ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant Dolgencorp, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment, Statement of Undisputed Material Facts, and Memorandum of Law in Support (Doc. 18; Motion), filed on March 30, 2018. Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Motion on April 27, 2018. See Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Supporting Memorandum of Law (Doc. 23; Response). In addition, on May 7, 2018, Defendant filed Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's Statement of Disputed Facts (Doc. 24; Motion to Strike). Plaintiff filed Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Strike Portions of Plaintiff's Statements of Disputed Facts (Doc. 28; Response to Motion to Strike) on May 29, 2018.1 Accordingly, this matter is ripe for review.

I. Background2

Plaintiff Georgena Newsome is a Jehovah's Witness who attends religious services on Sunday mornings. See Motion, Ex. 1: Deposition of Georgena Newsome (Doc. 18-1; Newsome Dep.) at 13-14. In August 2014, Defendant Dolgencorp, LLC d/b/a Dollar General (Dollar General) hired Plaintiff to work as a cashier at the Dollar General store in Jasper, FL. See Newsome Dep. at 25, 29-30; Defendant's Answer and Affirmative Defenses (Doc. 5; Answer) ¶ 3. Plaintiff had applied for the position by filling out an application on a computer. See Newsome Dep. at 22. On this application, under each day of the week, Plaintiff indicated that she was available to work "Any" hours. See Newsome Dep. at 21-23; Motion, Ex. 2 at 1 (Application for Employment). After submitting this Application for Employment, the store manager, Lisa Tillerson, contacted Newsome. See Newsome Dep. at 24. Tillerson offered Newsome the job and had her complete additional paperwork. Id. In this additional paperwork, Newsome indicated that she was not available to work on Sundays. See id. at 25, 57, 74-75. Newsome began work at the Dollar General on Thursday, September 11, 2014. See Answer ¶ 3; see also Motion, Ex. 2 at 12. According to Dollar General's records, Newsome worked that Sunday, September 14th, and the two following Sundays as well. See Motion, Ex. 2 at 12. Each of those shifts started at 4:00 p.m. or later. Id.

On November 29, 2014, Newsome received a promotion to Lead Sales Associate, a position she refers to as a keyholder. See Motion, Ex. 2 at 3; Newsome Dep. at 30, 33-34. After she became a keyholder, Newsome worked mostly at night as a closing manager. See Newsome Dep. at 30. She typically would work from 4:00 p.m. to closing at 10:00 p.m. Id. at 31. Newsome estimates that a total of approximately nine employees worked at the Dollar General store. Id. Four or five people would work the morning shift, two managers, a cashier, and a stocking person, and two people would work the evening shift, a cashier and a keyholder, typically Newsome. Id. at 31-32. Following her promotion to keyholder, Newsome worked the closing shift the next six Sundays in a row. See Motion, Ex. 2 at 12-13.

On February 23, 2015, Tillerson met with Newsome to discuss her failure to comply with the required store closing procedures. See Newsome Dep. at 35-36; Motion, Ex. 2 at 4. According to the Dollar General Progressive Counseling Form concerning the incident, Newsome engaged in the following "Substandard Performance" pertaining to closing procedures:

See Motion, Ex. 2 at 4. The Form includes an "Action Plan to Correct Unacceptable Performance, Conduct or Attendance" which instructs:

Id. On the bottom of the Form, Newsome commented that: "I was doing what I was talked [sic] to do. Now I just know what to do now. Sorry." Id. According to Newsome, Tillerson explained that "she [Tillerson] basically had got wrote up for not following Dollar General's policy and procedures, and that basically how I was trained was wrong, and these are the things that basically need to get changed. This is how I was taught doing it. That is why I apologized in my comments." See Newsome Dep. at 36. Newsome states that it was Tillerson who had initially trained her, and that she had gotten "so used to doing it like that," with the door open, "because that's how they trained me, . . . And that way I can also keep here and keep an eye on my one cashier that I have at nighttime, instead of being closed up." Id. at 37. Nevertheless, Newsome acknowledged that during the meeting on the Progressive Counseling Form, Tillerson told her that "the [office] door have [sic] to be closed while I count money, and that the double doors have to be locked before counting the money now." Id.

At some point during her employment, although the record does not indicate precisely when, Newsome asked Tillerson if she could have Sundays off, or at least alternate who worked on Sundays. See id. at 56-57, 64. The first conversation Newsome specifically recalls with Tillerson about her Sunday work schedule occurred in late March or early April 2015. Id. at 55-56, 64. In that conversation, Newsome had asked Tillerson about sharing Sundays by alternating who worked, id. at 57, 64, and told Tillerson that she wanted to attend church, id. at 82-83.4 According to Newsome, Tillerson told her that "she need me because of the fact that two ladies got fired, and both of them was key holders. And she needed me to close every night. I told her, `Fine.' She told me she was getting a key holder. Once she get the key holder, I could stop working on Sundays." Id. at 57; see also id. at 56 ("[S]he come to me, let me know that she needs me, and I do it because she's my GM, and if she tell me she needs me for the store, I do it."). When Newsome was still scheduled to work Sundays after another person was hired, she went to Tillerson again, but nothing changed.5 Id.

