ORDER

JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, District Judge.

BEFORE THE COURT are Plaintiffs' Motion for Miscellaneous Relief (Dkt. 257), Defendants' response (Dkt. 260), and Plaintiffs' Motion for Determination that the Defendants Have Waived Arbitration (Dkt. 264), to which a response is unnecessary. The motions are DENIED.

Ecclesiastical arbitration is scheduled for October 23, 2017 before a panel of three Scientologists in good standing. Plaintiffs move that the arbitrators be required to certify under oath that they have not communicated with or had any contact with any agent from the Church, that a court reporter be permitted to attend the arbitration, and for a determination that the Rules of the Committee on Evidence do not apply to the arbitration.1 Plaintiffs also move for a determination that Defendants have waived arbitration.2

As for their first request, Plaintiffs provide no authority for the requested certification. Nor do they demonstrate that the Court has jurisdiction to order the arbitrators to comply with the requested certification.3 As for their requests that a court reporter be permitted to attend the arbitration and for a ruling that the Rules of the Committee on Evidence do not apply, Plaintiffs provide no authority authorizing judicial involvement in determining the arbitration procedures.

By joining Scientology, Plaintiffs consented to its governing structures, policies, and doctrines and bound themselves to submit to its rules. Specifically, they agreed to arbitrate their dispute "in accordance with the arbitration procedures of Church of Scientology International." (Dkt. 189 at 16). The Church has maintained throughout these proceedings that IJC Mike Ellis is the official charged with deciding these internal matters, including the arbitration procedures. (See Ellis Dep., Dkt. 188-4 at 49:8-50:6).4 While the rules governing Scientology arbitration may not be entirely clear on the record, the Church has advised Plaintiffs, though e-mails between counsel, that "[t]he conduct of the religious arbitration will be decided by the IJC at the appropriate time during the arbitration" (Dkt. 264-4), that arbitration will be conducted in accordance with Church ecclesiastical justice procedures," and that "[t]he arbitrators will be instructed by the [IJC] on the application of Scientology principles to arbitrate this dispute in a neutral and fair manner" (Dkt. 264-2).

While Plaintiffs may disagree with the IJC's determination of how arbitration will be conducted, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits this Court from resolving internal disputes concerning the interpretation or application of religious doctrine. See, e.g., Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,727,20 S.Ct. 666 (1872) (whenever questions of "ecclesiastical rule, custom or law have been decided by the highest . . . church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them"). As the Supreme Court has instructed, "[c]onstitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of `fundamental fairness' or impermissible objectives, are . . . hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance." Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of Am. & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 715, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2383, 49 L. Ed. 2d 151 (1976).

Finally, Plaintiffs' argument that Defendants have waived arbitration by their actions is not supported by the evidence.5 And to the extent Plaintiffs suggest that Defendants have violated a direct order of the Court, they provide no more than speculation in support of that suggestion.

DONE AND ORDERD.