GREGORY A. PRESNELL, District Judge.
This Matter comes before the Court after evidentiary hearings on the Plaintiff's Daubert Motion to Exclude Hal Poret (Doc. No. 172), the Defendant's Daubert Motion to Exclude Kirk Martensen (Doc. 173), and the accompanying responses from Plaintiff and Defendant.
Superior owns two Florida fictitious business entities called "Your Future Health" and "YFH" (collectively "Superior"). Doc. 20 ¶ 5. Eleanor Cullen owns and operates Superior. Superior's "primary objective is the early detection of disease, through performing certain laboratory tests, including blood tests, for consumers." Id. ¶ 7. Superior accomplishes its objective by creating a profile "customized to a client's unique biochemistry," called a "Healthprint." Id. ¶ 11. Superior has registered the mark "Healthprint" twice with the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). Registration number 2646571 was obtained on November 5, 2002, and registration number 2928465 was obtained on March 1, 2005. Doc. 20 ¶¶ 14, 16. The USPTO did not require proof of a secondary meaning for either mark. Id. ¶ 18. On November 8, 2008, and February 5, 2011, Superior filed declarations of incontestability for the marks.
On June 8, 2016, Shaklee, a corporation that manufactures and distributes nutrition supplements, beauty products, and household-cleaning products, filed a trademark application with the USPTO claiming a similar "Healthprint" mark. Shaklee's Healthprint refers to a free, online survey that consists of twenty-two questions about a client's personal characteristics, habits, and goals. Doc. 43-8 ¶ 13. Once the client answers all of the questions, he or she is presented with "a customized set of Shaklee products that fits [his or her] health goals, needs and budget." Doc. 43-7, Ex. 1 at 1.
On December 14, 2017, Superior filed its Second Amended Complaint alleging trademark infringement and violations of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act. Doc. 159. On January 2, 2018, Shaklee filed its Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaim. Doc. 166. On January 12, 2018, Superior filed the Motion to Exclude Hal Poret under Daubert (Doc. 172), and Shaklee filed the Motion to Exclude Kirk Martensen (Doc. 173) that same day. On February 2, 2018, Shaklee filed its Response (Doc. 231), and Superior filed its Response (Doc. 243). The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Exclude Kirk Martensen on April 18, 2018. Doc. 282. On April 19, 2018, the Court held an evidentiary hearing on the Motion to Exclude Hal Poret. Doc. 286.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admission of expert witness testimony. It provides that:
Fed. R. Evid. 702. The proponent of the opinion testimony has the burden of establishing each precondition to admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Rink v. Cheminova, Inc., 400 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2005).
In Daubert v. Merrill Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the Supreme Court admonished trial courts to fulfill a gatekeeping role in the presentation of expert testimony. To guide district courts' assessments of the reliability of an expert's testimony, the Supreme Court identified four factors that district courts should consider: (1) whether the expert's methodology has been tested or is capable of being tested; (2) whether the theory or technique used by the expert has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether there is a known or potential error rate of the methodology; and (4) whether the technique has been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. See id. at 593-94. At the same time, the Court has emphasized that these factors are not exhaustive and are intended to be applied in a "flexible" manner. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). District courts are charged with this gatekeeping function "to ensure that speculative, unreliable expert testimony does not reach the jury" under the mantle of reliability that accompanies the appellation "expert testimony." Rink, 400 F.3d at 1291 (quoting McCorvey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 298 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2002)).
These expert witnesses are presented with respect to the issue of the likelihood of customer confusion between the two Healthprint marks, the most critical factor in a trademark infringement claim. See, e.g., Wesco Mfg., Inc. v. Tropical Attractions of Palm Beach, Inc., 833 F.2d 1484, 1488 (11th Cir. 1987). Each witness conducted a survey designed to measure the likelihood of confusion. Needless to say, the Plaintiff's expert found a high likelihood of confusion, while the Defendant's expert found a low likelihood of confusion. Neither party attacks the credentials of either witness, and both surveys are clearly relevant and would be helpful to a jury. Accordingly, the Rule 702 problem here is one of reliability.
The methodology of a survey conducted by an expert witness is important to the Court's determination of reliability. A Squirt survey format "presents a respondent with both of the conflicting marks." 6 McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:173.50 (5th ed.). Superior and Shaklee each describe their own experts' surveys as Squirt surveys. However, the methodologies of the two surveys are extraordinarily different. Poret's survey included static images of web pages from both Superior's and Shaklee's websites, displayed the two Healthprint marks as they appeared on those web pages, and asked questions to determine whether there was confusion between the two Healthprint marks that could be attributed to the alleged infringement. Poret's survey also included a control group to weed out "noise." Martensen's survey displayed the word "Healthprint" in plain font, used no marketing materials whatsoever, described Superior's Healthprint service but not Shaklee's, and posed various questions in an attempt to ascertain whether respondents believed the Healthprint name and/or service came from a single company. Martensen did not use a control group in his survey.
Although Squirt surveys are generally accepted by the courts, the Martensen survey does not comply with the basic tenants of a Squirt survey, and the methodology he used is not reliable.
