STEVEN D. MERRYDAY, District Judge.
Camacho-Maldonado moves to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) and challenges the validity of his convictions for both conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine while aboard a vessel and possession with the intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine while aboard a vessel, for which offenses he was sentenced to 151 months.
Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, requires both a preliminary review of the motion to vacate and a summary dismissal "[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief. . . ." Accord Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1980)
Camacho-Maldonado's earlier challenge to this same conviction was dismissed as time-barred. United States of America v. Eleazar Camacho-Maldonado, 8:13-cv-2405-T-23TBM. Camacho-Maldonado cannot pursue a second or successive motion without authorization from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. "Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996); Dunn v. Singletary, 168 F.3d 440, 442 (11th Cir. 1999). The determination that the earlier motion to vacate was time-barred precludes Camacho-Maldonado from again challenging either his conviction or his sentence without first obtaining authorization from the circuit court, as Candelario v. Warden, 592 Fed. App'x 784, 785 n.1 (11th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Candelario v. Wilson, 135 S.Ct. 2367 (2015), explains:
This new action is, therefore, a second or successive action that is subject to specific restrictions because a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive motion without the requisite authorization from the circuit court. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S.147, 157 (2007) ("Burton neither sought nor received authorization from the Court of Appeals before filing his 2002 petition, a `second or successive' petition challenging his custody, and so the District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain it."). Section 2255(h) permits authorizing a second or successive motion under two circumstances, specifically:
As a consequence, Camacho-Maldonado must obtain authorization from the circuit court to file a second or successive motion to vacate before jurisdiction is proper in the district court to review a second or successive motion under Section 2255. Camacho-Maldonado fails to represent that the circuit court has granted him the necessary authorization.
Accordingly, the motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) is
Camacho-Maldonado is not entitled to a certificate of appealability ("COA"). A prisoner moving under Section 2255 has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his motion to vacate. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court must first issue a COA. Section 2253(c)(2) permits issuing a COA "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." To merit a certificate of appealability, Camacho-Maldonado must show that reasonable jurists would find debatable both (1) the merits of the underlying claims and (2) the procedural issues he seeks to raise. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir 2001). Because the motion to vacate is clearly second or successive, Camacho-Maldonado is entitled to neither a COA nor leave to appeal in forma pauperis.
Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is