PATRICIA D. BARKSDALE, Magistrate Judge.
In this case alleging unfair debt-collection practices, Kenneth Killian moves for default judgment against United Credit Management, LLC ("UCM"). Doc. 9. The complaint asserts three claims: (1) violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p; (2) violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 ("TCPA"); and (3) a violation of the Florida Consumer Collection Practices Act ("FCCPA"), Fla. Stat. §§ 559.55-559.785. Doc. 1.
Before a court may grant a motion for default judgment, it must ensure that the well-pleaded factual allegations state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975). Under Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must allege facts, accepted as true, that state a claim "that is plausible on its face." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The plausibility standard asks for less than a probability but "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id.
With no supporting argument, Killian contends the well-pleaded complaint allegations establish violations of the FDCPA, FCCPA, and TCPA. See Doc. 9 at 3-4.
The Court is prepared to recommend denial of the motion for default judgment for at least four reasons. First, by only reciting the definition of "debt" under the FDCPA and FCCPA without alleging facts about the debt, Killian does not sufficiently allege the debt meets the definition.
Before dismissing a claim on its own motion upon finding a plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim for relief entitling him to default judgment, a court "must provide the plaintiff with notice of its intent to dismiss and an opportunity to respond." Surtain v. Hamlin Terrace Found., 789 F.3d 1239, 1248-49 (11th Cir. 2015).
Killian may replead.