled out the agreement to the entire company. See Doc. 131. However, there is no legal basis for including people in the class who signed agreements prior to the final roll-out.

The Defendant also argues that the class should be further limited in time. Plaintiffs' seek to send notice to current and former employees that worked for TBC during the three years prior to the lawsuit being filed. The FLSA statutes of limitations are 3 years for willful violations and 2 years for non-willful violations. See 29 U.S.C. § 255. Plaintiffs here have alleged that all violations by TBC are willful. In collective actions, each plaintiff's claim is considered made when their consent to join is filed. See, e.g., Gutescu v. Carey Int'l, Inc., Case Number: 01-4026-CIV-MARTINEZ, 2004 WL 5333763, 4 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2004) ("an Opt-in Plaintiff's suit is not commenced until he files his consent with the Court."). Therefore, a plaintiff who files a consent to join on June 1, 2015, for example, would be able to claim damages for willful damages as far back as June 1, 2012. Here, Plaintiffs filed a separate motion requesting equitable tolling of the statutes of limitations from the time the motion for certification was filed — December 29, 2014. See Doc. 134. By separate order, that motion will be denied. Thus, the Court will allow notice to be sent to putative class members who worked for Defendant within the past three years.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs will be authorized to send notice of the collective action to:

The "Hourly Class" will thus be defined as:

The form of the notice and process for notification will be discussed below.

B. The Tire Tech Class

The proposed Tire Tech Class is a "sub class" of the Hourly Employee Class and would include all current or former Tire Technicians who were employed by Defendant within the State of Florida as a Tire Tech during the past three years who were paid a base hourly wage of $6.40 per hour plus SPIFFs and who elect to opt-in to this action pursuant to FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Plaintiffs allege that Tire Techs falling within this category were sometimes paid less than minimum wage for the hours they worked and had to supply their own tools, which had the effect of bringing down their hourly wages further.

The only Named Plaintiff that could possibly fall within this definition is Easlick, who worked as a Tire Tech at the Palm River location from May 2012 through December 2012. However, there is no allegation that Easlick was ever paid less than minimum wage for any hour he worked for TBC as a Tire Tech or that he was required to purchase his own tools for work. See Doc. 84. Without any named plaintiff similar to this proposed class, the Court will not conditionally certify the class.

C. The Debit Card Class

Finally, the Plaintiffs seek conditional certification of the "Debit Card Class" which includes all hourly and flat rate employees4 working for Tire Kingdom who are presently employed or who were employed in the State of Florida during the three years immediately preceding the filing of this lawsuit, and who received payroll debit cards issued as payment of wages due and who elect to opt-in to this action pursuant to FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). All of the Named Plaintiffs appear to fall within this class.

The proposed class would have the same job titles as the Named Plaintiffs during the same general time frame as the Named Plaintiffs. The Named Plaintiffs include both hourly employees and one flat-rate employee (Knott). The proposed class has also been limited by the type of violation so that the putative class members and the Named Plaintiffs all assert similar alleged violations. However, once again, the proposed class covers a much larger geographic area than is represented by the Named Plaintiffs. The proposed class encompasses the entire state of Florida, but the named Plaintiffs worked only in the west-central Florida area. Indeed, all but one of the opt-in plaintiffs that would fall within this purported class worked in that geographic area.

The Defendant has indicated that notifying the entire proposed class would encompass approximately 6,600 employees. Some individual inquiries would be required of each class member, i.e. how they received the card, whether they chose to receive wages on the card, whether they received documentation with the card, what that documentation was, whether they attempted to access the money "free and clear" at any time, etc. Therefore, a class of 6,600 plaintiffs would likely be unmanageable. Thus, the geographic scope of the class must be limited. Accordingly, the Court will limit this class to the district or districts that encompass the stores worked in by the Named Plaintiffs, which are: 103 (Palm River), 95 (Plant City), 3 (Dale Mabry), 10 (Henderson Blvd.), 13 (North Palmetto), 30 (Pinellas Park), 158 (Lutz), 199 (Wesley Chapel), 102 (Highway 301), 90 (Brandon), 64 (Winter Haven), 49 (South Lakeland), 201 (Auburndale) and 164 (Seffner).

