PAUL G. BYRON, District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Defendant Commissioner of Social Security's Opposed Motion for Entry of Judgment with Remand (Doc. 14), filed August 1, 2017. Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition (Doc. 18) on August 9, 2017, and Magistrate Judge Karla R. Spaulding submitted a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") on August 10, 2017. (Doc. 19). The Magistrate's R&R found that reversing the final decision of the Commissioner and remanding the case "would not resolve the claims for damages arising under the various causes of action" alleged by Brown in the Complaint in this case. (Doc. 19, p. 2). Magistrate Judge Spaulding therefore recommended the Court deny Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment with Remand. (Id. at pp. 2-3). The R&R also recommended that the Clerk of Court categorize this case as a Track II case. (Id. at p. 3).
On September 25, 2017, the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration filed a document entitled "Defendant's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, and Motion to Dismiss." (Doc. 36).
Defendant's filing at Doc. 36 sought three objectives: (i) object to the R&R; (ii) respond to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment dated August 24, 2017 (Doc. 23); and (iii) move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 36). Defendant's compound motion seeks three objectives, but can achieve none. The Court addresses these objectives out of sequence.
Although the title of Defendant's filing at Doc. 36 suggests that it includes a response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, it does not, and could not. The Court denied without prejudice as premature Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 25, 2017—a full month before Docket Entry #36 was filed. (Doc. 24).
With respect to the third objective of Doc. 36, to move to dismiss, Defendant ignores the well-settled procedural rule that requests for affirmative relief shall be stated in a separate filing.
The Court now turns to Defendant's objection to the R&R. The filing at Doc. 36 contains a single objection, obscured by dismissal arguments. Defendant's sole Objection is that remand is appropriate where this Court "is unable to determine from the Commissioner's decision that the proper legal standards were applied," and that the Administrative Record in this case is deficient because of the absence of a hearing or final decision in the underlying Social Security Administration proceedings. (Doc. 36, p. 9).
When a party objects to a magistrate judge's findings, the district court must "make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The district court "may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." Id. The district court must consider the record and factual issues independent of the magistrate judge's report, as de novo review is essential to the constitutionality of § 636. Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 513 (11th Cir. 1990).
Upon de novo review, the Court adopts Magistrate Judge Spaulding's recommendation that this case not be remanded. The Court agrees with Defendant's contention that the record is unclear. However, a remand under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is not the remedy. That Section authorizes district courts to enter "a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security, with or without remanding the cause for rehearing." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Based on the record, the Court is unable to discern specifically the "decision" the Defendant asks the Court to affirm.
Plaintiff's Complaint is a shotgun pleading, and repleader is thus necessary. Faced with a shotgun pleading, district courts possess the inherent authority to order repleader sua sponte. Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1083 n.6 (11th Cir. 1996).
In Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313 (11th Cir. 2015), the Eleventh Circuit outlined four types of shotgun complaints:
Id. at 1321-23 (footnotes omitted). All four categories of shotgun complaints are deficient because "they fail . . . to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests." Id. at 1323; see also Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996). The bases for dismissing shotgun pleadings arise from the pleadings' violation of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) or 10(b). Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1320.
Plaintiff's Complaint falls within the third category of shotgun pleadings identified by the Eleventh Circuit in Weiland. (Doc. 1). The Complaint fails to separate into counts the various claims asserted, depriving Defendant of "adequate notice of the claims" asserted and the grounds supporting each claim. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff is directed to file a more definite statement.
In filing her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff shall write each claim to relief in a separate count.
Based on the foregoing, the R&R is adopted in part, with respect to the recommendation that Defendant's Motion for Entry of Judgment with Remand should be denied. Because of the issues relating to the Complaint and the current record, the Court determines that repleader is appropriate.
For the aforementioned reasons, it is