ORDER

TIMOTHY J. CORRIGAN, District Judge.

I. Status

Petitioner initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) (Petition). He challenges a 2002 state court (St. Johns County, Florida) judgment of conviction for sexual battery, a capital felony, for which he is serving life imprisonment. Respondents contend that the Petition was untimely filed, and therefore, this case must be dismissed. See Response to Petition (Doc. 5) (Response).1 Petitioner notified the Court that he would rely on his Petition and cited Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012). See "Traverse/Reply" (Doc. 6) (Reply). The case is ripe for review.2

II. One-Year Limitations Period

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 by adding the following subsection:

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).

III. Procedural History3 /Analysis

On September 9, 2002, Petitioner entered a nolo contendere plea to one count of sexual battery, a capital felony. Ex. A at 32-43, 70-80. He was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment that same day. See id. On May 27, 2003, the Fifth District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed the judgment without the entry of a written opinion. Ex. D. Petitioner's judgment became final ninety days later on August 25, 2003. See Supreme Court Rule 13.3;4 Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 525 (2003); Chavers v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 468 F.3d 1273, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006).

Petitioner had post-conviction motions pending in state court, which tolled the one-year limitations period until August 29, 2005. See Response at 2-4. The following day, August 30, 2005, Petitioner's one-year limitations period began to run and on February 9, 2006, he filed his first federal habeas petition in this Court.5 See Petition (Doc. 1), No. 3:06-cv-137-J-25MCR. The respondents filed a substantive response in that case, noting that the petition was timely filed. See Response (Doc. 5), No. 3:06-cv-137-J-25MCR. Petitioner, however, failed to timely file a reply as directed, and that case was dismissed without prejudice on September 25, 2006. See Order of Dismissal Without Prejudice (Doc. 11), No. 3:06-cv-137-J-25MCR. Petitioner was specifically advised that the dismissal "does not excuse [him] from the one-year period of limitation for raising a habeas corpus petition in the federal courts." Id. at 1 n.1. He was further advised that properly filed state court post-conviction motions toll the one-year period of limitations but that "the time in which a federal habeas petition is pending does not toll" the time period.6 Id.

While his first federal habeas petition was pending, he did not have any post-conviction motions pending in state court. The pendency of his first federal habeas petition did not toll the time period. See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 181 (2001) (finding that the time in which a federal habeas petition is pending does not toll the one-year limitations period). Thus, his one-year limitations period expired on August 30, 2006 (during the pendency of the first federal habeas proceeding). After the federal case was dismissed, Petitioner allowed more than one year to pass before he filed an additional state court post-conviction motion on or about November 30, 2007. Therefore, even if this Court were to restart the one-year clock on the day Petitioner's first federal habeas case was dismissed,7 the limitations period expired before Petitioner filed another post-conviction motion in state court. And more than eight years passed between the dismissal of his first habeas case and the initiation of the instant case.8 Under any calculation, the instant Petition is untimely filed.9

"When a prisoner files for habeas corpus relief outside the one-year limitations period, a district court may still entertain the petition if the petitioner establishes that he is entitled to equitable tolling." Damren v. Florida, 776 F.3d 816, 821 (11th Cir. 2015). "[E]quitable tolling is an extraordinary remedy `limited to rare and exceptional circumstances and typically applied sparingly.'" Cadet v. State of Fla. Dep't of Corr., ___ F.3d ___, 2017 WL 727547, at *3 (11th Cir. Feb. 24, 2017) (quoting Hunter v. Ferrell, 587 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009)). To warrant the application of this extreme remedy, a petitioner must show "`(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing." Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2012)); Diaz v. Sec'y for Dep't of Corr., 362 F.3d 698, 700-01 (11th Cir. 2004) ("Equitable tolling is to be applied when extraordinary circumstances have worked to prevent an otherwise diligent petitioner from timely filing his petition." (internal quotations and citation omitted)). "A habeas petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling simply because he alleges constitutional violations at his trial or sentencing." Cole v. Warden, Ga. State Prison, 768 F.3d 1150, 1158 (11th Cir. 2014). "The petitioner has the burden of establishing his entitlement to equitable tolling; his supporting allegations must be specific and not conclusory." Id.; see also Brown v. Barrow, 512 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) ("[A]n inmate bears a strong burden to show specific facts to support his claim of extraordinary circumstances and due diligence." (citation omitted)).

Petitioner argues that he is entitled to equitable tolling for several reasons. First, Petitioner claims that his mental health issues warrant equitable tolling. He asserts that since November 2002, he has "been off and on suicide watch and been off and on various medication." Petition at 19. He also asserts that in 2006, he "was placed in in-patient treatment and had his [first] § 2254 [petition] denied without prejudice due to lack of prosecution since he was disallowed writing supplies because he was off and on suicide watch." Id. He claims that "[h]e is habitually self-injurious and stays in inpatient treatment where property, legal work, and writing supplies are give[n] based on a level system and mental status." Id. at 19-20.

