DOUGLAS N. FRAZIER, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Candy Mitchell, seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("SSA") denying her claim for a period of disability, Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"), and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). The Commissioner filed the Transcript of the proceedings (hereinafter referred to as "Tr." followed by the appropriate page number), and the parties filed memoranda setting forth their respective positions. For the reasons set out herein, the decision of the Commissioner is
The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A), 1382(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905. The impairment must be severe, making the claimant unable to do her previous work, or any other substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2), 1382(a)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505-404.1511, 416.905-416.911.
The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405 (g). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate support to a conclusion. Even if the evidence preponderated against the Commissioner's findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by substantial evidence." Crawford v. Comm'r, 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439 (11th Cir. 1997)); Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). In conducting this review, this Court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, but must consider the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Martin v. Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1329, 1330 (11th Cir. 2002); Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). However, the District Court will reverse the Commissioner's decision on plenary review if the decision applied incorrect law, or if the decision fails to provide sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). The Court reviews de novo the conclusions of law made by the Commissioner of Social Security in a disability benefits case. Social Security Act, § 205(g), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
The ALJ must follow five steps in evaluating a claim of disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. At step one, the claimant must prove that she is not undertaking substantial gainful employment. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001), see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If a claimant is engaging in any substantial gainful activity, she will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i).
At step two, the claimant must prove that she is suffering from a severe impairment or combination of impairments. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278, 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a)(4)(ii). If the claimant's impairment or combination of impairments does not significantly limit her physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, the ALJ will find that the impairment is not severe, and the claimant will be found not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(c).
At step three, the claimant must prove that her impairment meets or equals one of impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P. App. 1; Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278; 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a)(4)(iii). If she meets this burden, she will be considered disabled without consideration of age, education and work experience. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278.
At step four, if the claimant cannot prove that her impairment meets or equals one of the impairments listed in Appendix 1, she must prove that her impairment prevents her from performing her past relevant work. Id. At this step, the ALJ will consider the claimant's RFC and compare it with the physical and mental demands of her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a)(4)(iv), 20 C.F.R. § 1520(f). If the claimant can still perform her past relevant work, then she will not be found disabled. Id.
At step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that the claimant is capable of performing other work available in the national economy, considering the claimant's RFC, age, education, and past work experience. Doughty, 245 F.3d at 1278; 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a)(4)(v). If the claimant is capable of performing other work, she will be found not disabled. Id. In determining whether the Commissioner has met this burden, the ALJ must develop a full and fair record regarding the vocational opportunities available to the claimant. Allen v. Sullivan, 880 F.2d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 1989). There are two ways in which the ALJ may make this determination. The first is by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines ("the Grids"), and the second is by the use of a vocational expert ("VE"). Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004). Only after the Commissioner meets this burden does the burden shift back to the claimant to show that she is not capable of performing the "other work" as set forth by the Commissioner. Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 n.2 (11th Cir. 2001).
Plaintiff filed applications for a period of disability, DIB, and SSI on November 26, 2012, alleging a disability onset date of July 1, 2011. (Tr. 209-11, 212-17). Plaintiff's applications were denied initially on January 18, 2013, and upon reconsideration on March 21, 2013. (Tr. 141-45, 146-51, 157-61, 162-66). Plaintiff requested a hearing and on December 9, 2014, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Robert Droker ("the ALJ"). (Tr. 75-96). On January 8, 2015, the ALJ entered a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 57-74). Plaintiff requested review of this decision and the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request on January 29, 2016. (Tr. 1-7). Plaintiff initiated the instant action by Complaint (Doc. 1) on March 21, 2016. The parties having filed memoranda setting forth their respective positions, this case is ripe for review.
At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 1, 2011, the alleged onset date. (Tr. 59). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: disorders of the hands, disorders of the spine, hypertension, fatigue, and affective disorder. (Tr. 59). At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Tr. 59-60).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to
(Tr. 61). At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not capable of performing her past relevant work as a school cafeteria cook. (Tr. 67).
