Filed: Aug. 24, 2016
Latest Update: Aug. 24, 2016
Summary: ORDER PHILIP R. LAMMENS , Magistrate Judge . In this case, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, appeals a decision regarding her "social security disability case." (Doc. 1). Defendant, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, has answered the Complaint (Doc. 14), and a briefing schedule has been established by the Court's Scheduling Order (Doc. 18). Plaintiff, however, has also filed two sets of documents titled "Additional Supplement," containing medical information. (Docs. 7 & 13). Defendan
Summary: ORDER PHILIP R. LAMMENS , Magistrate Judge . In this case, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, appeals a decision regarding her "social security disability case." (Doc. 1). Defendant, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, has answered the Complaint (Doc. 14), and a briefing schedule has been established by the Court's Scheduling Order (Doc. 18). Plaintiff, however, has also filed two sets of documents titled "Additional Supplement," containing medical information. (Docs. 7 & 13). Defendant..
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ORDER
PHILIP R. LAMMENS, Magistrate Judge.
In this case, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, appeals a decision regarding her "social security disability case." (Doc. 1). Defendant, the Acting Commissioner of Social Security, has answered the Complaint (Doc. 14), and a briefing schedule has been established by the Court's Scheduling Order (Doc. 18). Plaintiff, however, has also filed two sets of documents titled "Additional Supplement," containing medical information. (Docs. 7 & 13). Defendant has moved to strike both sets of documents and contends that supplementing the record is not appropriate in proceedings under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
Indeed, Section 405(g) expressly limits the Court's jurisdiction to a review of the pleadings and the certified transcript of the administrative record. Consideration of extra-record evidence is precluded. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) provides as follows:
[A]ny individual, after any final decision of the Commissioner made after a hearing to which he was a party. . . may obtain a review of such decision by a civil action. . . As part of his answer the Commissioner shall file a certified copy of the transcript of the record including the evidence upon which the findings and decision complained of are based. The court shall have power to enter, upon the pleadings and transcript of the record, a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner, with or without remanding the case for a rehearing. The findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . .
42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3) (providing that cases arising under Title XVI of the Social Security Act are subject to judicial review as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to the same extent as the Commissioner's final determinations under Title II.).
Thus, a court's review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). The Eleventh Circuit has confirmed that the district court is limited to a substantial evidence review of the record made at the administrative level. See Caulder v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 872, 876 (11th Cir. 1986) (noting that a federal court does not examine evidence that was not considered in the administrative proceedings, but can remand for the Commissioner to consider the evidence if the claimant makes a sufficient showing); see also Ingram v. Commissioner of Social Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1267-68 (11th Cir. 2007) (explaining that the Court had previously held in Caulder that a reviewing court may not consider evidence first presented to the court for purposes of sentence four remand because "a reviewing court is limited to the certified administrative record in examining the evidence" (quoting Caulder, 791 F.2d at 876)).
Here, the evidence submitted by Plaintiff is also inappropriate for consideration for a remand under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) because it relates to a time period almost two years after the ALJ's decision. To satisfy the criteria for a remand under sentence six of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), a claimant must establish that (1) the evidence is new and noncumulative; (2) the evidence is material such that a reasonable possibility exists that it would change the administrative result; and (3) there was good cause for the failure to submit the evidence at the administrative level. See Caulder, 791 F.2d at 877. The relevant question before this Court is whether Plaintiff was "entitled to benefits during a specific period of time, which period was necessarily prior to the date of the ALJ's decision." Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999). Plaintiff would have to show that the evidence is material to her condition on or before June 5, 2014, the date of the ALJ's decision in this case (Tr. 77-89).
Plaintiff's "supplements" consist of treatment records and documents regarding medication which are dated between April and June 2016, and thus, post-date the ALJ's decision by almost two years (Docs. 7, 13). The documents do not speak directly to Plaintiff's condition on or before June 5, 2014. See id. (noting that although a physician's opinion rendered after an ALJ's decision may be relevant to whether a subsequent deterioration occurred in the claimant's condition, it is not probative of the period considered by the ALJ). Plaintiff does not explain how the records relate to the relevant period before this Court. The undersigned agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff has not met the criteria for remand under sentence six. See Caulder, 791 F.2d at 877.
Accordingly, upon due consideration, Defendant's motion to strike (Doc. 15) is GRANTED, and the supplemental evidence submitted by Plaintiff (Docs. 7 & 14) is hereby STRICKEN, but shall remain as filed.
DONE and ORDERED.