Again, a number of putative class members have executed the same arbitration agreements that former opt-in plaintiffs Sharpe and McClelland have executed. Thus, the same limitation appropriate to the Hourly Class is appropriate here. As previously discussed, at this time, the Court will allow notice to be sent to putative class members who worked for Defendant within the past three years.

Accordingly, the Plaintiffs will be authorized to send notice of the collective action to:

The "Debit Card Class" with thus be defined as:

The form of the notice and process for notification will be discussed below.

IV. Form of Notice

Plaintiffs have filed proposed notices to send to the potential collective action members. See Doc. 133. Defendant filed objections to those proposed notices as well. See Doc. 135. "Court-authorized notice in a class action context helps to prevent "misleading communications," and ensures that the notice is "timely, accurate, and informative." Sealy v. Keiser Sch., Inc., No. 11-61426-CIV, 2011 WL 7641238, 4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2011) (quoting Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 171-172 (1989)). "In the exercise of its discretion, the court should screen the proposed notice to prevent potential plaintiffs from receiving information which is `factually inaccurate, unbalanced, or misleading.'" Earle v. Convergent Outsourcing, Inc., No. 2:12-CV-1050-WKW, 2013 WL 6252422, 5 (M.D. Ala. Sept. 5, 2013) (quoting Maddox v. Knowledge Learning Corp., 499 F.Supp.2d 1338, 1344 (N.D. Ga. 2007)).

First, Defendant objects to the notices because they have an "incorrect statute of limitations", lack a geographic limitation, and fail to exclude employees who signed arbitration agreements. The Court has discussed those issues above, and the class definitions that will be inserted into the notices will address these matters.

Defendant next objects to the notices' references to Plaintiff's counsel's website and what Defendant refers to as "inappropriate solicitations." The Court agrees that the references to the websites, which are represented by blank web addresses in the proposed notices, are inappropriate. The Court has no knowledge of what these websites may contain and will not allow counsel to refer to them in a court-authorized notice. The Court also agrees that the proposed notices should be edited with regard to the section titled "Can I be fired or retaliated against if I participate in the Class?" in that it instructs individuals to contact Class Counsel if they believe they have been retaliated against. Therefore, the Court has modified this section as well.

The proposed notices submitted by the Plaintiffs are also deficient in that they do not advise potential class members of the obligations and responsibilities they incur if they join the lawsuit. For example, they do not inform the potential opt-in plaintiffs that they may be required to participate in discovery or trial and, therefore, may be called to physically appear here in the Middle District of Florida. See Sealy, 2011 WL 7641238 at 4 (finding that the proposed class notice failed to fully advise potential class members of the consequences of opting into the suit, including that defendant may attempt to recover its costs from the potential class members if the lawsuit is unsuccessful and that the potential class members may be required to appear for trial); Gonzalez v. TZ Ins. Solutions, LLC, Case No. 8:13-cv-2098-T-33EAJ, 2014 WL 1248154, 5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 26, 2014) (same); Earle, 2013 WL 6252422 at 5 ("participation [of] plaintiffs may obligate them to provide discovery, give depositions, or testify in court, and that these obligations might require travel").

The proposed notices also indicate that Plaintiffs will not be liable for attorneys' fees. However, "unless [the N]amed Plaintiffs choose to separately enter into agreements with the opt-ins that waive their liability for attorney's fees, these opt-ins may indeed be liable for attorney's fees and costs." Rojas v. Garda CL Southeast, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 669, 681 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (citing Mayer v. Wall St. Equity Grp., Inc., 514 F. App'x 929, 932 (11th Cir. 2013); Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that the FLSA entitles a prevailing defendant to attorney's fees and costs when the district court finds that the plaintiff litigated in bad faith)). Thus, the Form should notify plaintiffs that they may be liable for attorneys' fees and costs if there is no judgment in their favor. Additionally, the proposed notice fails to indicate that the recipient can retain or consult counsel of his choosing before agreeing to join this lawsuit.

Finally, the Court agrees with Defendant that the proposed notices could be read to indicate judicial endorsement or sponsorship of the action. The Supreme Court has expressly cautioned that a district court "must be scrupulous to respect judicial neutrality" and "avoid even the appearance of judicial endorsement of the action" when issuing notice to potential plaintiffs. Hoffman-La Roche, 493 U.S. at 174. The Court has revised the language to recognize that the Court has made no decisions on the merits of this action. However, it is customary that a notice be styled with the court's name as the heading. See, e.g., McLean v. Cleaning Servs., Inc., No. 3:11-cv-874-MEF (M.D. Ala. June 28, 2012) (order granting motion to issue class notice and approving notice form with court's name in heading). Thus the notice may contain the Court name, as part of the case style, at the top of the first page.

