MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

GREGORY J. KELLY, Magistrate Judge.

Iris Leonor Cotto (the "Claimant"), appeals to the District Court from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. Doc. No. 1. Claimant argues the Administrative Law Judge (the "ALJ") erred by: 1) not adequately accounting for her moderate limitations in concentration, persistence and pace in his residual functional capacity ("RFC") determination and hypothetical to the vocational expert ("VE"); and 2) failing to discuss or weigh Dr. Gopal Basisht's opinion. Doc. No. 17 at 18-20, 24-27. Claimant argues the matter should be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 35. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's final decision is REVERSED and REMANDED.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW.

The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla — i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the District Court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The Court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560. The District Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).

II. ANALYSIS.

A. The ALJ's RFC and Hypothetical to VE.

Claimant maintains, albeit in a generalized fashion, the ALJ's RFC determination and hypothetical to the VE do not contain all of her limitations. Doc. No. 17 at 24 (citing Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2002)).1 Specifically, Claimant argues the ALJ's RFC determination and hypothetical to the VE did not adequately reflect her moderate limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence and pace, and thus his decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 24-27. In so arguing, the Court must determine whether the ALJ's RFC determination is consistent with his hypothetical to the VE in order to conclude the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence. As discussed below and notwithstanding Claimant's argument concerning her limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence and pace, the Court finds the ALJ's hypothetical question is not consistent with the ALJ's RFC determination.

At step five of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ uses the claimant's RFC, age, education, and work experience to determine if other work is available in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1239. The Commissioner bears the burden at step five to show the existence of such jobs. Id. at 1241 n.10 (citing Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1077 (11th Cir. 1996)). One of the methods used to show the claimant can perform other jobs in the national economy is through the testimony of a VE. Id. at 1239-40. If the ALJ relies on a VE, he or she must pose hypothetical questions which are accurate and which include all of a claimant's limitations. Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1227. However, the ALJ need not include "each and every symptom" of the claimant's impairments, Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007), or medical "findings . . . that the ALJ . . . properly rejected as unsupported" in the hypothetical question, Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004). If the ALJ relies on the VE's testimony to find a claimant can perform other jobs in the national economy, but fails to include all the claimant's limitations in the hypothetical question, then the final decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1562 (11th Cir. 1985) (quoting Brenem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1980)).2

At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found Claimant suffered from the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spines; carpal tunnel syndrome; adjustment disorder; and panic disorder without agoraphobia. R. 16. At step four of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determined Claimant has a RFC to perform "light work" as defined by 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), with the following functional limitations:

R. 18 (emphasis added). During the hearing, the ALJ posed a hypothetical question to the VE that contained all of the limitations in the ALJ's RFC with the exception of the following limitations: 1) occasional contact with the public; and 2) gradual introduction of changes in the workplace. Compare R. 18 with R. 68-69.3 Based on the incomplete hypothetical, the VE testified Claimant could still perform other work in the national economy, and the ALJ subsequently relied on the VE's testimony in determining Claimant is not disabled. R. 24, 70. It is unclear what effect the omission of the two limitations above would have on the VE's testimony, therefore the Court cannot conclude that the error is harmless. Accordingly, the Court finds the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence.4

III. CONCLUSION.

For the reasons stated above, it is ORDERED that:

DONE and ORDERED.