ORDER

ANTHONY E. PORCELLI, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the denial of his claim for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). As the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") decision was not based on substantial evidence and did not apply proper legal standards, the Commissioner's decision is reversed and remanded.

A. Procedural Background

Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and DIB. Tr. 169-70. The Commissioner denied Plaintiffs claims both initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 101-02; 106-11. Plaintiff then requested an administrative hearing. Tr. 112. Per Plaintiffs request, the ALJ held a hearing at which Plaintiff appeared and testified. Tr. 24-68. Following the hearing, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff not disabled and accordingly denied Plaintiffs claims for benefits. Tr. 8-23. Subsequently, Plaintiff requested review from the Appeals Council, which the Appeals Council denied. Tr. 1-5. Plaintiff then timely filed a complaint with this Court. (Dkt. No. 1.) The case is now ripe for review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3).

B. Factual Background and the ALJ's Decision

Plaintiff, who was born in 1965, claimed disability beginning February 25, 2011. Tr. 286. Plaintiff completed at least eighth grade but did not finish high school. Tr. 31; 191. Plaintiff's past relevant work experience included work as a maintenance worker. Tr. 197. Plaintiff alleged disability due to spina biffida occultis, learning disability, anxiety, and depression. Tr. 190.

In rendering the administrative decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31, 2014 and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 25, 2011, the alleged onset date. Tr. 13. After conducting a hearing and reviewing the evidence of record, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: anxiety, depression learning disability, ADD, affective disorder, spina bifida, osteoarthritis, and high cholesterol. Tr. 13. Notwithstanding the noted impairments, the ALJ determined Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 13. The ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff retained a residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work with several noted limitations. Tr. 15. In formulating Plaintiffs RFC, the ALJ considered Plaintiffs subjective complaints and determined that, although the evidence established the presence of underlying impairments that reasonably could be expected to produce the symptoms alleged, Plaintiffs statements as to the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely credible. Tr. 16.

Considering Plaintiffs noted impairments and the assessment of a vocational expert ("VE"), however, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could not perform his past relevant work. Tr. 17. Given Plaintiffs background and RFC, the VE testified that Plaintiff could perform other jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy, such as a garment sorter, ticketer, or book sorter. Tr. 18. Accordingly, based on Plaintiffs age, education, work experience, RFC, and the testimony of the VE, the ALJ found Plaintiff not disabled. Tr. 19.

II.

To be entitled to benefits, a claimant must be disabled, meaning the claimant must be unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). A "physical or mental impairment" is an impairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities, which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3).

The Social Security Administration, in order to regularize the adjudicative process, promulgated the detailed regulations currently in effect. These regulations establish a "sequential evaluation process" to determine whether a claimant is disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If an individual is found disabled at any point in the sequential review, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). Under this process, the ALJ must determine, in sequence, the following: whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity; whether the claimant has a severe impairment, i.e., one that significantly limits the ability to perform work-related functions; whether the severe impairment meets or equals the medical criteria of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; and whether the claimant can perform his or her past relevant work. If the claimant cannot perform the tasks required of his or her prior work, step five of the evaluation requires the ALJ to decide if the claimant can do other work in the national economy in view of his or her age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). A claimant is entitled to benefits only if unable to perform other work. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(g).

A determination by the Commissioner that a claimant is not disabled must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence and comports with applicable legal standards. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir. 1996). While the court reviews the Commissioner's decision with deference to the factual findings, no such deference is given to the legal conclusions. Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994) (citing Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991)).

In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the court may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the ALJ even if it finds that the evidence preponderates against the ALJ's decision. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). The Commissioner's failure to apply the correct law, or to give the reviewing court sufficient reasoning for determining that he or she has conducted the proper legal analysis, mandates reversal. Keeton, 21 F.3d at 1066. The scope of review is thus limited to determining whether the findings of the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam).

III.

Plaintiff argues here that the ALJ erred by failing to follow the opinions of the Drs. Abraham and Merin; failing to weigh the evidence in accordance with the law, specifically by failing to consider several other medical opinions; erroneously discounting Plaintiff's subjective testimony; and failing to adopt an opinion of the vocational expert. Because the ALJ failed to consider the opinion of Dr. Merin, the ALJ's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and must be remanded.

A. Legal Standard

When assessing the medical evidence, the ALJ must state with particularity the weight afforded to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor. Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). The Social Security regulations provide guidelines for the ALJ to employ when evaluating medical opinion evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527, 416.927. In determining the weight to afford a medical opinion, the ALJ considers a variety of factors including but not limited to the examining relationship, the treatment relationship, whether an opinion is well-supported, whether an opinion is consistent with the record as a whole, and the area of the doctor's specialization. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). For instance, the more a medical source presents evidence to support an opinion, such as medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight that medical opinion will receive. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 416.927(c)(3). Further, the more consistent the medical opinion is with the record as a whole, the more weight that opinion will receive. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4). The ALJ may reject any opinion when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion. Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam).

