PHILIP R. LAMMENS, Magistrate Judge.
Upon referral, this Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") matter is before the Court on the parties' Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement (Doc. 23). Thus, the Court must determine whether the settlement between Plaintiff Jesika Owens and Defendant SSRMI, LLC is a "fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute" over Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") issues.
If a settlement is not one supervised by the Department of Labor, the only other route for compromise of FLSA claims is provided in the context of suits brought directly by employees against their employer under section 216(b) to recover back wages for FLSA violations. "When employees bring a private action for back wages under the FLSA, and present to the district court a proposed settlement, the district court may enter a stipulated judgment after scrutinizing the settlement for fairness." Id. at 1353 (citing Schulte, Inc. v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 66 S.Ct. 925, 928 n.8, 90 L.Ed. 1114).
The Eleventh Circuit has held that "[s]ettlements may be permissible in the context of a suit brought by employees under the FLSA for back wages because initiation of the action by the employees provides some assurance of an adversarial context." Id. at 1354. In adversarial cases:
Id.
As set forth in the Settlement Agreement, Defendant will pay a total sum of $3,000 to resolve this matter, to include the following: (1) $564.35 to Plaintiff for unpaid overtime compensation; (2) $564.36 to Plaintiff for liquidated damages; and (3) $1,871.29 to Plaintiff's counsel for attorney's fees. Plaintiff represents that she has not compromised her claims and that she is being paid all monies allegedly owed her. Defendant does not agree that any wages are owed, but has agreed to this settlement to avoid the expense and uncertainty of litigation. The parties, who were represented by experienced counsel agree that this is a fair and reasonable settlement.
With respect to the agreed-to sum for attorney's fee and costs, the parties represent that they were negotiated separately from Plaintiff's recovery. See Bonetti v. Embarq Mgmt. Co., Case No.: 6:07-cv-1335, 2009 WL 2371407 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2009). Under the circumstances, I submit that the amount of $1,871.29 for attorney's fees and costs appears to be reasonable.
As for the remaining portions of the Settlement Agreement, the Release of Claims in Paragraph 5 is impermissibly overbroad in that it seeks to release not only the named Defendants, but "any companies that are parents, subsidiaries, affiliates or other entities related to or associated with Defendants and any of its past or present predecessors, successors, assigns, administrators, partners, officers, directors, employees, agents and attorneys" from "any and all claims that were or could have been asserted . . . arising out of her work with or termination of contract with Defendants from the beginning of time up to and including the date of this Agreement."
Generally, such broad releases are "`side deals' in which the employer extracts a gratuitous (although usually valueless) release of all claims in exchange for money unconditionally owed to the employee" and therefore, such releases "confer[ ] an uncompensated, unevaluated, and unfair benefit on the employer." Moreno v. Regions Bank, 729 F.Supp.2d 1346, 1351-52 (M.D. Fla. 2010). This is true even where there has been full compensation. See e.g., Dees v. Hydradry, Inc., 706 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1240 (M.D. Fla. 2010) ("[I]f the parties' proposed `full compensation' agreement includes an additional term — such as the forbearance of a valuable right of the employee, including perhaps one of the employee's FLSA rights, or the exchange of another valuable consideration of any kind — the notion of `full compensation' becomes illusory and inapplicable."). Due to these concerns, the unexplained inclusion of a general release in a FLSA settlement often results in a finding that the settlement is not fair and reasonable. See e.g., Brown v. SeaDog Brewpub BV, LLC, No. 6:16-cv-898-Orl-40GJK, 2016 WL 7743030, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2016); Shearer v. Estep Const., Inc., No. 6:14-cv-1658-Orl-41GJK, 2015 WL 2402450, at *4 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2015).
Notably, courts in this District have approved FLSA settlement agreements accompanied by separate general releases where there is consideration beyond what is due for the FLSA claims.
And courts in this District have also approved FLSA settlements with accompanying broad releases even where the plaintiff did not receive full compensation for his or her FLSA claim, as long as additional valuable compensation was paid to the plaintiff in exchange for the broad general release. See Buntin v. Square Foot Management, Co. LLC., 2015 WL 3407866, * 2-3, Case No. 6:14-cv-1394-Orl-37GJK (M.D. Fla. May 27, 2015) (Dalton, J.) (approving FLSA settlement where the settlement represented a compromise and consideration in the form of a neutral reference was promised by Defendant to Plaintiff in exchange for a broad general release).
Here, the parties recite that Plaintiff is receiving full compensation for the FLSA claim. Regarding the general release, however, the parties fail to offer any explanation regarding any other claims that Plaintiff is knowingly releasing, nor do they identify, what if any additional consideration was given in exchange. Accordingly, the Court cannot make an informed determination as to whether Plaintiff's general release affects the fairness and reasonableness of the settlement.
The waiver of future employment in Paragraph 6 also appears inappropriate since the parties provide no additional information to assist the Court in evaluating the fairness of that provision. In some cases, courts have approved settlement agreements including waivers of future employment because they were inconsequential. For example, where a plaintiff did not desire re-employment, and the defendant's financial viability was precarious, the inclusion of a waiver of future employment was "inconsequential" and did not render the settlement unfair. See Robertson v. Ther-Rx Corp., Case No. 2:09cv1010-MHT(WO), 2011 WL 1810193, at *2 (M.D.Ala. May 12, 2011). See also Cruz v. Winter Garden Realty, LLC, No. 6:12-cv-1098, 2013 WL 4774617, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 4, 2013) (finding the settlement agreement fair despite waiver of right to future employment, where settlement agreement stated plaintiff did not desire reemployment). In other cases, courts have viewed waiver of future employment provisions as punishment for exercising FLSA rights, and declined to approve them. See Nichols v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 1:13-CV-88 (WLS), 2013 WL 5933991, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 1, 2013).
Here, neither the agreement nor accompanying motion contain any information to assist the Court in evaluating the fairness of the provision, such as whether Plaintiff would desire future employment or regarding the financial viability of Defendants. Moreover, while comparable provisions have been approved in this District where it was shown additional consideration was paid in exchange for the waiver of future employment, it is not clear whether that is the situation here. See e.g., Caamal v. Shelter Mortg. Co., L.L.C., No. 6:13-cv-706-Orl-36KRS, 2013 WL 5421955, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2013) (approving a similar "no rehire" provision where the agreement specifically provided that additional, separate consideration had been paid for that part specific paragraph of the agreement and other releases). The Settlement Agreement does not state that any additional monetary consideration or otherwise was given for the "no re-employment provision," although the possibility exists that the Defendants' agreement to provide a neutral reference is intended as valuable consideration for the additional waivers.
Even though Plaintiff's general release and waiver of future employment provisions are unenforceable (in the absence of any additional information), they do not preclude approval of the Settlement Agreement in this case. See e.g., Niles v. Denny's Inc., No. 6:16-cv-999-Orl-40TBS. 2017 WL 1352232, at *2 (M.D. Fla. March 22, 2017) (recommending that settlement agreement be approved after modifying the broad general release to include only the named defendant); Brown v. SeaDog Brewpub BV, LLC, No. 6:16-cv-898-Orl-40GJK, 2016 WL 7743030, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 29, 2016) (recommending that settlement agreement be approved after striking general release and confidentiality provision). Indeed, the Agreement here contains a severability provision in Paragraph 3, stating:
Thus, terms in the Settlement Agreement may be severed (or modified) without affecting the enforceability of the rest of the Agreement. See id.
Accordingly, and upon due consideration, I recommend that the parties' joint motion for approval of settlement (Doc. 23) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as follows: