SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant, Ira Shawntae Shaw's Motion to Suppress
At the hearing, the Government was represented by Assistant United States Attorney Jeffrey Michelland. The Government presented evidence and called Fort Myers Police Officer Lesa Breneman and Detective Emily DeStefanis as witnesses.
On May 25, 2016, officers from the Fort Myers Police Department (FMPD) investigated a report that Ira Shaw was outside the Thomas Street Apartments (the Apartments) located at 2930 Thomas Street, Fort Myers, Florida threatening people with a hand gun. Ofc. Lisa Breneman of the FMPD received a call to investigate the incident at 12:27pm. Ofc Breneman confronted Shaw at the scene. Shaw informed Ofc. Breneman that he was at the Apartment to smoke weed with his cousin. Ofc. Breneman observed part of a plastic baggie protruding from the front pocket of Shaw's pants. She inquired of Shaw as to the contents of the baggie. Shaw informed her that the baggie contained weed. Ofc Breneman asked Shaw to hand her the baggie. Shaw gave the baggie to Ofc. Breneman. Ofc. Breneman testified that the baggie contained a green leafy substance which she recognized by sight and odor as marijuana.
Shaw was arrested for being in possession of marijuana at approximately 12:40:30pm. Ofc. Breneman placed Shaw in the back of her patrol car while officers conducted a search of the area. An officer of the FMPD along with his canine Thor conducted a search of the area and found a firearm laying on the ground in an adjacent yard. The FMPD log shows the firearm was located at 1:05pm. Shaw remained in the back of the police cruiser until 1:34pm at which time he was transported to Police Headquarters arriving at approximately 1:38pm.
Det. Emily DeStefanis arrived on the scene approximately 12:45pm. She spoke with Ofc. Breneman and then spoke with Shaw's grandfather who resided at the Apartments. Det. Destefanis went through the Grandfathers apartment and found ammunition but could not attribute it to Shaw. Det. Destefanis was informed that a firearm was recovered from a yard that was adjacent to the Apartment's grounds. Det. Destefanis remained at the Apartment for another thirty to forty minutes after Shaw was transported. Det. DeStefanis took possession of the firearm. The magazine was removed from the firearm and the firearm and magazine were placed in a paper bag. Det. DeStefanis then delivered the firearm to the FMPD Crime Scene Unit from approximately 3:00pm to 3:15pm.
Crime Scene Technician, Marissa Poppell found a fingerprint on the magazine. The fingerprint recovered from the firearm's magazine was analyzed by Trina Maurice an FMPD Crime Scene/Latent Print Analyst. Maurice found that the print on the magazine matched a known print of Shaw taken from a FMPD file. Maurice also took a fresh set of prints from Shaw's fingerprints while he was waiting in the interrogation room. Maurice then confirmed that the print on the firearm's magazine also matched the freshly rolled prints from Shaw.
Shaw was being held in an interview room at FMPD where he had been brought at approximately 4:11pm. Det. DeStefanis began the interview around 4:30pm. Det. DeStefanis knew that Shaw was a suspect in two homicides. During the interview, Det. DeStefanis told Shaw that she wanted to talk to him about the murder of an individual known to Shaw named Pop which occurred approximately five years prior to Shaw's instant arrest. Det. DeStefanis also told Shaw she wanted to know what he knew about the murder of Victor Johnson which had occurred recently. She informed Shaw that since he was considered as a witness to the murders she would need to swear him in as a witness.
After swearing Shaw, Det. DeStefanis informed him that since he was under arrest and not free to leave because of the instant possession charge, she was going to read him his Miranda rights. Det. DeStefanis read Shaw his Miranda rights from an FMPD form. Det. DeStefanis read the form as follows:
After hearing his Miranda rights, Shaw signed the consent form waiving his Miranda rights at approximately 4:26pm. Upon signing the consent to waive his rights, Shaw acknowledged that Det. DeStefanis did not threaten, coerce, or make him uncomfortable in anyway and then agreed to speak with Det. DeStefanis.
