JOHN ANTOON, District Judge.
Petitioner initiated this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). Respondents filed a response (Doc. 7), to which Petitioner replied. (Doc. 11). For the reasons set forth below, the petition is denied.
Petitioner was charged with robbery and with trafficking in illegal drugs. (Doc. 8-1 at 5). The charges arose out of a robbery at a CVS pharmacy in Rockledge, Florida involving one hundred oxycodone pills with a total weight of approximately fifteen grams. (Doc. 8-1 at 30; Doc. 8-4 at 41).
Prior to trial, the court asked the State about plea negotiations and the following exchange ensued:
(Doc. 8-1 at 13-14). The court then asked whether counsel had an opportunity to discuss the plea with Petitioner. Counsel responded:
(Doc. 8-1 at 14-15). The court then asked Petitioner whether he understood the "nature of the charges and the maximum penalties that could be imposed." Petitioner answered, under oath, "Yes, sir, I believe so." (Doc. 8-1 at 15). Petitioner also acknowledged, under oath, that he had a "meaningful discussion" with counsel about the charges and penalties; that counsel answered all of his questions "to the best of his ability;" and that he "pretty much" understood what counsel explained to him. (Doc. 8-1 at 15-16). Petitioner ultimately rejected the plea offer, stating "I would reject it on I don't feel that it meets — it just doesn't seem right." (Doc. 8-1 at 17). Petitioner acknowledged he made the decision to reject the plea freely, voluntarily and without any threats, coercion or promises. (Doc. 8-1 at 17).
The case proceeded to trial before a jury, at the conclusion of which Petitioner was found guilty of both robbery and trafficking. (Doc. 8-5 at 17-18). The court sentenced Petitioner to concurrent terms of twenty years, with a fifteen-year minimum mandatory sentence for trafficking. (Doc. 8-5 at 41-42, 48-50).
Petitioner appealed and his court-appointed counsel filed an Anders brief. (Doc. 8-5 at 95). The Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal (the "Fifth DCA") affirmed per curiam. (Doc. 8-5 at 195).
Petitioner then filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. (Doc. 8-5 at 123). The court denied the motion. (Doc. 8-5 at 134). Petitioner appealed (Doc. 8-5 at 144), and the Fifth DCA affirmed per curiam. (Doc. 8-5 at 178). Petitioner made a motion for rehearing (Doc. 8-5 at 180), but the Fifth DCA denied the motion. (Doc. 8-5 at 184).
The Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") provides that habeas relief cannot be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in a state court unless the adjudication:
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). AEDPA thus provides three avenues for relief: one based on a determination that the outcome was itself contrary to clearly established federal law; another based on a determination that the outcome was infected by an unreasonable application of the law to the facts; and a third based on an unreasonable determination of the facts themselves. With respect to the first two, the Supreme Court has explained:
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000). With respect to the third, the Supreme Court has explained:
Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S.Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) (citations omitted).
The standard for relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel is well known and familiar: a person is entitled to relief only when counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and, in addition, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if counsel had acted reasonably (i.e., that the departure from objective reasonableness prejudiced the case and, by extension, the client). Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). In evaluating counsel's performance, courts apply a "strong presumption" that the representation "fell within the `wide range' of reasonable professional assistance." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 104. As the Eleventh Circuit explained:
White v. Singletary, 972 F.2d 1218, 1220-21 (11th Cir. 1992). It is therefore not an understatement to say that "[s]urmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010).
Importantly for purposes of this case, the Strickland standard applies to alleged ineffective assistance in connection with plea agreements. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). "If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept it." Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168 (2012). To establish "prejudice" when the alleged deficiency results in the rejection of an offer:
Id. at 164.
A state court's application of Strickland to a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance is subject to review in a habeas proceeding. But establishing that a state court's application of Strickland was unreasonable for purposes of AEDPA is especially difficult. As the Supreme Court explained:
Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (emphasis added). More to the point:
Id. at 101 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
AEDPA contains its own standard of review for state court findings of fact: "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). The clear and convincing standard is highly deferential, even more so than the typical clearly erroneous standard. Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1285 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Stephens v. Hall, 407 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 2005), aff'd, 558 U.S. 290 (2010)). As a result, "where factual findings underlie the state court's legal ruling, our already deferential review [under AEDPA] becomes doubly so." Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 972 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
Petitioner contends that his counsel provided ineffective assistance by "misadvising the petitioner to reject the state's plea offer." (Doc. 1 at 5). In particular, he contends:
(Doc. 1 at 5-6).