Shaklee argues that Martensen's report should be excluded for several reasons: (1) the survey does not show Superior or Shaklee's Healthprint marks as they would be encountered in the marketplace; (2) the survey contains no control group; (3) the survey contains a question that implies there is a single "Healthprint" company, tainting the remainder of the survey; (4) the survey never describes the services offered by Shaklee under the Healthprint mark; and (5) the survey fails to use a proper universe of survey respondents. Doc. 173 at 2-3. Superior's primary response is that any problems with the survey are technical issues that go to the weight of the survey, not its reliability. It is the very substance—not the format—of the survey questions that renders the survey unreliable. Cf. Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Georgia, Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 845 (11th Cir. 1983) (indicating that problems with the format of the questions go to the weight, and not the admissibility, of a survey). The problem with Martensen's survey, however, is not that the survey failed to show confusion; rather, the problem is that the survey questions could not possibly show confusion even if confusion were present.
First, instead of presenting respondents with the two Healthprint marks that are in dispute, Martensen's survey simply included questions that inquired about the word "Healthprint," asking, for example, in question 14, whether respondents believed it was from one company, more than one company, or no company at all.
The Martensen survey also fails to use a control group.
Adding to its reliability problems, Martensen's survey fails to actually describe Shaklee's Healthprint service. At the evidentiary hearing, Martensen indicated that he believed that question 17's description of the Healthprint service included both Superior's and Shaklee's Healthprints. Doc. 293 at 33. However, that description specifically says that "the Healthprint service provides early detection of disease for individuals by reviewing answers to health questions and performing laboratory tests, with or without a blood test." Id. at 34. While that may describe Superior's Healthprint, it does not describe Shaklee's Healthprint. Martensen testified that the description was "an attempt to include the combined services of [Superior's] Healthprint and Shaklee's Healthprint and to get a measurement on whether or not this, as it's written, would be viewed as—to the respondents from a single company, more than one company, or whether or not they didn't know." Id. at 36. However, question 17 straightforwardly states that the service described involves performing laboratory tests. Id. at 37-38. Shaklee's Healthprint service does not involve performing laboratory tests. A respondent can only compare and contrast two services if they are first given two services to compare and contrast. Martensen's survey gave only one, so if any of the respondents rightfully believed that that the described service came from one entity, it is unremarkable.
After considering Martensen's report it in its entirety and the testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing, the Court finds that Martensen's expert testimony is fatally flawed. Accordingly, the Court will not allow this speculative and unreliable expert testimony to reach the jury.
Superior makes three arguments as to why the Poret Report should be excluded: (1) Poret's survey failed to identify the proper universe of respondents; (2) Poret's survey used a flawed methodology; and (3) Poret's survey showed respondents more stimuli from Shaklee's use of the Healthprint mark than that of Superior's use of the Healthprint mark.
Superior argues that the universe of the survey was under-inclusive for purposes of both reverse and forward confusion.
First, Superior contends that the universe fails to account for those would-be Superior consumers that want a nutritional consultation without a blood test. Doc. 172 at 11; Doc. 295 at 57. Superior makes much of Poret "learn[ing] for the first time [at his deposition] that Superior offers its Healthprint service both with a blood test and without a blood test." Doc. 172 at 12.
Superior argues that the universe is also under-inclusive because it eliminates prospective Shaklee customers who are not interested in a blood testing service. Doc. 295 at 57. The Poret survey included a question for which the results indicated about seventy percent of the survey participants were prospective users of online health questionnaires. Id. at 6. Evidently, most of those surveyed were also interested in the type of service provided by the Shaklee Healthprint. Id. at 7. To the extent that the universe was under-inclusive as to prospective Shaklee consumers, it was not fatally so, and any error there should be dealt with by cross-examination, not exclusion.
Superior's second universe criticism stems from what it claims are its "primary customers," who are allegedly between fifty and ninety years old. Doc. 172 at 13-14. But Superior never claims that its customer base is limited to those over fifty years of age. In fact, the Court notes the Martensen survey included respondents over the age of 18, not just those over 21, making it an even broader universe than that of the Poret survey. While Superior boldly claims that "only one in three respondents were in the same demographic as Superior's consumers," id. at 14, that statement is contradicted by Mrs. Cullen's deposition testimony. According to Mrs. Cullen, Superior's customer base included "a lot of kids," and "a lot of 40- and 50- year-olds." Doc. 176 at 259. It would have been improper to limit the survey respondents by age when Superior's own customers are not so limited. Furthermore, the Poret survey's results can be narrowed by age, and respondents aged fifty-five and older had a lower percentage of net confusion than did younger respondents. Doc. 295 at 20, 67. The age of the respondents in the survey universe does not render Poret's survey unreliable under Rule 702.
Superior also argues that Poret's methodology was flawed, because Poret's survey used static screenshots instead of actual web pages. Superior similarly contends that Poret's methodology was flawed because brochures and word of mouth are the primary ways that Superior's Healthprint is advertised. See Doc. 295 at 60. Poret testified that he used static images because that was the only way to tell what the respondents actually saw and that, in this situation, there was nothing left out of the user experience by showing a succession of fixed webpages. Doc. 295 at 9-10, 13. There is no apparent reason why the usage of brochures would be more reliable than webpages here, and there is simply nothing unreliable in the use of Shaklee's website.
Superior takes issue with the disparity in the number of static webpages shown to respondents that belonged to Shaklee and the number that belonged to Superior. Doc. 172 at 23.
For the foregoing reasons, Shaklee's Motion to Exclude Kirk Martensen under Daubert (Doc. 173) is