B. Analysis

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to take into account the opinion of Dr. Merin. On October 10, 2005, Dr. Jeffrey Merin, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, evaluated Plaintiff at the request of Kathy Sangster of the Division of Vocational Rehabilitation. Tr. 348. Dr. Merin noted that the reason for the referral was to determine the absence or presence of a specific developmental disorder and how Plaintiff's psychological symptoms might affect vocational rehabilitation. Tr. 348.

Dr. Merin's findings regarding Plaintiffs mental impairments could be characterized as mixed. On the one hand, Dr. Merin noted many positive attributes. Plaintiff presented to Dr. Merin as oriented in all spheres with no evidence of a manic condition or formal thought disorder. Tr. 350. Dr. Merin noted that he was adequately groomed, cooperative, task-oriented, and displayed good levels of effort and motivation. Tr. 350. Furthermore, Plaintiff denied suicidal ideation, suicidal behavior, and homicidal thoughts. Tr. 350. In addition, he noted that Plaintiff was in the average range regarding his information and comprehension skills and read at a high school level. Tr. 351. He concluded that Plaintiff would be able to read application forms and simple manuals. Tr. 353. Based on this analysis, Dr. Merin found no specific developmental disorder. Tr. 351.

On the other hand, Dr. Merin did note multiple unfavorable conditions. During the examination, he noted that Plaintiff was easily frustrated by cognitively challenging tasks. Tr. 350. In addition he had a borderline IQ range with a full scale IQ of 74. Tr. 351. He rated Plaintiffs spelling and arithmetic levels as being at the fifth grade level. Tr. 351. Despite the absence of a specific learning disorder, Plaintiff exhibited poor cognitive processing. Tr. 351. Dr. Merin concluded that Plaintiff's ability to acquire new skills was limited. Tr. 353.

Furthermore, Plaintiff exhibited moderate/marked depression. Tr. 352. His depression caused irritability and high levels of emotional defensiveness. Tr. 352. Dr. Merin noted that similar individuals tend to suffer intense feelings of inadequacy and insecurity and are easily frustrated with cognitive and physical challenges. Tr. 352. Dr. Merin also noted that, Plaintiffs symptoms were magnified in response to stressful situations, and contributing psychological factors may exacerbate underlying disorders. Tr. 352. Ultimately, Dr. Merin recommended that Plaintiff undergo further psychiatric evaluation, including an evaluation taking into account the ways in which his depression affected his physical symptoms. Tr. 354.

The ALJ does not appear to have considered the opinion of Dr. Merin or his report in the decision; as such this decision must be remanded. This is not a simple case where all of the medical evidence unequivocally indicates that Plaintiff is able to work. In his decision, the ALJ was required to weigh and discount the opinions of multiple medical sources who spoke to Plaintiffs psychological symptoms. The ALJ placed weight on the opinions of Drs. Thibodeau and Meyer, who found some mental limitations, but none that the ALJ concluded would preclude Plaintiff's ability to work. Tr. 17. The ALJ used the opinion of Dr. Reddout to conclude that Plaintiff could carry out instructions and could tolerate interactions with coworkers, but would have trouble concentrating. Tr. 16. The ALJ discounted more severe findings of Dr. Abraham, who noted a variety of work-related limitations, ultimately finding that Plaintiff would not be able to even perform semi-skilled work without interruption from psychological symptoms and would miss four days of work per month. Tr. 16-17.

It is not the task of this Court now to evaluate for the first time the opinion of Dr. Merin in light of the conflicting medical sources, the other medical evidence, and Plaintiffs reported symptoms. This Court recognizes that Plaintiff only claimed a disability onset date of February 25, 2011, years after Dr. Merin issued his report. Tr. 286. However, in light of Dr. Merin's negative findings related to Plaintiffs depression, ability to learn, and borderline IQ, this Court cannot conclude that the ALJ's failure to consider Dr. Merin's report did not affect Plaintiffs substantial rights. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61; Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir.1983) (applying the harmless error doctrine when errors or defects in a lower tribunal do not affect any party's substantial rights). Accordingly, this decision must be reversed and remanded for consideration of the findings in Dr. Merin's report.1

IV.

Accordingly, after due consideration and for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED:

1. The decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED AND REMANDED.

2. The Clerk is directed to enter final judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED.