OPINION AND ORDER1

JAMES R. KLINDT, Magistrate Judge.

I. Status

Jeannette Delgado ("Plaintiff") is appealing the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's final decision denying her claims for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI"). Plaintiff's alleged inability to work is a result of "right shoulder injury," "depression," and "h[igh] b[lood] p[ressure]." Transcript of Administrative Proceedings (Doc. No. 12; "Tr." or "administrat ive transcript"), filed May 4, 2015, at 249 (emphasis and capitalization omitted). On December 14, 2011, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging an onset disability date of January 12, 2010. Tr. at 183-86 (DIB), 190-96 (SSI). Plaintiff's applications were denied initially, see Tr. at 57, 59-68, 117-22 (DIB), 58, 69-78,123-28 (SSI), and upon reconsideration, see Tr. at 79, 81-92, 105, 132-37 (DIB), 80, 93-104, 106,138-42 (SSI).

On June 3, 2013, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing during which the ALJ heard testimony from Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel; and a vocational expert ("VE"). Tr. at 39-56. On July 3, 2013, the ALJ issued a Decision finding Plaintiff not disabled and denying Plaintiff's claims. Tr. at 23-32. Plaintiff then requested review by the Appeals Council, Tr. at 18, and submitted evidence to the Council in the form of a brief authored by her attorney representative and some additional medical evidence, Tr. at 5-6; see Tr. at 346-57 (brief), 913-25 (medical records of Claudio E. Vincenty, M.D.), 926-31 (updated medical records of Kasraeian Urology), 932-950 (updated medical records of Memorial Hospital). On February 9, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, Tr. at 1-4, thereby making the ALJ's Decision the final decision of the Commissioner. On February 26, 2015, Plaintiff commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and § 1383(c)(3), by timely filing a Complaint (Doc. No. 1), seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision.

Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal: whether "the ALJ erred by not characterizing the Plaintiff's mental health impairment as `severe'"; and whether "the ALJ erred by not placing appropriate weight on the opinions of the treating physicians." Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Complaint (Doc. No. 16; "Pl.'s Mem."), filed May 6, 2015, at 6-11 (capitalization and emphasis omitted). On September 4, 2015, Defendant responded by filing a Memorandum in Support of the Commissioner's Decision (Doc. No. 17; "Def.'s Mem.").

After a thorough review of the entire record and consideration of the parties' respective memoranda, the undersigned finds the ALJ's Decision is due to be affirmed for the reasons explained herein.

II. The ALJ's Decision

When determining whether an individual is disabled,2 an ALJ must follow the five-step sequential inquiry set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations ("Regulations"), determining as appropriate whether the claimant (1) is currently employed or engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one listed in the Regulations; (4) can perform past relevant work; and (5) retains the ability to perform any work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004). The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through step four and, at step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).

Here, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential inquiry. See Tr. at 25-32. At step one, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff "worked after the alleged disability onset date but this work activity did not rise to the level of substantial gainful activity." Tr. at 25. Accordingly, the ALJ determined Plaintiff "has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 12, 2010, the alleged onset date." Tr. at 25 (emphasis and citations omitted). At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff "has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease (DDD) and right upper extremity arthropathy." Tr. at 25 (emphasis and citations omitted). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff's "medically determinable mental impairment of affective disorder does not cause more than minimal limitation in [Plaintiff's] ability to perform basic mental work activities and is therefore nonsevere." Tr. at 26. At step three, the ALJ ascertained Plaintiff "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1." Tr. at 27 (emphasis and citations omitted).

The ALJ determined Plaintiff has the following residual functional capacity ("RFC"):

Tr. at 27 (emphasis omitted). At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff "is unable to perform any past relevant work" as a "Laborer, Stores," or "General Clerk." Tr. at 30 (some emphasis and citation omitted). At step five, after considering Plaintiff's age ("46 years old . . . on the alleged disability onset date"), education ("at least a high school education"), work experience, and RFC, the ALJ found "there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff] can perform," Tr. at 30 (emphasis and citations omitted), including representative occupations such as "Addresser," "Surveillance System Monitor," and "Call Out Operator," Tr. at 31. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff "has not been under a disability . . . from January 12, 2010, through the date of th[e D]ecision." Tr. at 32 (emphasis and citation omitted).