During questioning, Shaw at first denied that he had possession of the firearm. When asked by Det. DeStefanis if there was any reason why his fingerprints would be on the firearm recovered by the FMPD, Shaw stated that he threw the firearm into the adjacent yard for somebody else. The interview continued as follows:
Det. DeStefanis left the interrogation room for approximately one hour. When she returned Shaw admitted that the firearm was his. The interview continued:
During the interview with Det. DeStefanis, Shaw told her that he was fearful of his life because of the rumors on the street that he was involved in the murder of Pop and Victor. DeStefanis also told Shaw he needed to think hard about what he wanted to say in regards to the murders of Pop and Victor because he did not want someone else raising his kids. DeStefanis continued:
No further mention is made about the firearm during the remainder of the interview.
Shaw avers that all of the statements he made during his interview with Det. DeStefanis on May 25, 2016, were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Government replies that Shaw knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights when he made his incriminating statements.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that "[n]o person... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend. V. The United States Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona considered the scope of this Fifth Amendment guarantee against self-incrimination. Sanchez-Toribio v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 557 F.Supp.2d 1322, 1331-32 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S .Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)). In Miranda, the Court held that before a suspect, in custody, can be interrogated, the suspect must be informed of his right to remain silent, that what he says can be used against him, and the right to have an attorney during interrogation, or if he cannot afford an attorney, the right to have one appointed. Id. at 478-479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. It is clearly established federal law that a state cannot introduce a suspect's testimony provided in the absence of an attorney without first showing that the suspect made a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. Hart v. Attorney General for Fla., 323 F.3d 884, 891 (11th Cir.2003). A two-prong test is required to determine whether a waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent is twofold: First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986)).
Courts look at four factors, none of which are independently dispositive, to determine whether a statement is voluntary: (1) whether the Miranda warning was given; (2) "`[t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession'"; (3) "`the presence of intervening factors'"; (4) "`the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.'" Lawhorn v. Allen, 519 F.3d 1272, 1291 (11th Cir.2008). To determine "knowing" and "intelligent" waiver of Miranda rights, the courts focus on the suspects' comprehension of their rights. Blanco v. Singletary, 943 F.2d 1477, 1509-1510 (11th Cir.1991) (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978)). "`If a defendant cannot understand the nature of his rights, he cannot waive them intelligently.' " Sanchez-Toribio, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-32 (citing Miller v. Dugger, 838 F.2d 1530, 1539 (11th Cir.1988)). Further, although a suspect's signature on a waiver of Miranda rights form is strong evidence, it is not conclusive evidence that the rights were waived. Id. (citing Hart, 323 F.3d at 893 (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)). Rather, the court must look to the "totality of the circumstances." Sanchez-Toribio, 557 F. Supp. 2d at 1331-32. A suspects' age, experience, education, background, intelligence, and physical and mental condition are factors to be considered in determining whether the waiver was made knowingly under the totality of circumstances. Narine v. Sec'y, No. 809-CV-1005-T-30TGW, 2010 WL 746440, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2010) (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979)).
Shaw claims that he was coerced into making incriminating statements by the misrepresentations made by Det. DeStefanis during the interview. Shaw states that DeStefanis undermined the reading of his Miranda rights by swearing him in as a witness and not as the subject of an investigation. Contrary to Shaw's position, Det. DeStefanis was very clear when she told Shaw that she was swearing him in as a witness for questions regarding the murders of Pop and Victor Johnson. After she swore Shaw, Det. Destefanis also clearly informed him that he was under arrest on other charges. Det. Destefanis said "[o]kay alright now we'll go down through this like I said because you have your charge and you're under arrest I'm gonna read this portion to you and then I'll get your height weight and all that stuff okay? Before we ask you any questions any you must understand your rights."
It's clear from the transcript that DeStefanis explained to Shaw the difference between swearing him as a witness in the ongoing murder investigations and reading him his Miranda rights for the criminal charge against him. Shaw was clear that he understood his rights as read by DeStefanis and agreed that she had not coerced him nor threatened him in any way when he agreed to speak with her. Given Shaw's past experiences in the judicial system—arrested in 2007 for Home Invasion Robbery, 2015 arrested for marijuana possession—he clearly had the experience to understand the process.
