AMANDA ARNOLD SANSONE, District Judge.
Darrell Archer requests an order compelling Walmart-Stores East, LP, ("Walmart") to answer an interrogatory seeking the identity and contact information of Walmart's corporate vice president in charge of asset protection. (Doc. 172). Walmart moves for a protective order as to this same interrogatory. (Doc. 171). Both motions are opposed. (Docs. 173, 177).
Mr. Archer brought this Fourth Amendment claim of unlawful detention and seizure of property pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 133). Mr. Archer alleges that, after he purchased a television at Walmart, an employee stopped him and requested to see a receipt for the purchase. (Doc. 133, ¶¶ 15-19). When Mr. Archer refused, three Winter Haven police officers responded to the incident and Mr. Archer was detained for a short period. (Id. at ¶¶ 20, 34-35, 39). Ultimately, Mr. Archer left the store without his television because he would not show his receipt. (Id. at ¶ 48).
Mr. Archer now seeks to compel a compete response to the following interrogatory:
Walmart objected to the interrogatory with the following:
(Doc. 172). Walmart objects to the motion and moves for a protective order as to the same request. (Doc. 171).
Motions to compel discovery are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Westrope, 730 F.2d 729, 731 (11th Cir. 1984). Rule 26(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the scope of discovery. That rule provides, in relevant part, that
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
The "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strongly favor full discovery whenever possible." Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985). However, under Rule 26(c), any person from whom discovery is requested may move for a protective order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). For good cause, the court may enter a protective order to protect a party from embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden. Id. To establish good cause, the party requesting protection must demonstrate the need for a protective order, which requires "particular and specific demonstration of fact." United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir. 1978) (citations omitted).
The interrogatory at issue simply seeks the identity and contact information of Walmart's corporate vice president in charge of asset protection. This information is relevant to Mr. Archer's claim that Walmart employees failed to follow Walmart's policy as it pertains to "receipt checking," and his claim for unlawful detention. Certainly, the corporate vice president in charge of asset protection would have knowledge of Walmart's "receipt checking"-related policies and their implementation. Because this information is relevant and easily attainable, it is due to be compelled. However, because the only issue before the court is this interrogatory, this order should not be interpreted as compelling the deposition of the named individual(s).
In support of Walmart's motion for protective order, Walmart relies on precedent pertaining to depositions of corporate officials, not interrogatories requesting public information about those corporate officials. Providing a response to this interrogatory would not subject anyone to embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden. Thus, good cause does not exist for entering a protective order at this time.
Accordingly, it is
(1) Mr. Archer's Motion to Compel Answers to Interrogatory (Doc. 172) is
(2) Walmart's Motion for Protective Order (Doc. 171) is