III. Standard of Review

This Court reviews the Commissioner's final decision as to disability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Although no deference is given to the ALJ's conclusions of law, findings of fact "are conclusive if . . . supported by `substantial evidence'. . . ." Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). "Substantial evidence is something `more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.'" Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987)). The substantial evidence standard is met when there is "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Falge, 150 F.3d at 1322 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It is not for this Court to reweigh the evidence; rather, the entire record is reviewed to determine whether "the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation and citations omitted); see also McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). The decision reached by the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence-even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's findings. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).

IV. Discussion

As indicated above, Plaintiff raises two issues on appeal. She first challenges the ALJ's failure to find in step two of the sequential evaluation process that her mental health impairment is a "severe" impairment. Pl.'s Mem. at 6-8. She next argues that the ALJ erred by not attributing appropriate weight to the opinions of her treating physicians. Id. at 8-11. A discussion follows.

A. Mental Health Impairment

Plaintiff contends the ALJ "erred by not characterizing [her] mental health impairment as `severe.'" Id. at 6. Specifically, she argues that her treating psychiatrist, Hazem Herbly, M.D., diagnosed her with a major depressive disorder that was caused by her physical injury. Id. She complains that the ALJ ignored relevant statements in Dr. Herbly's records in which Dr. Herbly noted in February 2013 that Plaintiff's depression "increased severely, daily for several weeks, she is anhedonic, stays home, isolates herself, sleep is disturbed, she feels hopeless[,] helpless, wants to go to sleep and not wake up." Id. at 7 (quoting Tr. at 895). Additionally, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Herbly's assessment in August 2012 indicated that Plaintiff has a

Pl.'s Mem. at 6 (referring to Tr. at 620-23). She urges that these limitations should have been included in the hypothetical to the VE. Pl.'s Mem. at 8.

Defendant responds that Plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that her mental health impairment is severe, and a review of her records and daily activities reveals Plaintiff is not as limited as she claims. Def.'s Mem. at 5-7. Defendant also argues that "Plaintiff's positive response to medication belies a finding that she has a severe mental impairment." Id. at 7.

At step two of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ must determine if a claimant suffers from a severe impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). At this step, "[a]n impairment can be considered as not severe only if it is a slight abnormality which has such a minimal effect on the individual that it would not be expected to interfere with the individual's ability to work[.]" Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984). "[T]he `severity' of a medically ascertained disability must be measured in terms of its effect upon ability to work, and not simply in terms of deviation from purely medical standards of bodily perfection or normality." McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir. 1986). In the context of a Social Security disability benefits case, a condition is severe if it affects a claimant's ability to maintain employment. See id. A claimant has the burden of proving that her allegations of depression constitute a severe impairment. Nigro v. Astrue, No. 8:06-cv-2134-T-MAP, 2008 WL 360654, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2008) (unpublished).

When evaluating mental impairments, the Regulations direct the use of a "`special technique' dictated by the PRTF [Psychiatric Review Technique Form] for evaluating mental impairments." Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1213 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a-(a)). The PRTF is further described in the introduction to section 12.00 of the listing of impairments. See 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 12.00(A). In the first step of the psychiatric review technique, it is determined whether a claimant has a medically determinable mental impairment using the criteria in "paragraph A" of the listing of impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(b)(1) and 416.920a(b)(1); 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 12.00(A).

Next, if there is a medically determinable mental impairment, the degree of functional limitation resulting from such impairment is ascertained. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c) and 416.920a(c). The degree of functional limitation resulting from a medically determinable mental impairment is ascertained by rating four "broad functional areas" in "paragraph B" of the listings: activities of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of decompensation. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(3) and 416.920a(c)(3); 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 12.00(c). The first three broad functional areas are rated using a five-point scale: none, mild, moderate, marked, and severe. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(4) and 416.920a(c)(4); 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 12.00(c). The fourth is rated using a four-point scale: none, one or two, three, four or more. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(c)(4) and 416.920a(c)(4); 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 § 12.00(c).3

After the degree of functional limitation resulting from the claimant's medically determinable mental impairment is rated, the severity of the mental impairment is established. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d) and 416.920a(d). The four broad functional areas "are used to rate the severity of mental impairments at steps [two] and [three] of the sequential evaluation process." SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *4. If the first three of the four broad functional areas are rated "none" or "mild," and the forth area is rated as "none," the Commissioner generally concludes that the impairment is not severe, "unless the evidence otherwise indicates that there is more than a minimal limitation in [the claimant's] ability to do basic work activities." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d)(1) and 416.920a(d)(1).

Here, the ALJ found that Plaintiff's "medically determinable mental impairment of affective disorder does not cause more than minimal limitation in [Plaintiff's] ability to perform basic mental work activities and is therefore nonsevere." Tr. at 26. In her Decision, the ALJ noted:

Tr. at 26 (citations omitted). The ALJ then rated the four broad functional areas pursuant to the psychiatric review technique. Tr. at 26. In the first functional area, activities of daily living, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has "mild limitation." Tr. at 26. The ALJ based this finding on Plaintiff's testimony that she "is able to walk and exercise daily, read, and do some writing. She does not drive, and her family does the housework and shopping. She is able to use a computer, but requires help with typing." Tr. at 26. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding in this regard, as Plaintiff reported to the Social Security Administration that she was able to perform some of these activities, Tr. at 263-66, 284, and Plaintiff testified that she was able to perform these activities, Tr. at 45-47.

In the second functional area, social functioning, the ALJ found Plaintiff has "mild limitation." Tr. at 26. The ALJ based this finding on the evidence that Plaintiff does not socialize or participate in activities. Tr. at 26. Plaintiff reported to the Social Security Administration that she does not go out with friends and does not socialize any more. Tr. 267. But, she also reported attending church weekly and reading the Sunday liturgy for her church. Tr. 266.

In the third broad functional area, concentration, persistence, or pace, the ALJ found Plaintiff has "no limitation." Tr. at 26. The ALJ stated "[t]he evidence of record does not establish that [Plaintiff] has difficulty maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace as a result of mental limitations." Tr. at 26. The ALJ's conclusion is supported by substantial evidence as Plaintiff was described as alert and oriented with good memory and judgment in her visits with Dr. Herbly in August 2012, February 2013, and November 2013. Tr. at 894-96. Additionally, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff testified that in 2010 she could have continued doing administrative work had she not moved. Tr. at 27; see Tr. at 44.

In the fourth functional area, episodes of decompensation, the ALJ found Plaintiff has had "no episodes of decompensation which have been of extended duration." Tr. at 26. The ALJ's finding in this regard is supported by substantial evidence as there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiff has ever been hospitalized for any mental disorder. Plaintiff also testified that the medications she takes for her psychiatric complaints do help her. Tr. at 49.

In sum, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no more than mild limitations in the first three functional areas and no episodes of decompensation in the fourth. For the foregoing reasons, these findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Based on these findings, the ALJ determined Plaintiff's alleged mental impairment of affective disorder is not severe. Tr. at 26. This determination is in accordance with the Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520a(d)(1) and 416.920a(d)(1) (stating, "[i]f we rate the degree of your limitation in the first three functional areas as `none' or `mild' and `none' in the fourth area, we will generally conclude that your impairment(s) is not severe . . ."). Accordingly, there was no error at step two.

Plaintiff next argues that because Dr. Herbly's assessment found her to be limited in her dealings with the public, co-workers and stressors, these limitations should have been included in the hypothetical to the VE. Pl.'s Mem. at 8; see Tr. at 620-23. In response, Defendant notes that Dr. Herbly referenced that Plaintiff was trying to find a job but had not been successful. Def.'s Mem. at 6 (referring to Tr. at 540). Additionally, Defendant cites Dr. Herbly's records that reported Plaintiff was "more active, enjoys socialization" and "volunteering at church." Def.'s Mem. at 6 (quoting Tr. at 539).