Shaw further claims that Det. DeStefanis' statements that she would testify before a jury that Shaw was not honest and the jury would throw away the key were made to undermine Miranda. Shaw argues that Det. DeStefanis was cajoling him into making an incriminating statement by suggesting if he did she would tell the jury he was honest and he would get leniency. Conversely, if Shaw lied to her, the jury would give him a more severe sentence. Shaw further argues that Det. DeStefanis would be prohibited from telling a jury that he was not credible and as a police officer she would not have any say in his sentencing.
Shaw relies on Hart v. Attorney General for Fla. for his proposition that Det. DeStefanis' statements were so egregious that they violated Miranda. 323 F.3d at 893. In Hart, Defendant Hart and his co-defendants were indicted by a Dade County, Florida Grand Jury for first degree murder, armed robbery, burglary with assault and battery therein while armed, unlawful possession of a firearm while engaged in criminal conduct, and kidnapping. After his arrest Hart was interviewed by a Metro-Dade County police officer.
During the course of the interview, Hart asked the officer what would be the benefits of having a lawyer present during the interview. The officer told Hart that one disadvantage would be that "the lawyer would tell Hart not to answer incriminating questions," the officer continued that "honesty wouldn't hurt him." Hart subsequently confessed to the crimes and told Schuster the entire story. Hart was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the officer's comment contradicted the Miranda warnings given to Hart earlier in the interview.
Hart is easily distinguished from the instant case. In Hart, defendant was seeking advice on whether or not to evoke his right to counsel and was told by the interviewing officer that answering her questions honestly would not hurt him. The officer's statement contradicted Miranda's warning that anything you say can be used against you in a court of law. United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2010). By contradicting Miranda's warning that anything can be used against you, the officer mislead Hart concerning the consequences of relinquishing his right to remain silent. Id. As a result, Hart's confession was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent as required by Miranda. Id.
Here, unlike Hart, Det. DeStefanis did not specifically undermine Miranda, but instead represented to Shaw about how she might testify before a jury if he was not honest with her. However, contrary to Shaw's argument, a police officer's misrepresentation of facts is not enough to render a suspect's confession involuntary, nor will such misrepresentation undermine the waiver of a defendant's Miranda rights. Id. DeStefanis' statement that she would tell the jury he was not honest and the jury would throw away the key, while not correct, did not contradict nor undermine the Miranda warnings previously read to Shaw.
Shaw also argues that the corollary to DeStefanis' statement that the jury would throw away the key if he was not honest with her was that he would receive leniency for his confession. Promises of leniency are relevant to determining whether a confession was voluntary and, depending on the totality of the circumstances, may render the statement coerced. United States v. Herron, No. 2:14-CR-23-FTM-38, 2015 WL 867309, at *20 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2015) (citing Clanton v. Cooper, 129 F.3d 1147, 1159 (10th Cir.1997)). "[A] promise of leniency may render a confession involuntary if it was sufficiently compelling and linked to the confession so that it could be said that the defendant's will was overcome by the offer." Herron, 2015 WL 867309, at *20. Nevertheless, the Court may not speculate as to what Shaw may have read into DeStefanis' statements, because the mere perception of leniency on Shaw's part is insufficient for the Court to render Shaw's confession involuntary. United States v. Shears, 762 F.2d 397, 401-03 (4th Cir. 1985) (confession voluntary despite defendant's perception that leniency offered) United States v. Davidson, 768 F.2d 1266, 1271-72 (11th Cir. 1985) (confession voluntary despite agent's statement that although he could not promise anything, U.S. Attorney could recommend shorter sentence if defendant cooperated).
Det. DeStefanis' did not offer any suggestion of leniency, nor express any quid pro quo bargain for a confession. DeStefanis stated that the jury would throw away the key if she went before them and told the jury Shaw was not honest with her. Her generalized statement that the jury would throw away the key was clearly not a promise nor offer of leniency that would render Shaw's confession involuntary.
It is clear from the testimony and evidence presented during the suppression hearing, that Shaw voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights without any coercion, threats or offers of leniency. Consequently, based on the totality of the circumstances Shaw's wavier of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.
Accordingly, it is now
Defendant, Ira Shawntae Shaw's Motion to Suppress
