OPINION AND ORDER1

SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL, District Judge.

Petitioner Shedrick Smith ("Petitioner" or "Smith"), initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. #1, "Petition") and memorandum of law (Doc. #2, "Memorandum") on May 16, 2013.2 Pursuant to the Court's Order to respond and show cause why the Petition should not be granted (Doc. #8), Respondent filed a Limited Response (Doc. #10, Response) arguing that the Petition is time barred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) because the evidence that Petitioner claims was "newly discovered" was not newly discovered.3 Respondent submits exhibits (Exhs. 1-22) in support of the Response. See Appendix of Exhibits (Doc. #12). Petitioner filed a reply to the Response (Doc. #14, Reply). This matter is ripe for review.

Petitioner challenges his 1999 judgment of conviction for first degree felony murder (Count One); attempted armed robbery (firearm/deadly weapon)(Count Two); and Possession of firearm by convicted felon (Count Three) entered by the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court, Lee County, Florida (case number 98-CF-2356). Petitioner was sentenced to life without parole on March 8, 2000. Petition at 1. Petitioner's sentences and conviction were per curiam affirmed on direct appeal on Friday, April 20, 2001. Exh. 5. Consequently, Petitioner's state conviction became final on Wednesday, July 18, 2001. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) and Rule of the Supreme Court of the United States, Rule 13.3 (ninety days after entry of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed).4 This was after the April 24, 1996, effective date of the AEDPA. Thus, Petitioner's one-year time period for filing a federal habeas challenging his conviction expired on Thursday, July 18, 2002. 5 Consequently, the Petition filed in this Court on May 16, 2013, would be untimely, unless Petitioner availed himself of one of the statutory provisions which extends or tolls the time period.

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), the limitations period is tolled during the time that "a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending." Here, 582 days of the federal limitations period elapsed before Petitioner filed his first state post-conviction motion — a motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 filed on February 20, 2003. See Exh. 5 (state court docket sheet); see also Exh. 6. However, by that time, Petitioner's AEDPA period had lapsed, and the Rule 3.850 motion could not operate to toll the statute of limitation. See Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (a state court petition that is filed following the expiration of the federal limitations cannot toll the limitations period because there is no remaining period to be tolled). Consequently, the subsequent motions for postconviction relief filed by Petitioner, whether timely filed under Florida law or whether properly filed, are inconsequential for purposes of determining the timeliness of the Petition sub judice. "Once the AEDPA's limitations period expires, it cannot be reinitiated." Davis v. McDonough, No. 8:03-CV-1807-T-27TBM, 2006 WL 2801986, *4 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 2006)(citing Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333-34 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1144 (2002)). Thus, the instant Petition is due to be dismissed as untimely.

Petitioner argues that the Petition is not untimely because his one year to file the instant Petition should be calculated from the date he discovered "new evidence." See generally Memorandum. Petitioner refers the Court to certain arguments raised in the Petition and Memorandum (concerning: (1) counsel was ineffective where failing to move for suppression of Smith's statement where it was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to move for suppression of physical evidence, which was obtained in violation of his Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Constitutional rights), contending that these claims were based on newly discovered evidence.

Under § 2244(d)(1)(D), the one-year limitations period may run from the date on which, as a result of exercising due diligence, the petitioner could have discovered the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner's arguments are unavailing. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has found that the key inquiry in determining timeliness under § 2244(d)(1)(D), is whether the petitioner exercised due diligence in discovering the evidence. Aron v. United States, 291 F.3d 708, 711 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating—in the context of a nearly identical provision in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4)—that "the court should begin the timeliness inquiry . . . by determining whether the petitioner exercised due diligence."); see also Ross v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 517 F. App'x 731, 733 (11th Cir. 2013)(unpublished) (applying Aron in a § 2254 case). Petitioner is "presumed to have conducted a reasonable investigation of all facts surrounding [his] prosecution." In re Boshears, 110 F.3d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 498 (1991)). Due diligence in this context means reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence. Aron, 291 F.3d at 712. None of the arguments Petitioner raises actually involve new evidence to trigger a later start date for the one-year limitations period because the factual predicate for the claims were available prior to trial. Specifically, as Respondent points out, information pertaining to the police informant wearing a wiretap was included in a police report and in a search warrant for Petitioner's home. Response at 6 (citing Exh. 16). Although Petitioner claims he did not discover this information from the police file until he filed a Freedom of Information Act request, see Memorandum, Petitioner acknowledges that he was aware of the recorded statements at the time he waived his Miranda rights and provided incriminating statements. Id. at 7 (citing Petition at 6; Exh. 20 at 4).

A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he can demonstrate that: (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way. Id. at 2562 (internal quotations and citations omitted). "The diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is `reasonable diligence,' not maximum feasible diligence." Id. at 2565. Further, to demonstrate the "extraordinary circumstance" prong, a petitioner "must show a causal connection between the alleged extraordinary circumstances and the late filing of the petition." San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that equitable tolling applies. Drew v. Dep't of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002). Petitioner does not make such a showing in this case.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds the Petition is time barred and finds Petitioner has not demonstrated a justifiable reason why the dictates of the one-year limitations period should not be imposed upon him. Therefore, the Court will dismiss this case with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. The § 2254 Petition (Doc. #1) is DISMISSED with prejudice as time-barred.

2. The Clerk shall enter judgment dismissing this case with prejudice, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close this case.

CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS DENIED

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. A prisoner seeking to appeal a district court's final order denying his petition writ of habeas has no absolute entitlement to appeal but must obtain a certificate of appealability ("COA"). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009). "A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) or, that "the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further," Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003)(citations omitted). Petitioner has not made the requisite showing in these circumstances.

Finally, because Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.

DONE and ORDERED.