At step five, the ALJ found that considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (Tr. 68). Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could work such occupations as office helper, mail clerk, and marker. (Tr. 68). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability from July 1, 2011, through the date of the decision, January 8, 2015. (Tr. 68-69).
Plaintiff argues that "[t]he ALJ incorrectly summarized the medical evidence of record or alternatively does not assign weight to the opinions of the treating physicians." (Doc. 15 p. 4). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by improperly relying on a portion of the Functional Capacity Evaluation completed by Plaintiff's treating physician, John Drewniany, M.D.. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ relied on the portion of Dr. Drewniany's opinion that stated Plaintiff exerted submaximal effort on hand and pinch grip testing, but does not mention that Dr. Drewinany elsewhere in the evaluation remarked that Plaintiff's effort was consistent. (Doc. 15 p. 6). In addition, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by failing to discuss the weight accorded to the opinion of Brett Puckett, M.D. and Marc Kaye, M.D. of Shands Jacksonville—Bone and Joint Institute ("Shands"), who examined Plaintiff after the opinion offered by Dr. Drewniany. (Doc. 15 p. 7).
In response, Defendant argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding, after proper evaluation of the medical opinion evidence, that Plaintiff could at least frequently handle, finger, and reach in all directions but overhead. (Doc. 18 p. 4). Defendant contends that the ALJ specifically discussed the medical evidence from Shands Jacksonville and argues that because this evidence is consistent with the ALJ's finding of severe hand impairment, but does not indicate limitations greater than those included in the ALJ's RFC finding, the ALJ was not required to explicitly state the weight he gave it. (Doc. 18 p. 5).
Here, upon review of the ALJ's decision, the Court finds no basis to reverse and remand. By the Court's estimation, the ALJ completed a thorough summarization of the medical record across nearly six single-spaced pages. The Court does not find any error in the ALJ's thorough summarization of Dr. Drewniany's opinion:
(Tr. 64). While Plaintiff is correct that there is some ambiguity in Dr. Drewniany's opinion as to whether she gave submaximal effort, it is incorrect to suggest that the ALJ "relied" on this fact in weighing the evidence. The ALJ's decision shows that he did not rely on Dr. Drewniany's note that Plaintiff gave submaximal effort:
(Tr. 66). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's treatment of Dr. Drewniany's opinion.
As to the record from the doctors at Shands Jacksonville, the ALJ's decision shows that he considered and discussed this evidence. The ALJ noted Plaintiff's complaints of pain, numbness, and tingling in her wrists and forearm (Tr. 838); difficulties grasping and holding objects (Tr. 850); and pain, numbness, and temperature and color changes in her hands (Tr. 842). He further noted that despite these complaints the treatment notes contained testing indicating stable findings, normal carpal bone alignment with no evidence of joint space narrowing or degenerative joint disease, only mild ulnar nerve compression on the right, and a negative rheumatological workup showing no connective tissue or autoimmune disease of the bones or joints (Tr. 65, 795-96, 798, 848, 852-53, 875). The ALJ even acknowledged the statement from a physician that degenerative disease of the CMC joints was the likely cause of Plaintiff's wrist complaints (Tr. 65, 846).
Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ erred by failing to state the weight he accorded the opinions of the doctors from Shands. Ordinarily, it would be reversible error for the ALJ to fail to state the weight accorded a physician's opinion. See MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986). Here, however, Plaintiff has failed to show that any of the records from Shands contradict the ALJ's findings or demonstrate that Plaintiff is more limited than found by the ALJ in his RFC determination. For this reason, the Court finds it would be inappropriate to reverse and remand. See Wright v. Barnhart, 153 F. App'x 678, 684 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding the ALJ's failure to explicitly weigh the opinions of four physicians harmless error because none of the physicians' opinions directly contradicted the ALJ's findings).
The decision of the Commissioner is
