MONTE C. RICHARDSON, Magistrate Judge.
In reaching the decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had "the following severe impairments: lymphoma in remission, osteoarthritis, Crohn's disease, gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), obesity, and an affective mood disorder." (Tr. 13.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a reduced range of light work. (Tr. 15.) After finding that Plaintiff had no past relevant work, the ALJ found that there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 20-21.)
Plaintiff is appealing the Commissioner's decision that she was not disabled since February 13, 2012. Plaintiff has exhausted her available administrative remedies and the case is properly before the Court. The Court has reviewed the record, the briefs, and the applicable law. For the reasons stated herein, the Commissioner's decision is
The scope of this Court's review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner's factual findings).
Plaintiff raises three issues on appeal. First, Plaintiff argues that in determining her RFC, the ALJ failed to weigh and adequately consider the opinions of her treating physicians, Dr. J. Wynn Sullivan, Dr. Cordero, Dr. Howard Sullivan, and the practitioners at Family Medical & Dental Center/Azalea Health. Specifically, with respect to Dr. Wynn Sullivan, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to weigh his opinions in the questionnaire and the progress notes, including his notations of Plaintiff's delayed nausea and fatigue, which were side effects of the chemotherapy, and continuing night sweats and fatigue, and that the ALJ failed to include Dr. Sullivan's opinion that Plaintiff must get up and move around every hour for 15 minutes in the RFC assessment. Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly relied on the testimony of the Vocational Expert ("VE") because his hypothetical question did not adequately reflect all of Plaintiff's limitations. Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding her "not entirely credible" when the record "clearly reveals" that she "suffered from documented impairments causing significant limitations," and that the ALJ's alleged failure to make accurate and specific findings regarding Plaintiff's credibility amounted to a failure to develop a full and fair record. (Doc. 25 at 22.)
The Court does not find any reversible error. First, although Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not weigh the opinions of Dr. Wynn Sullivan, it appears that the ALJ gave Dr. Sullivan's opinions significant weight. (See Tr. 20 ("Significant weight is given to these opinions, as they are consistent with each other and are consistent with the other objective medical evidence of record which establishes that while the claimant has limitations as a result of her impairments, these limitations are not disabling in nature and do not completely preclude her from performing all basic work activities.").)
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to include in the RFC assessment Dr. Wynn Sullivan's opinion that Plaintiff must get up and move around every hour for 15 minutes, which was included in the Cancer Impairment Questionnaire he completed on August 16, 2013. (Tr. 808-14.) The ALJ discussed and considered the opinions included in the questionnaire as follows:
(Tr. 18 (citing Tr. 808-14).) Dr. Sullivan also opined that Plaintiff must get up and move around every hour for 15 minutes. (Tr. 811.) Although it does not appear that the ALJ discussed this part of Dr. Sullivan's questionnaire, the ALJ was not required to refer to every piece of evidence in his decision. Importantly, however, the ALJ apparently considered this evidence because he noted in the RFC assessment that Plaintiff must "have the option of performing job duties either sitting or standing at will." (Tr. 15.)
Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ failed to weigh the medical records of Dr. Wynn Sullivan noting Plaintiff's delayed nausea and fatigue, as side effects of her chemotherapy, and night sweats,
Plaintiff points to portions of the record, listing various diagnoses and/or symptoms, such as urge incontinence, ulcerative colitis, reflux esophagitis, Crohn's disease, lymphoma in remission, painful/abnormal gait, limited joint mobility, joint pain, stiffness, abnormal range of motion, swelling associated with decreased mobility, anxiety, depressive disorder, mild mental retardation, abnormal involuntary movements, nausea, fatigue, and some night sweats. (Tr. 542, 629, 723, 725, 797-98, 834, 836, 852, 856, 915-16, 919, 924-25.) However, Plaintiff does not explain how these diagnoses, symptoms, or side effects support greater restrictions than found by the ALJ. The ALJ considered these symptoms and diagnoses (see Tr. 15-20), and found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work with the following limitations:
(Tr. 15.)
The ALJ explained:
(Tr. 19; see also Tr. 20 ("A limitation regarding only occasional interaction with co-workers and the general public has been included to address the claimant's alleged incontinence issues.").)
The ALJ properly considered the evidence of record and his conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. To the extent Plaintiff argues otherwise, the RFC assessment did not need to mirror or match the findings or opinions of any particular medical source because the responsibility for assessing the RFC rests with the ALJ. Kopke v. Astrue, 2012 WL 4903470, *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2012) (report and recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4867423 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2012)).
Turning to Plaintiff's credibility argument, the Court finds that the ALJ provided explicit and adequate reasons for finding Plaintiff's credibility regarding the limitations allegedly imposed by her impairments "not fully supported by the evidence of record." (Tr. 19.) The ALJ explained:
(Id.)
As shown above, the ALJ provided explicit and adequate reasons for his credibility determination. Moreover, these reasons are supported by substantial evidence. (See, e.g., Tr. 37-38, 52-54, 192.) Plaintiff does not even acknowledge the reasons provided by the ALJ for his credibility finding; as such, she does not argue that these reasons are not supported by substantial evidence. Because "credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ," Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1212 (11th Cir. 2005), "[a] clearly articulated credibility finding with substantial supporting evidence in the record will not be disturbed by a reviewing court," Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562.
Because the Court finds that the ALJ's credibility determination and RFC assessment are supported by substantial evidence, Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ improperly relied on the testimony of the VE because his hypothetical question allegedly failed to adequately reflect all of Plaintiff's limitations, also fails. The ALJ was not required to include in the hypothetical question any limitations or opinions that he properly rejected. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161 (stating that the ALJ is not required to include findings in the hypothetical question that the ALJ has properly rejected as unsupported by the record). Based on the foregoing, the Commissioner's decision is due to be affirmed.
The Court does not make independent factual determinations, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute its decision for that of the ALJ. Thus, the question is not whether the Court would have arrived at the same decision on de novo review; rather, the Court's review is limited to determining whether the ALJ's findings are based on correct legal standards and supported by substantial evidence. Based on this standard of review, the Court concludes that the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act for the time period in question is due to be affirmed.
Accordingly, it is
1. The Commissioner's decision is
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment consistent with this Order and close the file.
(Tr. 14.)
