MONTE C. RICHARDSON, District Judge.
On June 24, 2015, a nine-count Indictment was returned in open Court charging Defendant with encouraging or inducing an alien to enter the United States unlawfully (Count One), bringing an alien to the United States unlawfully (Count Two), alien harboring (Count Three), labor trafficking (Count Four), peonage (Count Five), involuntary servitude (Count Six), forced labor (Count Seven), commercial sex trafficking (Count Eight), and unlawful conduct with respect to documents (Count Nine). (Doc. 18.) Defendant was detained pending trial. (See Doc. 16-2.)
At defense counsel's request, Stephen J. Bloomfield, Ed.D., a licensed psychologist, issued a report on September 2, 2015, after conducting a psychological evaluation, assessment, and examination of Defendant on September 1, 2015. (Doc. 35.) Dr. Bloomfield opined that Defendant was incompetent to proceed due to a Psychotic Disorder NOS and needed hospitalization as soon as possible because "the object of her delusional belief system [was] the Baker County jail and its staff." (Id. at 1.)
On September 24, 2015, the Court held a competency hearing and, on September 29, 2015, on Defendant's motion and the parties' stipulation regarding Dr. Bloomfield's report, the Court committed Defendant for treatment and a psychiatric or psychological examination to the custody of the Attorney General for placement at the Federal Medical Center Carswell ("FMC Carswell") in Ft. Worth, Texas, for a reasonable period not to exceed 120 days. (Doc. 36.)
Defendant arrived at FMC Carswell on October 20, 2015. (Doc. 67-1.) Following her competency restoration, on March 1, 2016, Hayley Blackwood, Ph.D., a staff psychologist, Christine Anthony, Ph.D., a forensic psychologist, and Daniel D. Kim, a chief psychologist, submitted a report dated February 28, 2016, opining that Defendant was competent to proceed with the current case. (Id.) Defendant was administered the following psychological testing: Personality Assessment Inventory—Spanish Version (PAI) and Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms—2
(Id. at 15-16.)
The doctors opined that Defendant's prognosis as to her competency to stand trial was good. (Id. at 16.) She had "a good factual and rational understanding of the charges and proceedings against her." (Id. at 14; see also id. at 16.) The doctors also opined that Defendant's ability to communicate reasonably with her attorney while at the facility and to communicate effectively with the evaluators over the course of multiple interviews "should generalize to future interactions with her attorney" as well. (Id. at 15, 16.) They concluded that Defendant did "not suffer from a mental disease or defect that could significantly interfere with her factual and rational understanding of the legal proceedings [against] her or her ability to communicate with her attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding," and, as such, was competent to stand trial. (Id. at 16.)
On June 16, 2016, Dr. Bloomfield conducted another psychological evaluation, assessment, and examination of Defendant at the Baker County Jail. (Doc. 67 at 2.) In a report issued on June 21, 2016, he opined that Defendant was competent to proceed. (Id.) He explained: "[Defendant] has a lucid rational and clear understanding of the charges against her, the possible consequence; how the adversarial system functions. She can assist in her own defense. She can contribute to her own defense." (Id.) Dr. Bloomfield added:
(Id. at 3.)
On June 22, 2016, the Court held another competency hearing and received the parties' stipulation regarding Dr. Blackwood's February 28, 2016 report and Dr. Bloomfield's June 21, 2016 report. (Docs. 63, 65.) Based on these reports and the absence of any contrary evidence, on June 29, 2016, the Court entered an Order finding Defendant competent to participate in all pretrial proceedings and to stand trial. (Doc. 68.)
On March 27, 2017, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to Count Seven of the Indictment, charging her with forced labor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a). (Docs. 89, 90, 91, 92.) The Plea Agreement provided that at the time of sentencing, the remaining counts against Defendant would be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)(A). (Doc. 91 at 3.) On March 30, 2017, Judge Corrigan adopted the undersigned's Report and Recommendation Concerning Plea of Guilty as to Count Seven and adjudged Defendant guilty of the offense. (Doc. 95.) Sentencing was scheduled for June 28, 2017.