The following background information is provided to place Petitioner's argument in context. During Petitioner's plea colloquy, his counsel stated, "Pursuant to plea negotiations with the State Attorney's Office, Mr. Northrup wishes to enter a plea of no contest to Count One of the information. . . . Mr. Northrup does understand that by entering this plea that the only sentence that can be given is life. He is entering this plea against my legal advice." Ex. A at 72. Petitioner was placed under oath, and the court advised him that "[t]he only penalty which is allowed by law is life imprisonment." Id. at 73. Petitioner advised the court that he had a high school education and could read and write. Id. He also advised that he had previously been treated for bipolar disorder. Id. at 74. He denied having any alcohol or narcotic drugs in the last 24 hours, and after being advised of his rights, he affirmed his belief that the plea was in his best interests, that no one threatened or coerced him to enter the plea, and that he was satisfied with his attorney's representation. Id. at 74-76.

After he pled guilty, was sentenced, and his direct appeal was affirmed, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to withdraw the plea arguing that he entered the plea involuntarily and against his counsel's advice. See Ex. F at 1-2. The motion also indicated that Petitioner had a history of mental illness and requested a competency evaluation. See id. The state court entered an order appointing two experts to examine Petitioner and evaluate his past and present competency. See id. at 6-8. After reviewing the experts' reports and considering the arguments of counsel, on October 14, 2003, the state court entered an order denying the motion to withdraw the plea, finding that "[i]t is clear from the reports of the experts, that the Defendant was in fact competent at the time of the entry of the plea." Id. at 49.

Petitioner filed substantive pro se motions and briefs in the state courts in March 2004, May 2005, and July 2005,10 and then filed his first pro se habeas petition in this Court in February 2006. According to Petitioner, he has been off and on suicide watch since November 2002; however, the record reflects that he was adequately able to prosecute his post-conviction proceedings in state court and then able to timely file his first federal habeas petition in this Court. Because his one-year limitations period expired during the pendency of his first habeas case, the proper course of action would have been to seek reconsideration of the Court's dismissal order and/or appeal the dismissal of that case. Petitioner did not do so. Indeed, other than filing an undated motion that the Court received after judgment was entered,11 Petitioner failed to take any action for more than one year after that case was dismissed. Petitioner does not allege now that he attempted to take any action after his case was dismissed; thus, there can be no finding that he was diligently pursuing his rights. Moreover, simply alleging the existence of a mental impairment is insufficient. See Hunter, 587 F.3d at 1308 ("[M]ental impairment is not per se a reason to toll a statute of limitations." (citation omitted)). To warrant equitable tolling based on mental incompetence, there must be a causal connection between the alleged mental impairment and the petitioner's inability to timely file a habeas petition. See Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2005). Petitioner has not shown such a causal connection.

Second, Petitioner asserts that he "has lost legal work due to offices destroying his legal work when he went to confinement to protect [him]self." Petition at 19. He claims that in the 10 months preceding the filing of the Petition, he had "been to approximately 6 institutions." Id. However, his one-year limitations period had long expired before he filed the instant case; thus, his transfers during the 10 months preceding the filing of this case are of no moment.

Third, Petitioner cites to Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012), and appears to argue that the Martinez decision somehow excuses his untimely filing. Petition at 20; Reply at 1. Petitioner is mistaken about Martinez's application. See Lambrix v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., 756 F.3d 1246, 1262 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that a petitioner "cannot seek equitable tolling of the limitations period based on Martinez because we have rejected the notion that anything in Martinez provides a basis for equitably tolling the filing deadline." (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Arthur v. Thomas, 739 F.3d 611, 630 (11th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he Martinez rule explicitly relates to excusing a procedural default of ineffective-trial-counsel claims and does not apply to AEDPA's statute of limitations or the tolling of that period.").

Fourth, to the extent Petitioner seeks to excuse his untimeliness based on his pro se status, this reason alone is insufficient to warrant equitable tolling. See Johnson v. United States, 544 U.S. 295, 311 (2005)12 ("We have never accepted pro se representation alone or procedural ignorance as an excuse for prolonged inattention when a statute's clear policy calls for promptness."); see also Perry v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., No. 6:14-cv-262-Orl-31TBS, 2016 WL 345526, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 28, 2016) (unpublished) (finding that "[f]actors such as a lack of access to a law library, lack of legal papers, ignorance of the law, lack of education, and pro se status are not considered extraordinary circumstances that would excuse an untimely habeas petition" (citations omitted)).

Upon review of the record, the Court finds that Petitioner has failed to show an adequate reason why the dictates of the one-year limitations period should not be imposed upon him. Therefore, this case will be dismissed with prejudice as untimely. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED:

DONE AND ORDERED.