"[F]or a [VE]'s testimony to constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which comprises all of the claimant's impairments." Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1227 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1229 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). An ALJ is not required to include findings in a hypothetical question to the VE that the ALJ has found to be unsupported. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161. Here, the ALJ appropriately declined to include mental health impairments in her assessment of Plaintiff's RFC and the corresponding hypothetical question to the VE. The record supports this decision. For example, the ALJ noted:

Tr. at 27; see Tr. at 44-47. Additionally, the ALJ noted Plaintiff "takes psychiatric medication which is helpful." Tr. at 28; see Tr. at 49.

Plaintiff relies on Dr. Herbly's August 2012 assessment to support her argument that her mental impairment causes more than a minimal impact on her functioning. Pl.'s Mem. at 6. In summarizing Dr. Herbly's assessment, Plaintiff states:

Id. at 6 (referring to Tr. at 620-23). Significantly, Dr. Herbly nor any other doctor stated that Plaintiff was unable to work due to any mental health limitation. Additionally, other treatment records and Plaintiff's own testimony indicate her depression is not as limiting as she claims such that it would impact her RFC. Tr. at 44 (testifying that she could have continued to work but for her move); 49 (testifying that her psychiatric medications help); 539 (indicating "significant improvement in mood" and she "is more active, enjoys socialization [and] volunteering at church); 540 ("has been volunteering with Lions Club at church"); 896 (indicating that "[d]epression is partially improved" and that she "does not feel helpless nor hopeless"). Also the report of psychiatric evaluation performed by Eduardo A. Sanchez, M.D. reveals Plaintiff "was an alert, well-oriented, pleasant and cooperative lady who was able to speak coherently, demonstrating the absence of a thinking disorder. There were no perceptual abnormalities. [Plaintiff] had a depressed affect and came across despondent. There were no cognitive deficits or memory defects." Tr. at 911. Dr. Sanchez concluded that Plaintiff's disability was "from the pain and physical standpoint and not from the psychiatric standpoint." Tr. at 912.

These medical records constitute substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision not to include mental health impairments in the Plaintiff's RFC or in the hypothetical to the VE. For the foregoing reasons, the Decision is due to be affirmed on this issue.

B. Medical Opinions

In her second argument, Plaintiff submits the ALJ "erred by not specifically identifying the `significant weight' that was to be assigned to the examining and/or reviewing physicians." Pl.'s Mem. at 11. Specifically, she argues that "two of the doctors indicate that she would not be able to use her right upper extremity while another indicated `limited use' and yet another specifically limited her pushing and pulling ability with her right upper extremity and no repetitive use." Id. Plaintiff claims that because the ALJ stated that "significant weight is given to each of the opinions set forth above" and yet failed to discuss which limitations contained within those opinions were accepted, remand is warranted. Id. at 10.

1. Opinions at Issue4

a. Sina Kasraeian, M.D.

Dr. Kasraeian saw Plaintiff on June 16, 2011, for re-evaluation of her right shoulder. Tr. at 536. The record of exam on that date indicates Plaintiff was "in no acute distress[,] is alert and oriented times four[, and] is appropriate in mood, affect, and appearance." Tr. at 536. Physical exam of the right shoulder revealed "numbness is improving [and] swelling in the forearm is also approving." Tr. at 536. Dr. Kasraeian "strongly recommended that [Plaintiff] continue to follow up with Dr. Trescot . . . as [Plaintiff] appears to be benefitting from her plan and Dr. Trescot's plan appears to be very reasonable and appropriate." Tr. at 536.5

On September 12, 2011, Dr. Kasraeian saw Plaintiff and noted that Plaintiff "was feeling well" and had previously gotten relief from a series of injections over the summer that helped her symptoms. Tr. at 532. Physical exam of the right shoulder revealed:

Tr. at 532. On that same date, Dr. Kasraeian completed a "Patient Work Status Report" in which she checked on the form the following limitations: "Shoulder Sedentary [n]o use of affected extremity." Tr. at 641. The limitation contains no other detail or explanation.

In an October 24, 2011 exam, Plaintiff reported that she was continuing to "hav[e] a lot of significant pain in her shoulder at this time." Tr. 530. Dr. Kasraeian's treatment plan included continued physical therapy and "sedentary shoulder at this time." Tr. at 531.

In her December 7, 2011 visit with Dr. Kasraeian, Plaintiff reported she was "working on getting approval for injection to the shoulder[, and she had] completed physical therapy with limited results in range of motion." Tr. at 525.