Accordingly, the Court has revised the proposed notice to conform to this Order. The approved forms of notice are attached hereto as Exhibit A (Hourly Class) and Exhibit B (Debit Card Class). Defendant has not objected to Plaintiffs' proposed Consent to Join forms, therefore, those proposed forms may be included with the Court-approved notice.

It is hereby ORDERED that:

1. Plaintiffs' Motion for Conditional Certification of Collective Action and Issuance of Notice (Doc. 75) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

2. Defendant shall produce to Plaintiff, within 30 days of the date of this Order, the names and last known addresses of:

3. Counsel for Plaintiff is authorized to distribute the approved form of notice and consent to join via first class U.S. Mail within 30 days of receiving the contact information from Defendant.

4. Each "Consent to Join" returned to plaintiffs' counsel must be post-marked, or delivered to a commercial carrier who provides a receipt, on or before December 7, 2015.

5. Counsel for Plaintiffs shall file all consents to join with the Court on or before December 15, 2015.

6. During the allowed period for response to this initial mailing, should the initial "Notice of Right to Join" mailed to any individual be returned as un-deliverable, the parties shall promptly cooperate and exchange such additional information in their custody or control, or in the custody or control of their agents, as may reasonably be available to identify a better address for each such individual, to assist in the search for better addresses. To the extent that it is feasible, but in no event later than the end of the allowed period for response to the initial mailing, plaintiffs' counsel shall, at the sole cost and expense of plaintiffs, re-mail one time the "Notice of Right to Join" to each such individual. For each re-mailed "Notice of Right to Join," it shall be in the form set forth above; shall be re-dated with the date of re-mailing, and shall give the individual up to the same deadline allowed for response to the initial mailing to return a "Consent to Join" and no additional time.

7. Individuals who timely opt into this collective action pursuant to this Court's supervised notice procedure shall be deemed joined as opt-in plaintiffs for all purposes under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and under the orders of this Court through trial and appeal, if any, subject to any motion for decertification or representative discovery, and may be represented at any settlement, mediation or trial by the named plaintiffs at the time, pending further orders of the Court.

8. In light of the deadlines above, the parties shall submit an Amended Case Management Report within fourteen (14) days of this Order proposing new deadlines.

DONE AND ORDERED.

NOTICE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION LAWSUIT

If you are a current or former employee who TIRE KINGDOMdid not sign an SERVICE MANAGER, SALES ASSOCIATE or TIRE TECHarbitration agreement and worked for as a at any time on or aft er August 7, 2012, a collective action lawsuit may affect your rights.

This is a court authorized this notice. This is not a solicitation from a lawyer.

CLASS NOTICE

1. Why did I get this notice?

Tire Kingdom's records show that you currently work, or previously worked, for Tire Kingdom in one of the specified districts as a Service Manager, Sales Associate and/or a Tire Tech. This notice explains that the Court has conditionally allowed, or "certified," a collective class action lawsuit that may affect you as a potential member of the Class.

Judge Charlene E. Honeywell of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida is overseeing this collective class action. The lawsuit is known as David Czopek, et. al. v. TBC Retail Group Inc. d/b/a Tire Kingdom, Civil Action No. 8:14-cv-00675. The court has made no findings as to the merits of the claims in this case at this time.

2. What is a collective class action and who is involved?

In a collective class action lawsuit, one or more people are called "Class Representatives" and sue on behalf of other people who have similar claims. In this case the Class Representatives are David Czopek, David Easlick, Lawrence Leveson, and Jonathan Red. The people together are a "Class" or "Class Members." The employees who sued—and all the Class Members like them—are called the Plaintiffs. The companies they sued (in this case TBC Retail Group Inc., d/b/a Tire Kingdom) are called the Defendants. One court resolves the issues for everyone.

