JOHN E. STEELE, Senior District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Correct Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. #87) filed on April 7, 2016. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #103) on April 25, 2016, and defendant filed a Reply (Doc. #107) on May 3, 2016, with leave of Court. Because the Case Management and Scheduling Order is accurate, there is nothing to correct and the motion is denied. On May 18, 2016, defendant filed a Motion to Stay Those Pretrial Deadlines Dependent on Whether Trial is a Jury or Non-Jury Trial (Doc. #112) seeking to stay the requirement to exchange jury instructions, verdict forms, and voir dire, and to submit a trial brief until such time as the issue is decided.
This is a state court case which was removed to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. (Doc. #1.) Neither the Complaint (Doc. #2) nor the Answer (Doc. #5) contain a demand for a jury trial. Nonetheless, the Case Management Report (Doc. #12) filed on June 2, 2014, and signed by counsel for both parties, states that the parties agreed to a jury trial, and estimated its length at five days (Doc. #12, p. 2). As a result, the June 9, 2014, Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. #15, p. 2) scheduled the case as a jury trial. Defendant now seeks to "correct" this order because the Intercreditor Agreement waived the right to trial by jury. Defendant asks that the Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. #15), and Amended Case Management and Scheduling Order (Doc. #50) to the extent it incorporates the prior Scheduling Order, be amended to reflect that there is no jury demand.
Because the parties jointly agreed to a jury trial in a document filed with the Court despite the known provision in the Intercreditor Agreement, the Court finds that a jury trial was sufficiently asserted. A written demand for trial by jury is not limited to the pleadings and is made upon service to the other party. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b). Without the consent of all parties to proceed to a nonjury trial,
Defendant does raise a collateral issue in its Reply which is outside the scope of its motion to correct. Defendant asserts that plaintiff has no right to a jury trial because all the claims are equitable in nature. This touches on different issues than mere correction of a scheduling order, including whether all the claims are equitable in nature, whether this characterization alone is sufficient to determine a right to a jury trial, and whether the parties can agree to a jury trial where no such right would otherwise exist. None of these matters, and perhaps others, are properly before the Court.
Accordingly, it is hereby