On May 18, 2017, defense counsel filed a Second Motion for Hearing to Determine Competency, providing, in relevant part: "Regrettably, since the entry of the plea [of guilty], it appears Ms. Clark's mental health condition has significantly deteriorated. As a result of observations of the undersigned counsel and others, counsel submits a good faith basis exists to move for a hearing to determine her competency for sentencing." (Doc. 96.) On June 1, 2017, the Court held a hearing on the motion, at which time defense counsel orally moved for a continuance of the motion hearing and for a competency evaluation by a local expert. (Docs. 98, 99, 100.) The Court continued the motion hearing and appointed Jason A. Demery, Ph.D., ABPP, for the purpose of examining Defendant and issuing a written report as to her competency. (Docs. 101, 104.)
Dr. Demery examined Defendant at the Baker County Jail on August 11, 2017, and issued a report on August 28, 2017. (Doc. 108 at 2.) He opined that Defendant had an inadequate understanding of the nature and consequences of the proceedings against her and was incapable of properly assisting in her defense at that time. (Id.) Dr. Demery assessed Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic Disorder. (Id. at 5.) He noted that he was unable to assess Defendant's appreciation of the charges against her, appreciation of the range and nature of possible penalties, appreciation of the range of plea options, and understanding of the adversarial nature of the legal process. (Id. at 4.) He added:
stay engaged throughout any hearing. Overall, Mr. [sic] Clark appears to have an inadequate ability to manifest appropriate courtroom behavior.
(Id. at 5.)
On August 31, 2017, the Court held another competency hearing, at which time the parties filed a joint stipulation as to Dr. Demery's report. (Docs. 107, 108.) On September 1, 2017, the Court entered an Order committing Defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for placement at FMC Carswell, for a reasonable period not exceeding four months, for the purpose of treatment and a psychiatric or psychological examination. (Doc. 109.)
Defendant initially arrived at FMC Oklahoma on September 19, 2017, where the psychologist noted that "malingering was suspected," but could not be confirmed due to Defendant's lack of verbal communication with the staff. (Doc. 121 at 11.) On September 26, 2017, Defendant arrived at FMC Carswell. (Id.) Following her competency restoration, on February 14, 2018, Amor Correa, Ph.D., a forensic psychologist, and Dr. Kim submitted a report, dated February 1, 2018, opining that Defendant was competent to proceed with the current case. (Doc. 121 at 2, 3, 19-20.) Specifically, they found that Defendant was not suffering from a mental disease or defect that would render her unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against her, to properly assist in her defense if she so chooses, or to understand the consequences and significance of pleading guilty to the charges against her. (Id. at 19-20; id. at 2, 3.)
The diagnostic impression was malingering. (Id. at 17.) Dr. Correa explained:
(Id. at 18-19.)
On March 15, 2018, the Court held a competency hearing, at which the Government presented the telephonic testimony of Dr. Correa. (Docs. 117, 118.) The forensic evaluation by Dr. Correa and Dr. Kim, dated February 1, 2018, was also received into evidence as Government's Exhibit One.
Dr. Correa testified that Defendant's presentation during her last competency restoration at FMC Carswell was "vastly different" from her presentation the first time she was there. (Tr. 9.)
Moreover, Defendant's "presentation was largely inconsistent . . . throughout the evaluation period." (Tr. 16.) For example, it fluctuated depending on who she was communicating with and depending on the topic of conversation, it also fluctuated depending on the duration of the contact (the longer the meeting lasted, the more her behavior subsided), and it was inconsistent with her presentation before and after her meetings with medical staff. (Tr. 16-18, 49-50.) Also, Defendant seemed "able to incorporate feedback about her symptoms" from earlier reports, suggesting "an attempt to become more sophisticated and convincing in her presentation as time went on." (Tr. 19.) In addition, although Dr. Correa could not administer formal psychological testing because, for the most part, Defendant declined to speak to her, Defendant's testing from previous evaluations consistently indicated a malingering presentation. (Tr. 21.) Given that Defendant's health status had not changed as she did not suffer any organic brain insult that could have caused her alleged symptoms and there was neither medical nor psychological reason for her presentation, Dr. Correa concluded that Defendant was malingering.
Dr. Correa further concluded that Defendant was competent to proceed with this case. (Tr. 22.) She explained that in her three previous evaluations, Defendant was able to articulate good factual knowledge and rational understanding of the proceedings against her, she was able to reach out to her attorney prior to proceeding with certain parts of those evaluations, and she demonstrated sufficient capacity to assist in her defense. (Tr. 48.) Since those evaluations, there has been no medical or psychological cause to prevent Defendant from using these abilities. (Id.) In Dr. Correa's opinion, motivation was "the deciding factor," which "goes hand-in-hand with malingering." (Id.) She explained: "An individual can have the capacity to do something, but simply not be motivated to do it, or be motivated to not do it, for whatever reason they may have." (Tr. 49.)
The Court is required to hold a competency hearing "if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense." 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d); see also United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1479 (11th Cir. 1986) ("The legal test for competency is whether the defendant had `sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding' and whether he had `a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.'") (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960)).
Here, the preponderance of the evidence indicates that Defendant is competent to proceed with this case. First, the Court finds, consistent with Dr. Correa's February 1, 2018 report and testimony at the March 15, 2018 hearing, the February 28, 2016 report from FMC Carswell, and Dr. Bloomfield's June 21, 2016 report, that Defendant is not suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering her unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against her. (See Docs. 67, 67-1, 121.) Dr. Correa did not find "any major mental health symptoms that would prevent [Defendant] from being a competent defendant if she so chooses." (Doc. 121 at 19.) In her report, she explained:
(Id.)
Then, at the competency hearing, Dr. Correa confirmed that Defendant's functioning was generally intact and although Defendant presented primarily as mute during her most recent competency restoration, there was no organic or medical cause for her presentation. (Tr. 10, 11-12, 15-16.) These factors, along with Defendant's largely inconsistent presentation throughout the evaluation period, ability to incorporate feedback about her symptoms, the test results from the previous evaluations, and the lack of any organic brain insult that could have caused her alleged symptoms (Tr. 11, 16-19, 21-22, 49-50), led Dr. Correa to conclude that Defendant was malingering, which is consistent with the February 28, 2016 report from FMC Carswell and the September 19, 2017 notation from FMC Oklahoma (Doc. 67-1 at 15; Doc. 121 at 11). In light of this evidence, the Court finds that Defendant was indeed malingering during her evaluations. Based on the foregoing, the Court also finds that Defendant has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against her.
Secondly, Defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. As reflected throughout the record, Defendant has been able to reach out to her attorney prior to proceeding with certain portions of her evaluations and has been able to reasonably communicate with her attorney and the evaluators during her first commitment at FMC Carswell. (Doc. 67-1; Tr. 48.) Although Defendant's presentation during her second commitment at FMC Carswell was vastly different in that she presented mostly as mute, as Dr. Correa noted, there was no medical or psychological cause for her symptoms, which could prevent Defendant from assisting with her defense. (See Doc. 121; Tr. 48.) Consistent with Dr. Correa's opinions and the conclusions in the February 28, 2016 report from FMC Carswell and Dr. Bloomfield's June 21, 2016 report, the Court finds that Defendant has the ability to communicate with her attorney with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. (Doc. 67-1 at 16; Doc. 67 at 2.) Accordingly, after due consideration, it is hereby
Defendant, Esthela Clark, is mentally competent to proceed and there is no reason to delay further proceedings in this case.