In a January 18, 2012 exam, Plaintiff advised Dr. Kasraeian that "her pain is improved. She still has pain and soreness around the shoulder including the AC joint but .. . that she is feeling better compared to her last appointment." Tr. 551. On February 29, 2012, Plaintiff saw Dr. Kasraeian and reported that she "recently underwent an intra-articular injection by Dr. Trescot from which she says she did get substantial relief for about a month; however, now her pain has recurred to the same level. . . ." Tr. 549. On physical exam, Plaintiff had "pain with extremes of range of motion but no pain with internal or external rotation." Tr. at 549.

Plaintiff underwent physical therapy at Heartland Rehabilitation Services. Tr. 633-759. Dr. Kasraeian was one of the doctors who referred her to Heartland. Tr. at 753. At an initial evaluation on February 2, 2011, Plaintiff rated her ability to perform daily activities and activities associated with her job at 50%. Tr. at 741. A review of the records of Heartland Rehabilitation Services reveals Plaintiff reported some improvement and decrease in pain with therapy. See, e.g., Tr. at 658, 675, 685-86, 687, 692, 694, 711.

b. Michael S. Scharf, M.D.

Plaintiff saw Dr. Scharf for a one-time consultative examination on December 12, 2011. Tr. 477-80. In reviewing her history, Dr. Scharf noted Plaintiff received injections in her shoulder from Dr. Steinberg in March 2010, and "she did obtain some relief." Tr. at 477. He further noted that Plaintiff was discharged by Dr. Steinberg as "[h]er shoulder was presumably better" [but] "[h]er shoulder pain then recurred." Tr. 477-78. Physical examination indicated:

Tr. at 479. He opined: "Based on my examination, I do not feel that she is capable of working or certainly not using her right upper extremity." Tr. at 479.

c. Robert Hurford, Jr., M.D.

Dr. Hurford performed a worker's compensation evaluation in August 2012. Tr. 761-63. His diagnosis of Plaintiff was "cervical spondylosis" and "frozen shoulder." Tr. at 762. At that time, he found no functional limitations related to Plaintiff's neck and noted "[r]estrictions for shoulder to be addressed by shoulder surgeon[.]" Tr. at 763. In February 2013, Dr. Hurford found Plaintiff "has limited use of right shoulder." Tr. at 868.

d. Robert Whittier, M.D.

In May 2012, Dr. Whittier reviewed Plaintiff's medical records for the State agency. Based upon his review, he concluded that Plaintiff is limited to no repetitive use of her right upper extremity. Tr. at 100. He noted that Plaintiff obtained relief from injections. Tr. at 100. Additionally, he concluded that Plaintiff is limited in pushing, pulling and in reaching overhead on the right. Tr. at 100-101.

2. Applicable Law

The Regulations establish a "hierarchy" among medical opinions6 that provides a framework for determining the weight afforded each medical opinion: "[g]enerally, the opinions of examining physicians are given more weight than those of non-examining physicians[;] treating physicians[' opinions] are given more weight than [non-treating physicians;] and the opinions of specialists are given more weight on issues within the area of expertise than those of non-specialists." McNamee v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 164 F. App'x 919, 923 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1), (2), (5)). The following factors are relevant in determining the weight to be given to a physician's opinion: (1) the "[l]ength of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination"; (2) the "[n]ature and extent of [any] treatment relationship"; (3) "[s]upportability"; (4) "[c]onsistency" with other medical evidence in the record; and (5) "[s]pecialization." 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2)-(5), 416.927(c)(2)-(5); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e).

With regard to a treating physician or psychiatrist,7 the Regulations instruct ALJs how to properly weigh such a medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). Because treating physicians or psychiatrists "are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a claimant's] medical impairment(s)," a treating physician's or psychiatrist's medical opinion is to be afforded controlling weight if it is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence" in the record. Id. When a treating physician's or psychiatrist's medical opinion is not due controlling weight, the ALJ must determine the appropriate weight it should be given by considering the factors identified above (the length of treatment, the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, as well as the supportability of the opinion, its consistency with the other evidence, and the specialization of the physician). Id.

