OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN E. STEELE, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Compel Individual Arbitration Stay Proceedings (Doc. #14) filed on September 26, 2016. Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. #18) on October 10, 2016, and defendant filed a reply (Doc. #21) on October 17, 2016. For the reasons set forth below, the proceedings are stayed and individual arbitration compelled.

I.

Chad Gregorius (plaintiff or Gregorius) initiated this action on July 29, 2016 by filing a three-count Complaint (Doc. #1) on behalf of himself and other similarly-situated individuals against his former employer, NPC International, Inc.1 (defendant or NPC). Plaintiff claims that he (and others) were denied overtime and minimum wage pay, in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Plaintiff also alleges violation of FLSA's tip-credit provision, 29 U.S.C. § 201(m). Defendant seeks to enforce an arbitration agreement and dismiss the Complaint, or to stay the case and compel arbitration.

What follows is a brief summary of the undisputed facts: plaintiff worked for defendant2 from on or about June 7, 2015 to May 19, 20163. On October 1, 2014, NPC implemented an Agreement to Arbitrate (Agreement) for all Pizza Hut employees hired after that date for electronic view and sign-off. (Docs. # 14-2, ¶7; 14-3.) The Agreement was available for signature by new-hire employees through a system known as SAP, via the company web portal. See Declaration of Rachel Berry (Doc. #14-2, ¶¶3-4.) To electronically sign a document in SAP, an employee must: (i) login to his or her SAP file using an individual sign-on access; (ii) open the "My Documents" tab; (iii) click on the individual document to be viewed, which opens the document in the full screen for review; (iv) after review, close the document; and (v) click on the "Acknowledged Document" box, which appears to the right of the document title. (Id. at ¶5.) Once an employee signs a document in SAP, the name of the document automatically populates in the "Acknowledged Documents" section of SAP, along with the date the employee signed it. (Id. at ¶6.) Rachel Berry, Director of Human Resources for NPC, states that based upon her review of the company records, plaintiff viewed and signed the Agreement on July 7, 2015, a copy of which is attached as an exhibit to her Declaration. (Id. at ¶10; Doc. #14-3.) To show this, plaintiff has included a screenshot of plaintiff's "Acknowledged Documents" in SAP, which lists the Agreement. (Doc. #14-4.)

The Agreement outlines in detail the process for resolving disputes between NPC and its employees, and provides in relevant part as follows:

(Doc. #14-3.)

Plaintiff also agreed that he may bring claims only individually, not as a class, and that he was giving up his rights to participate in a class or other representative action as follows:

(Doc. #14-3.)

In response, plaintiff does not dispute the substance of the Agreement, defects in its formation, or its validity. Instead, plaintiff asserts that because defendant failed to produce a signed arbitration agreement, defendant has failed to meet its burden to prove that an enforceable arbitration agreement exists between the parties. (Doc. #18, p. 1.)

II.

The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, applies to arbitration agreements involving interstate commerce. See 9 U.S.C. § 2; Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 113 (2001) (finding that the FAA's coverage provision includes employment contracts). According to the FAA, any "written [arbitration] provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. "Accordingly, the FAA requires a court to either stay or dismiss a lawsuit and to compel arbitration upon a showing that (a) the plaintiff entered into a written arbitration agreement that is enforceable under ordinary state-law contract principles and (b) the claims before the court fall within the scope of that agreement." Lambert v. Austin Ind., 544 F.3d 1192, 1195 (11th Cir. 2008). A court may only order parties to arbitration when it is "satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue." 9 U.S.C. § 4. "The principal purpose of the [Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)] is to ensure private arbitration agreements are enforced according to their terms." AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).

In Bazemore v. Jefferson Capital Sys., LLC, 827 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 2016), the court held that whether an enforceable contract or agreement to arbitrate exists must be examined using a summary-judgment like standard and "a district court may conclude as a matter of law that parties did or did not enter into an arbitration agreement only if `there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact' concerning the formation of such an agreement." 827 F.3d at 1333 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). "This court has consistently held that conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value" for a party resisting summary judgment. Id. (citing Leigh v. Warner Bros., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000) (quotation marks omitted)).

To determine whether an enforceable agreement to arbitrate exists, the Court notes that the Agreement was executed and plaintiff's claims arose in Florida. Under Florida law, a contract requires offer, acceptance, consideration, and sufficient specification of essential terms. Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying Florida law). "In Florida, `[a] party has a duty to learn and know the contents of a proposed contract before he signs and delivers it and is presumed to know and understand its contents, terms and conditions.'" Williams v. Eddie Acardi Motor Co., 3:07-cv-782-J-32JRK, 2008 WL 686222, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2008). An electronic signature may be used to sign a writing and has the same force and effect as a written signature. See Fla. Stat. § 668.50.

Here, the competent evidence offered by NPC is sufficient to establish the existence of an arbitration agreement entered into between it and Gregorius, including evidence that plaintiff at least electronically opened the Agreement and electronically signed it. Plaintiff has provided no evidentiary support that would show that he did not enter into an arbitration agreement with NPC. Just as in Bazemore, plaintiff "has not, for example, submitted an affidavit swearing under oath that []he never received" the arbitration agreement. 827 F.3d at 1329. Plaintiff's only argument — that defendant must produce a signed arbitration agreement — does not raise a fact issue as to the existence of a valid agreement. See Fla. Stat. § 668.50. The case cited by plaintiff in support, Barkley v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 6:14-cv-376-Orl-37DAB, 2014 WL 3908197, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2014), does not compel a different result. In Barkley, the employer could not find plaintiff's allegedly signed arbitration agreement, nor did anyone have a recollection that the agreement was signed. Id. at *3. That is not the case here.4

The Court further finds that plaintiff's FLSA claims are within the scope of the explicit terms of the Agreement. The contract's language is the best evidence of the parties' intent, and a court should look to the contract's plain meaning when interpreting it. Royal Oak Landing Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. Pelletier, 620 So.2d 786, 788 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Herpich v. Estate of Herpich, 994 So.2d 1195, 1197 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008).

III.

The final issue that defendant asks the Court to decide is whether plaintiff's claims must proceed to arbitration as individual claims only or may proceed to arbitration on behalf of a class. Under the terms of the contract which are particularly broad, the parties agreed that a judge, not an arbitrator, would decide this issue. (Doc. #14-3.) Pursuant to the Agreement, class arbitration is forbidden and the parties agreed to individual arbitration. Parties may agree to collective action and classwide arbitration waivers in arbitration agreements. Walthour v. Chipio Windshield Repair, LLC, 745 F.3d 1326, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 2014); Cruz v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 648 F.3d 1205, 1215-16 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333) (finding that to the extent Florida law would require the availability of classwide arbitration procedures, it would be inconsistent with and preempted by FAA § 2). Thus, plaintiff's claims will proceed to arbitration as individual claims only and not on behalf of a class. The matter will be stayed for its duration.

Accordingly, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:

1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or, Alternatively, Compel Individual Arbitration Stay Proceedings (Doc. #14) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part to the extent that the proceedings are stayed and individual arbitration is compelled. The motion is otherwise denied.

2. The case is hereby stayed pending notification by the parties that plaintiff has exhausted arbitration and the stay is due to be lifted or the case is due to be dismissed.

3. The Clerk shall terminate all deadlines and motions, and administratively close the case.

4. Defendant's Motion to Stay FLSA Scheduling Order Pending Resolution of Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration (Doc. #23) is DENIED AS MOOT.

DONE and ORDERED.