THE CLAIMS IN THIS LAWSUIT

3. What is this Lawsuit About?

This lawsuit claims that Tire Kingdom forced and/or allowed employees to work "off-the-clock" (i.e. without compensation) and that Tire Kingdom shorted or "shaved" employees' hours to avoid overtime payment(s) in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

4. What are the Plaintiffs asking for?

The Plaintiffs want the Court to order Tire Kingdom to pay them and each member of the Class compensation for every hour that employees worked off-the-clock and for every hour that Tire Kingdom "shaved" from their time. In addition, Plaintiffs are asking for liquidated damages (or "double damages") for themselves and each member of the Class.

5. How has the Defendant responded?

Tire Kingdom denies that it violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and denies that any employees worked without proper compensation. Tire Kingdom denies that they owe the Class Members any unpaid wages. Tire Kingdom's attorneys are:

6. Has the Court decided who is right?

The Court has not decided who is correct. By establishing the Class and issuing this Notice, the Court is not suggesting that the Plaintiffs will win or lose this case. The Plaintiffs must prove their claims at a trial.

7. Is there any money available now?

No money or benefits are available now because the Court has not yet decided who is right, and the two sides have not settled the case. There is no guarantee that money or benefits ever will be obtained.

8. Who is eligible?

The collective action is open to all current or former Service Managers, Sales Associates and Tire Techs who are not party to an arbitration agreement with Defendant and who were employed by Defendant at any store within the same district(s) that encompass the following stores at any time during the three years preceding conditional certification of the class: 103 (Palm River), 95 (Plant City), 3 (Dale Mabry), 10 (Henderson Blvd.), 13 (North Palmetto), 30 (Pinellas Park), 158 (Lutz), 199 (Wesley Chapel), 102 (Highway 301), 90 (Brandon), 64 (Winter Haven), 49 (South Lakeland), 201 (Auburndale) and 164 (Seffner); and who allege timely Fair Labor Standards Act violations by the Defendant regarding failure to pay minimum or overtime wages due for all hours worked.

9. How to join this Lawsuit.

You need to decide whether you want to join this lawsuit. Only eligible employees who submit a CONSENT TO JOIN by December 7, 2015 will be part of the Class.

If You wish to file a claim to join this lawsuit that will allow You to collect damages should the case be successful or should the claims be settled, You must complete the enclosed Consent to Join and mail it to:

You must complete the Consent to Join form, and have it mailed and postmarked by December 7, 2015 or You will NOT be allowed to participate in this lawsuit.

10. What are the benefits to joining the lawsuit?

By joining this lawsuit or "opting in," you gain the possibility of receiving money or benefits that may result from a trial or settlement in this case.

You will receive damages only if (1) You JOIN the lawsuit and (2) the Court affirms that Your claims are similar to others to be pursued as one lawsuit and (3) the Court determines that the Defendant violated the law. If the case is settled, the Court will have to approve the fairness of the settlement.

11. What Responsibilities do I have if I join?

If you do opt-in, you may be required to respond to written questions and requests for documents, sit for depositions and/or testify in court in Tampa, Florida.

12. What rights do I give up if I join the lawsuit?

By joining this lawsuit or "opting in," you give up your right to separately sue Tire Kingdom for the same legal claims brought in this lawsuit.

13. Can I be fired or retaliated against if I participate in the Class?

No. Federal and state law prohibit Defendants from firing you or in any way harassing or discriminating against you because of your decision to participate or not participate in this lawsuit.

14. What if I choose not to join the lawsuit?

You are not required to join the lawsuit. It is your choice as to whether you wish join. By doing nothing, you retain your right to bring your own separate lawsuit against Tire Kingdom. However, if You do not participate in the lawsuit, You will not be eligible to receive any portion of any recovery that might be obtained by those who do join the lawsuit or settle it on a class wide basis.

15. If I join the lawsuit, do I have a lawyer in this case?

You have the right to choose to be represented by the current Plaintiffs' attorney or another attorney of your choosing. You may also choose to represent yourself (i.e. appear pro se).

The current Plaintiffs' attorney is:

16. How will the lawyers be paid?

If Class Counsel get money or benefits for the Class, they may ask the Court for fees and expenses. If the Court grants Class Counsels' request, the fees and expenses would be either deducted from any money obtained for the Class or paid separately by the Defendants.

You will not have to pay fees to the Feldman Law Group, P.A., unless money is recovered by them on your behalf.

If you do join the lawsuit and your claims are unsuccessful, you may be responsible for Tire Kingdom's costs and attorneys' fees in this matter.

WHAT IF I RECEIVED MORE THAN ONE NOTICE?

Currently, there are two different classes that have been certified by the Court. Each class is different, and each class is seeking payment for different wage and hour violations. You may be a member of multiple classes.

If you received more than one notice, you must file a Consent to Join for each Class that you wish to join, and the Consent to Join must be received by December 7, 2015.

If you are unsure about which class(es) you are a member of, or if you would like additional information about the classes and/or claims, read below to get more information.

GETTING MORE INFORMATION

You may speak to the current Plaintiffs' attorney by calling 888-984-3549 or by writing to: Feldman Law Group P.A., 1715 N. Westshore Blvd., Suite 400, Tampa, Florida 33607.

To opt-in, you must complete the Opt-in Consent Form and send it by mail, fax, or email to:

An attorney must file your Opt-in Consent Form with the Court by no later than December 14, 2015. If you want to opt-in, please ensure that counsel receives your Opt-in Consent Form well before this date or you may lose your right to opt-in. You should receive a confirmation from either the Claims Administrator or Feldman Law Group, P.A. that your consent form has been received and filed with the Court within approximately 14 days after you sent it. If you do not receive this confirmation, the Claims Administrator may not have received it and you should contact the Feldman Law Group, P.A., to avoid being foreclosed from participating in this suit.

NOTICE OF COLLECTIVE ACTION LAWSUIT

If you are a current or former employee who did not sign an arbitration agreement and worked for TIRE KINGDOM as an hourly or flat-rate employee at any time on or after August 7, 2012, a collective action lawsuit may affect your rights.

This is a court authorized this notice. This is not a solicitation from a lawyer.

CLASS NOTICE

1. Why did I get this notice?

Tire Kingdom's records show that you currently work, or previously worked, for Tire Kingdom in one of the specified districts as a Service Manager, Sales Associate and/or a Tire Tech. This notice explains that the Court has conditionally allowed, or "certified," a collective class action lawsuit that may affect you as a potential member of the Class.

Judge Charlene E. Honeywell of the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida is overseeing this collective class action. The lawsuit is known as David Czopek, et. al. v. TBC Retail Group Inc. d/b/a Tire Kingdom, Civil Action No. 8:14-cv-00675. The court has made no findings as to the merits of the claims in this case at this time.

2. What is a collective class action and who is involved?

In a collective class action lawsuit, one or more people are called "Class Representatives" and sue on behalf of other people who have similar claims. In this case the Class Representatives are David Czopek, David Easlick, Lawrence Leveson, and Jonathan Red. The people together are a "Class" or "Class Members." The employees who sued—and all the Class Members like them—are called the Plaintiffs. The companies they sued (in this case TBC Retail Group Inc., d/b/a Tire Kingdom) are called the Defendants. One court resolves the issues for everyone.

THE CLAIMS IN THIS LAWSUIT

3. What is this Lawsuit About?

This lawsuit claims that Tire Kingdom forced and/or allowed employees to work "off-the-clock" (i.e. without compensation) and that Tire Kingdom shorted or "shaved" employees' hours to avoid overtime payment(s) in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.

4. What are the Plaintiffs asking for?

The Plaintiffs want the Court to order Tire Kingdom to pay them and each member of the Class compensation for every hour that employees worked off-the-clock and for every hour that Tire Kingdom "shaved" from their time. In addition, Plaintiffs are asking for liquidated damages (or "double damages") for themselves and each member of the Class.

5. How has the Defendant responded?

Tire Kingdom denies that it violated the Fair Labor Standards Act and denies that any employees worked without proper compensation. Tire Kingdom denies that they owe the Class Members any unpaid wages. Tire Kingdom's attorneys are:

6. Has the Court decided who is right?

The Court has not decided who is correct. By establishing the Class and issuing this Notice, the Court is not suggesting that the Plaintiffs will win or lose this case. The Plaintiffs must prove their claims at a trial.

7. Is there any money available now?

No money or benefits are available now because the Court has not yet decided who is right, and the two sides have not settled the case. There is no guarantee that money or benefits ever will be obtained.

8. Who is eligible?

The collective action is open to all current or former Service Managers, Sales Associates and Tire Techs who are not party to an arbitration agreement with Defendant and who were employed by Defendant at any store within the same district(s) that encompass the following stores at any time during the three years preceding conditional certification of the class: 103 (Palm River), 95 (Plant City), 3 (Dale Mabry), 10 (Henderson Blvd.), 13 (North Palmetto), 30 (Pinellas Park), 158 (Lutz), 199 (Wesley Chapel), 102 (Highway 301), 90 (Brandon), 64 (Winter Haven), 49 (South Lakeland), 201 (Auburndale) and 164 (Seffner); and who allege timely Fair Labor Standards Act violations by the Defendant regarding failure to pay minimum or overtime wages due for all hours worked.

9. How to join this Lawsuit.

You need to decide whether you want to join this lawsuit. Only eligible employees who submit a CONSENT TO JOIN by December 7, 2015 will be part of the Class.

If You wish to file a claim to join this lawsuit that will allow You to collect damages should the case be successful or should the claims be settled, You must complete the enclosed Consent to Join and mail it to:

You must complete the Consent to Join form, and have it mailed and postmarked by December 7, 2015 or You will NOT be allowed to participate in this lawsuit.

10. What are the benefits to joining the lawsuit?

By joining this lawsuit or "opting in," you gain the possibility of receiving money or benefits that may result from a trial or settlement in this case.

You will receive damages only if (1) You JOIN the lawsuit and (2) the Court affirms that Your claims are similar to others to be pursued as one lawsuit and (3) the Court determines that the Defendant violated the law. If the case is settled, the Court will have to approve the fairness of the settlement.

11. What Responsibilities do I have if I join?

If you do opt-in, you may be required to respond to written questions and requests for documents, sit for depositions and/or testify in court in Tampa, Florida.

12. What rights do I give up if I join the lawsuit?

By joining this lawsuit or "opting in," you give up your right to separately sue Tire Kingdom for the same legal claims brought in this lawsuit.

13. Can I be fired or retaliated against if I participate in the Class?

No. Federal and state law prohibit Defendants from firing you or in any way harassing or discriminating against you because of your decision to participate or not participate in this lawsuit.

14. What if I choose not to join the lawsuit?

You are not required to join the lawsuit. It is your choice as to whether you wish join. By doing nothing, you retain your right to bring your own separate lawsuit against Tire Kingdom. However, if You do not participate in the lawsuit, You will not be eligible to receive any portion of any recovery that might be obtained by those who do join the lawsuit or settle it on a class wide basis.

15. If I join the lawsuit, do I have a lawyer in this case?

You have the right to choose to be represented by the current Plaintiffs' attorney or another attorney of your choosing. You may also choose to represent yourself (i.e. appear pro se).

The current Plaintiffs' attorney is:

16. How will the lawyers be paid?

If Class Counsel get money or benefits for the Class, they may ask the Court for fees and expenses. If the Court grants Class Counsels' request, the fees and expenses would be either deducted from any money obtained for the Class or paid separately by the Defendants.

You will not have to pay fees to the Feldman Law Group, P.A., unless money is recovered by them on your behalf.

If you do join the lawsuit and your claims are unsuccessful, you may be responsible for Tire Kingdom's costs and attorneys' fees in this matter.

WHAT IF I RECEIVED MORE THAN ONE NOTICE?

Currently, there are two different classes that have been certified by the Court. Each class is different, and each class is seeking payment for different wage and hour violations. You may be a member of multiple classes.

If you received more than one notice, you must file a Consent to Join for each Class that you wish to join, and the Consent to Join must be received by December 7, 2015.

If you are unsure about which class(es) you are a member of, or if you would like additional information about the classes and/or claims, read below to get more information.

GETTING MORE INFORMATION

You may speak to the current Plaintiffs' attorney by calling 888-984-3549 or by writing to: Feldman Law Group P.A., 1715 N. Westshore Blvd., Suite 400, Tampa, Florida 33607.

To opt-in, you must complete the Opt-in Consent Form and send it by mail, fax, or email to:

An attorney must file your Opt-in Consent Form with the Court by no later than December 14, 2015. If you want to opt-in, please ensure that counsel receives your Opt-in Consent Form well before this date or you may lose your right to opt-in. You should receive a confirmation from either the Claims Administrator or Feldman Law Group, P.A. that your consent form has been received and filed with the Court within approximately 14 days after you sent it. If you do not receive this confirmation, the Claims Administrator may not have received it and you should contact the Feldman Law Group, P.A., to avoid being foreclosed from participating in this suit.