The state court denied relief. The state court found, based on the statements made at the pre-trial hearing, that (a) Petitioner "made the decision to not accept the State's offer, on his own initiative, because he refused to accept a fifteen-year minimum mandatory sentence;" (b) Petitioner's attorney "advised him of the maximum sentence;" and (c) Petitioner "stated to the Court that he understood the maximum penalties" to which he was exposed if he went to trial and lost. (Doc. 8-5 at 139-40). From this, the state court concluded that Petitioner failed to demonstrate either deficient performance or prejudice, thus precluding relief under the Strickland standard. (Doc. 8-5 at 140).
The state court's rejection of Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim is not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts, thus precluding relief under § 2254(d)(2).
As a threshold matter, the state court's finding regarding Petitioner's understanding of the maximum sentence is presumed to be correct. Petitioner clearly states that counsel did not advise him about the maximum sentence to which he was exposed. But Petitioner's statements, although evidence, do not constitute the clear and convincing evidence necessary to overcome the presumption of correctness that attaches to the state court's contrary finding.
Moreover, the state court's finding is undergirded — and Petitioner's contrary statements are undermined — by the events at the plea hearing. The prosecutor, the judge and counsel all referenced potential sentences of thirty years to life for either or both crimes, yet Petitioner did not express surprise, ask questions or otherwise indicate a misunderstanding about the charges or potential sentences. If Petitioner did not understand the maximum potential sentences to which he was exposed, or believed he had been told something else by his counsel, he would be expected to pipe up and clarify things. The fact that he did not voice concern or confusion implies there was no surprise or misunderstanding and that, instead, he knew exactly what was going on and what he was getting into if he rejected the plea offer.
Furthermore, Petitioner represented, under oath, that he understood the nature of the charges and the maximum penalties that could be imposed; that he had a meaningful discussion about them with counsel; and that he came to the decision to reject the offer freely and voluntarily. Petitioner's sworn statements cannot be ignored because "there is a strong presumption that the statements made during the [plea] colloquy are true." United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994).
The state court's finding regarding Petitioner's understanding of the maximum sentence to which he was exposed is not unreasonable. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to relief under § 2254(d)(2).
The state court's rejection of Petitioner's claim is not based on an unreasonable application of the law to the facts, thus precluding relief under § 2254(d)(1).
Even assuming counsel performed deficiently by failing to advise Petitioner regarding his potential sentence, Petitioner cannot demonstrate prejudice from that deficiency because he clearly understood the seriousness of the charges and the sentences that attached to them. At the pretrial hearing, the prosecutor clearly stated that the potential sentence on the trafficking charge was thirty years; the judge clearly stated that the potential sentence on the robbery charge was thirty years (assuming Petitioner qualified as a habitual felony offender); and Petitioner's counsel clearly stated that an HFO designation could increase the sentence for trafficking to life. Petitioner cannot credibly claim he did not understand what he was up against if he were to reject the plea offer and go to trial. Nor can he credibly claim he would have acted differently if counsel had said something more or said something differently.
The state court's application of the law to the facts of the case was not unreasonable. Petitioner is therefore not entitled to relief under § 2254(d)(1).
This ground for relief is therefore denied.
This Court should grant an application for a certificate of appealability only when a petitioner makes a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, "the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see also Lamarca v. Sec'y Dep't of Corr., 568 F.3d 929, 934 (11th Cir. 2009). When a district court dismisses a federal habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claim, a certificate of appealability should issue only when a petitioner shows "that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Id.; Lamarca, 568 F.3d at 934. However, a prisoner need not show that the appeal will succeed. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003). Petitioner has not demonstrated that reasonable jurists would find this Court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong. Moreover, Petitioner cannot show that jurists of reason would find this Court's procedural rulings debatable. Petition has failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Thus, this Court will deny Petitioner a certificate of appealability.
Accordingly, it is
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1) is
2. Petitioner is
3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.
