ROY B. DALTON, Jr., District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the following:
Plaintiffs initiated this action against Defendant on claims for: (1) infringement of Plaintiffs' federally registered trademarks under 15 U.S.C. § 1114 ("
When a party objects to a magistrate judge's findings, the district court must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." Id. The district court must consider the record and factual issues based on the record independent of the magistrate judge's report. Ernest S. ex rel. Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 513 (11th Cir. 1990).
Plaintiffs object only to the recommendation that the Court deny their request for fees and costs.
"Costs—other than attorney's fees—should be allowed to the prevailing party." Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Upon request, the Court must allow a party to file "adversary submissions" on a motion for attorney's fees. Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(C). The Court "may decide issues of liability for fees before receiving submissions on the value of services." Id. (emphasis added).
Under Section 35(a) of the Lanham Act, courts may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party "in exceptional cases." 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a); Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1304 (11th Cir. 1999). In the patent context, the Supreme Court recently defined an "exceptional case" as "one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party's litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated." Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014). District courts determine whether a case is "exceptional" on a case-by-case basis, considering the totality of the circumstances. Id.
After careful consideration of the arguments raised in Plaintiffs' Objection, the Court sustains the Objection and adopts the Alternative Recommendation.
Accordingly, it is hereby
In his findings and recommendations for Count III, Magistrate Judge Smith acknowledges that "Count III is an action for common law trademark infringement," yet recommends that "Plaintiffs are entitled to default judgment on their common law claim of unfair competition." (Doc. 14, pp. 7-8 (emphasis added).) Plaintiffs object to this recommendation solely to the extent that it constitutes a recommendation that the Court deny the Motion as to Count III. (Doc. 15, p. 2, n.1.) Magistrate Judge Smith's recommendation as to Count III is grounded on the recognition that a party may claim unfair competition under the theory of trademark infringement (Doc. 14, p. 7 (citing Sony Corp. v. Digital4Less, Inc., No. 6:12-cv-1893-Orl-28GJK, 2013 WL 6842796, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 27, 2013)); therefore, the Court construes this portion of the R&R as a recommendation that the Court grant the Motion on Count III. Because Plaintiffs indicate that they agree with the R&R to the extent that it recommends granting their Motion on Count III (see Doc. 15, p. 2, n.1), the Court finds that Plaintiffs do not object to this portion of the R&R.