JAMES S. MOODY, Jr., District Judge.
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Plaintiff's Motion to Authorize Voluntary Dismissal (Doc. 15), Defendant's Response in Opposition (Doc. 16), and Plaintiff's Reply (Doc. 19). The Court, having reviewed the motion, response, and reply, and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, concludes that the motion should be granted in part with conditions.
Plaintiff's motion seeks, in relevant part, leave to dismiss its case under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) without prejudice. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A) provides that a "plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing: (i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves either an answer or a motion for summary judgment; or (ii) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Where a defendant, like Defendant in this case, has already served an answer, "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) (emphasis added).
Generally, "[a] district court enjoys broad discretion in determining whether to allow a voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2)." Arias v. Cameron, 776 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Pontenberg v. Bos. Scientific Corp., 252 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam)). "In most cases, a voluntary dismissal should be granted unless the defendant will suffer clear legal prejudice, other than the mere prospect of a subsequent lawsuit, as a result." Pontenberg, 252 F.3d at 1255 (emphasis in original) (citing McCants v. Ford Motor Co., 781 F.2d 855, 856-57 (11th Cir. 1986)). "The crucial question to be determined is, [w]ould the defendant lose any substantial right by the dismissal." Pontenberg, 252 F.3d at 1255 (citing Durham v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 385 F.2d 366, 368 (5th Cir.1967)). In exercising its broad equitable discretion under Rule 41(a)(2), the "court should weigh the relevant equities and do justice between the parties in each case, imposing such costs and attaching such conditions to the dismissal as are deemed appropriate." Arias, 776 F.3d at 1269 (citing McCants, 781 F.2d at 857).
Defendant opposes Plaintiff's motion to the extent that Defendant contends that the Court should condition the dismissal on payment of Defendant's attorney's fees and costs incurred in this case to date. In light of this opposition, the Court turns to the relevant factors with respect to weighing the equities to determine the appropriate resolution.
This is a post-judgment collection action; Plaintiff filed a two-page complaint on November 16, 2015, to collect on a judgment that was entered against Defendant in Wisconsin.
However, the Court acknowledges the practical prejudice of the attorney's fees that Defendant has incurred in defending this action, especially in light of Defendant's argument that Plaintiff will likely refile this action in Wisconsin and Defendant will have to retain Wisconsin counsel to defend that action. The Court finds it appropriate to attach conditions to the dismissal. Accordingly, it is
1. Plaintiff's Motion to Authorize Voluntary Dismissal (Doc. 15) is granted on the condition that
2. Plaintiff shall inform the Court within seven (7) days from the date of this Order as to whether it agrees to the condition described in Paragraph 1, or instead wishes to withdraw its motion to dismiss and proceed with the case in this forum.
3. Plaintiff's alternative request to stay these proceedings is denied for the reasons stated in Defendant's response.