If an ALJ concludes the medical opinion of a treating physician or psychiatrist should be given less than substantial or considerable weight, he or she must clearly articulate reasons showing "good cause" for discounting it. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). Good cause exists when (1) the opinion is not bolstered by the evidence; (2) the evidence supports a contrary finding; or (3) the opinion is conclusory or inconsistent with the treating physician's or psychiatrist's own medical records. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41; see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991); Schnorr v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that a treating physician's medical opinion may be discounted when it is not accompanied by objective medical evidence).

An examining physician's opinion, on the other hand, is not entitled to deference. See McSwain v. Bowen, 814 F.2d 617, 619 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (citing Gibson v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1986)); see also Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1160 (citation omitted). Moreover, the opinions of non-examining physicians, taken alone, do not constitute substantial evidence. Broughton v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 960, 962 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1094 (11th Cir. 1985)). However, an ALJ may rely on a non-examining physician's opinion that is consistent with the evidence, while at the same time rejecting the opinion of "any physician" whose opinion is inconsistent with the evidence. Oldham v. Schweiker, 660 F.2d 1078, 1084 (5th Cir. Unit B. 1981) (citation omitted).

An ALJ is required to consider every medical opinion. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c) (stating that "[r]egardless of its source, we will evaluate every medical opinion we receive"). While "the ALJ is free to reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion," Oldham, 660 F.2d at 1084 (citation omitted); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2), 416.927(d)(2), "the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor," Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (citing Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir.1987)); see also Moore, 405 F.3d at 1212; Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. "`In the absence of such a statement, it is impossible for a reviewing court to determine whether the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational and supported by substantial evidence.'" Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981)).

3. Analysis

Regarding the medical opinions of record, the ALJ wrote as follows:

Tr. at 29-30 (citations omitted).

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ "has an obligation to specifically define what evidence is accepted and the weight to be afforded that evidence," and she claims error in the ALJ's failure to do so in this case. Pl.'s Mem. at 11. Defendant responds that an ALJ's obligation is to "consider[] the totality of the evidence in arriving at a conclusion on the ultimate question of disability." Def.'s Mem. at 9 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927). A claimant's RFC is the most she can do despite her limitations and is based upon an evaluation of all the relevant evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.150(e), 404.1545(a)(1), (a)(3); Social Security Ruling (SSR) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *1-2 (July 2, 1996).

As noted above, the ALJ ultimately made the following RFC assessment:

Tr. at 27 (emphasis omitted). In her Decision, the ALJ then went on to discuss Plaintiff's testimony and the medical evidence of record. Tr. at 27-28. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff's "medically determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some of the alleged symptoms; however, [Plaintiff's] statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of these symptoms are not entirely credible." Tr. at 28. The ALJ supported this credibility finding by noting the following medical evidence of record:

Tr. 28 (citations omitted).

In summarizing the Decision, the ALJ stated that "[w]hile [Plaintiff's] impairments produce limitations, the objective evidence as a whole does not suggest that her impairments render her unable to perform any work, and the limitations that do exist are adequately accommodated within her [RFC]." Tr. 30. A review of the Decision reveals the ALJ considered the totality of the evidence in making her RFC finding and her Decision is supported by substantial evidence. With regard to the right shoulder injury, the ALJ reviewed the treating doctor's opinions and the other medical opinions of record, all of whom recognized a limitation of the Plaintiff's ability to use her right upper extremity. Tr. at 29. The ALJ gave significant weight to these opinions to the extent they were "consistent with the other objective medical evidence of record, including [Plaintiff's] treatment records." Tr. at 30. The ALJ considered the other medical evidence of record and Plaintiff's own testimony, Tr. 27-28, in determining that Plaintiff is not as limited as she claims. Thus, the ALJ properly considered the medical opinions, including Plaintiff's treating doctors, and gave them significant weight to the extent their opinions were consistent with the other objective medical evidence of record including Plaintiff's treatment records and her own testimony. Accordingly, the ALJ's Decision is supported by substantial evidence and due to be affirmed.

V. Conclusion

After due consideration, it is

ORDERED:

1. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), as incorporated by § 1383(c)(3), AFFIRMING the Commissioner's final decision.

2. The Clerk is further directed to close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED.