ORDER

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN, District Judge.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Leonard Anthony Settles II,1 Keith Byrd,2 Nilda Angelica Sharp,3 and Michelle Hembrock4 ("Plaintiffs") were involuntarily confined at River Point5 a mental health treatment facility in Jacksonville, Florida, pursuant to the Florida Mental Health Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 394.451-394.47891 (2015) (the "Baker Act"). Plaintiffs allege that River Point is a designated receiving facility under the Baker Act, which permits it to receive and treat involuntary patients. Id. § 394.461. In 2016, Plaintiffs filed four separate cases alleging that Defendants UHS,6 Premier,7 TBJ,8 all d/b/a River Point,9 Baptist,10 Lepely,11 Rashid,12 Charboneau,13 John Does 1-5, and Jane Does 1-5 ("Defendants") violated state and federal laws in connection with Plaintiffs' commitment at River Point.14 Although the facts of their individual cases differ, Plaintiffs each allege that they did not meet the criteria for involuntary confinement under the Baker Act, as they were not dangerous to themselves or others and had not been charged with a crime during their involuntary confinement. Further, they allege that their confinement stemmed from a fraudulent scheme concocted by Defendants to submit false claims to insurers for reimbursement of medically unnecessary services.

These cases are now before the Court on Defendants' motions to dismiss, to which Plaintiffs have responded.15

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal notice pleading requires only that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Though the court assumes the factual allegations in the complaint are true in evaluating a motion to dismiss, it disregards all legal conclusions drawn from the facts, conclusory allegations, and unwarranted deductions of fact. Burroughs v. Broadspire, 323 F. App'x 730, 731 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh Produce, N.A., Inc., 416 F.3d 1242, 1246 (11th Cir. 2005)).

III. FEDERAL CLAIMS

While Plaintiffs have alleged multiple counts in the four complaints, the Court begins with the claim for deprivation of civil rights under § 1983, the only federal claim in each of the cases. "A successful section 1983 action requires a showing that the conduct complained of (1) was committed by a person acting under color of state law and (2) deprived the complainant of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Harvey v. Harvey, 949 F.2d 1127, 1130 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156-57 (1978)). Plaintiffs allege that Defendants acted under color of state law—specifically, the Baker Act—and that they were deprived of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to liberty, freedom from unlawful searches and seizures, and due process of law.

Taking the factual allegations in the complaints as true, as the Court must in reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged a violation of their constitutional rights because, as the Eleventh Circuit has found, involuntary commitment implicates the liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. See id. However, the Court must address the equally vital question of whether Defendants acted under color of state law or whether their actions are "fairly attributable to the state." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982).

"Merely acting pursuant to a statute does not make one's conduct `under color of state law.'" Foshee v. Health Mgmt. Associates, 675 So.2d 957, 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (affirming circuit court's dismissal of a count which failed to properly plead a § 1983 cause of action because defendants were not state actors). In considering whether a plaintiff could maintain an action against a private psychiatric facility, nurse, and psychiatrist for deprivation of her rights while acting pursuant to the Baker Act, the Foshee court concluded that the defendants were not state actors subject to suit under § 1983. Id. at 959-60. The court noted that rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments, and the deprivation of rights must be fairly attributable to the state. Id. at 960. Without such limits, "private parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the community surrounding them." Id. (quoting Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939); see also Harvey, 949 F.2d at 1132 (holding private hospital and private physicians acting pursuant to Georgia commitment statute were not state actors under § 1983 and stating that "[t]o hold otherwise would expose private hospitals and private physicians to section 1983 liability whenever they act pursuant to the Georgia commitment statutes, despite the fact that their actions ultimately reflect medical judgments . . . that are not established by the state").

According to the allegations in Plaintiffs' complaints, Defendants are either corporate entities or employees or agents thereof. Plaintiffs allege that Universal "is one of the largest owners of mental health facilities in the United States." (See e.g., Sharp, Doc. 2 ¶ 15). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Universal and Premier are Delaware corporations, and TBJ is a Delaware limited liability company. (Id. ¶¶ 5-7). Premier, TBJ, and River Point are allegedly subsidiaries of UHS and do business as River Point. (Id. ¶ 9). Hembrock, the only plaintiff to name Baptist as a defendant, alleges that it is a Florida corporation. (See Hembrock, Doc. 2 ¶ 5). The individual defendants are allegedly employees or agents of these businesses.

Other than reincorporating previous allegations, the allegations in the § 1983 counts do not state any facts demonstrating that Defendants are state actors, nor do Plaintiffs allege that River Point is a state hospital. To the contrary, Plaintiffs have only alleged facts demonstrating that Defendants are private institutions and their employees or agents.16 Moreover, in their responses, Plaintiffs fail to substantively respond to Defendants' arguments or address the case law cited in Defendants' briefs. They merely reiterate that "Defendants were acting under color of state law, specifically the Baker Act" and offer no legal authority to support this conclusory allegation. (See e.g., Byrd, Doc. 11 at 9). Although they request leave to amend the complaint if the Court determines the claim is due to be dismissed, they provide no explanation as to what facts they would include in an amended complaint which would demonstrate that Defendants are state actors. Therefore, the Court finds that further amendment on this point would be futile. Simply because one acts pursuant to, or even under the authority of, a statute does not make one a state actor, and as a result, § 1983 offers no relief here. Thus, Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are due to be granted.

IV. STATE LAW CLAIMS

Having dismissed the only grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction in all four cases, the Court turns to the issues of whether: (1) it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims in Settles; and (2) remand is appropriate in Byrd, Sharp, and Hembrock, the three cases which were removed from state court.

A. Supplemental Jurisdiction in Settles

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. Only two claims remain in Settles, both of which arise under state law: false imprisonment and a violation of Fla. Stat. § 772.103. (Doc. 8). Because this case is in its very early stages, and it is preferable for Florida courts to make rulings on issues of Florida law, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Settles's state law claims. See Carr v. Tatangelo, 156 F.Supp.2d 1369, 1380 (M.D. Ga. 2001), aff'd, 338 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2003), as amended (Sept. 29, 2003) ("According to the Supreme Court, `When the balance of [judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity] indicates that a case properly belongs in state court, as when the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice.'") (emphasis in original) (citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)).

B. Remand in Byrd, Sharp, and Hembrock

Next, in deciding whether remand is appropriate, the Court must determine whether purely state law claims remain and if so, weigh the Carnegie-Mellon factors to determine whether remand is "judicious at this stage of the proceedings." Lake Cty. v. NRG/Recovery Grp., Inc., 144 F.Supp.2d 1316, 1320 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (remand to state court was appropriate where plaintiff's amended complaint did not include any federal claims). Here, all remaining counts in the three complaints contain allegations concerning state common law claims and Florida statutory violations, see supra n.2-4, all of which will be resolved exclusively under Florida law; thus, no federal question is present.

Even though the Court concludes that only state law claims remain in the cases, the Court must weigh and consider the factors of "economy, convenience, fairness, and comity" in determining whether the Court should exercise its discretion to remand the cases. Carnegie-Mellon, 484 U.S. at 350. Because these cases are in their very early stages, economy and convenience weigh in favor of remand. Defendants have not yet answered the complaints because they filed motions to dismiss. Further, it is reasonable to assume discovery is also in its early stages. The Court has not yet expended a significant amount of judicial labor and time at this point and remand would not require the state court to duplicate its efforts. Next, principles of comity weigh in favor of remanding these cases, for the remaining counts require the court to interpret state common law claims and Florida statutes, which are best suited for determination by a state court. Finally, principles of fairness support remand. These cases do not involve the forum shopping concerns implicated in Carnegie-Mellon, where federal claims were eliminated late in a case to secure a state court judge to try a case after the federal court expended significant resources. Moreover, remand to state court effectuates Byrd, Sharp, and Hembrock's original choice of a state forum.

Having weighed the economy, convenience, comity, and fairness of remand, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Byrd, Sharp, and Hembrock's state law claims and will remand these cases to the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County, Florida.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED:

1. In Settles, Case No. 3:16-cv-1-J-32JRK,

a. The following motions are GRANTED as to Count II (deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Doc. 8), which is DISMISSED with prejudice:

i. Defendant Henry Lepely, M.D.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, or in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement and Incorporated Motion to Strike (Doc. 13);

ii. Defendants Universal Health Services, Premier Behavioral Solutions, Inc., TBJ Behavioral Center, LLC, all d/b/a River Point Behavioral Health, and Roxanne Charboneau's Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and/or Motion to Strike (Doc. 18); and

iii. Defendant Paul Ferris Rashid, M.D.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 23).

b. Because Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, Settles's state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice.

2. In Byrd, Case No. 3:16-cv-878-J-32PDB,

a. Defendants Universal Health Services, Inc., Premier Behavioral

Solutions, Inc., TBJ Behavioral Center, LLC, all d/b/a River Point Behavioral Health's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and/or Motion to Strike (Doc. 7) is GRANTED as to Count II (deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Doc. 2), which is DISMISSED with prejudice.

b. The case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County, Florida, and the motion to dismiss as to the state law claims is carried with the case.

3. In Sharp, Case No. 3:16-cv-880-J-32MCR,

a. The following motions are GRANTED as to Count VIII (deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Doc. 2), which is DISMISSED with prejudice:

i. Defendant Henry Lepely, M.D.'s Amended Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, or in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement and Incorporated Motion to Strike (Doc. 6); and

ii. Defendants Universal Health Services, Inc., Premier Behavioral Solutions, Inc., TBJ Behavioral Center, LLC, all d/b/a River Point Behavioral Health's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 7).

b. The case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County, Florida, and the motions to dismiss as to the state law claims are carried with the case.

4. In Hembrock, Case No. 3:16-cv-1061-J-32JBT,

a. The following motions are GRANTED as to Count IX (misnumbered, actually is Count X) (deprivation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) (Doc. 2), which is DISMISSED with prejudice:

i. Defendant Henry Lepely, M.D.'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint, or in the Alternative, Motion for More Definite Statement and Incorporated Motion to Strike (Doc. 4); and

ii. Defendants Universal Health Services, Inc., Premier Behavioral Solutions, Inc., TBJ Behavioral Center, LLC, all d/b/a River Point Behavioral Health, and Roxanne Charboneau's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint and/or Motion to Strike (Doc. 5).

b. The case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County, Florida, and the motions to dismiss as to the state law claims are carried with the case.

5. The hearing on all pending motions set for October 21, 2016 at 10:00 A.M. is CANCELLED.

6. The Clerk shall close the file in Settles. After remand has been effected in Byrd, Sharp, and Hembrock, the Clerk shall close those files.

DONE AND ORDERED.