At that point, around May 3, 2015, Newsome decided to call the Dollar General corporate Employee Response Center (ERC) to complain about being over-worked.6 Id. at 49-50, 52-54; see also Motion, Ex. 2 at 8. In its records, Dollar General summarized the call as follows:

See Motion, Ex. 2 at 8. Newsome does not recall relaying her concerns "like they said it," but she does recall "letting them know" that Tillerson "need[ed] to hire some more people to stock," and Newsome needed help to do the "rolltainers," as well as help "when there's only two people on the shift and [she] still [has] to look out for [her] cashier." See Newsome Dep. at 50-52. Although not documented in Dollar General's records, Newsome also recalls complaining about working on Sundays during this call. See id. at 55. When asked during her deposition what she reported regarding Sundays, Newsome responded: "I let them know that I was informed that a manager, a GM, supposed to work at—close up the building at night, too. And I let them know that she has not been doing that, that I'm the only one that been closing up at night." Id. Newsome testified that after her call to the ERC she received a call back from someone who let her know that:

Id. at 54; 57-58. In addition, the person Newsome spoke with cautioned her that when Tillerson finds out about Newsome's complaint she may retaliate by cutting Newsome's hours, and advised Newsome that if that happens, she should call back and report the retaliation. Id. at 54-55, 57-58.

Approximately a week after this call, Newsome spoke with Tillerson again at which time: "Tillerson asked [Newsome] about the Sundays, that basically [they were] going to— [Tillerson] was going to start closing up, and she had to start working some Sundays. And [Newsome] told her, `Okay, I agree to that.'" Id. at 59-60. According to Newsome, this arrangement of alternating Sundays only lasted a few weeks until it went back to Newsome working on Sundays. Id. at 55-56, 60. However, this testimony is inconsistent with Dollar General's employment records which show that after she called the ERC, Newsome worked the next six Sundays in a row. See Motion, Ex. 2 at 15-16. Notably, in a different portion of her deposition, Newsome testified that: "[w]hen I went to her the second time, after the fact that I had called in on her, she basically told me that she's short on staff and if [Newsome] can't work a Sunday, then she either going to have to step me down or she don't need me." Id. at 76.7

Just over two months after Newsome called the ERC to complain about Tillerson, on July 10, 2015, Tillerson terminated Newsome's employment with Dollar General. See id. at 60-61; see also Motion, Ex. 2 at 9-10. According to the Dollar General Progressive Counseling Form, on July 6, 2015, Newsome did not follow closing procedures. See Motion, Ex. 2 at 9. The Form states "[o]n 2-17-15 she was given a final written counseling on closing procedures. She was counting money at closing with door open and cashier sitting in office. Also failed to present her bags when leaving." Id. Newsome wrote the following response on the Form:

Id. (spelling and grammar errors in original). Newsome does not remember whether she was counting money with the cashier in the office and the door open. See Newsome Dep. at 61-62. In Newsome's view, Tillerson retaliated against her for requesting Sundays off because after she called the ERC and talked to Tillerson "the next thing you know it's just little icky picky things, and then the next thing, you know, it's termination." Id. at 63, 78. After she was terminated, Newsome called "corporate" to report what she viewed as a retaliatory termination and was told they would review what happened. Id. at 65. Newsome never received a return call. Id.

II. Standard of Review

Under Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)), "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(a). The record to be considered on a motion for summary judgment may include "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials." Rule 56(c)(1)(A).8 An issue is genuine when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmovant. Mize v. Jefferson City Bd. of Educ., 93 F.3d 739, 742 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting Hairston v. Gainesville Sun Publ'g Co., 9 F.3d 913, 919 (11th Cir. 1993)). "[A] mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Kesinger ex rel. Estate of Kesinger v. Herrington, 381 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).

The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court, by reference to the record, that there are no genuine issues of material fact to be determined at trial. See Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991). "When a moving party has discharged its burden, the non-moving party must then go beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Substantive law determines the materiality of facts, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, a court "must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment." Haves v. City of Miami, 52 F.3d 918, 921 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Dibrell Bros. Int'l, S.A. v. Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro, 38 F.3d 1571, 1578 (11th Cir. 1994)).

III. Clarification of Newsome's Claims

Newsome's Complaint sets forth two counts: Count I — Religious Discrimination and Count II — Retaliation. In the Motion, Dollar General asserts that Count I of the Complaint constitutes a claim for religious discrimination based on disparate treatment, and that Newsome did not plead a failure to accommodate claim. See Motion at 10-11. Indeed, in the "Religious Discrimination" Count Newsome alleges that she "has been the victim of discrimination on the basis of [her] religion in that [she] was treated differently than similarly situated employees of Defendant [who] do not share [Newsome's] religious beliefs and preferences. . . ." See Complaint ¶ 15. The words "failure to accommodate" do not appear anywhere in the Complaint. See generally Complaint. Thus, because Newsome did not "separate discrete claims of discrimination into separate counts," Dollar General argues that she cannot add a failure to accommodate claim at this stage of the proceedings. See Motion at 11. In her Response, Newsome contends that she need not have invoked the precise legal theory giving rise to recovery so long as Dollar General had sufficient notice of her claim. See Response at 5. According to Newsome, her factual allegations are sufficient to put Dollar General on notice that "Plaintiff's religious discrimination claim is based on Tillerson's refusal to accommodate Plaintiff's schedule as necessary for her practice of religion." Id. at 6.

In the Complaint, Newsome includes the following pertinent factual allegations:

See Complaint ¶¶ 7-11. Based on these allegations, Newsome's sole religious discrimination claim is that Dollar General intentionally discriminated against her based on her religious practice. Specifically, Newsome alleges that Dollar General terminated her because she requested not to work on Sundays for religious reasons. Discharging Newsome for this reason "is synonymous with refusing to accommodate the religious practice. To accuse the employer of one is to accuse him of the other." See E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S.Ct. 2028, 2032 n.2 (2015). Indeed, in Abercrombie, the Supreme Court explained that "the rule for disparate-treatment claims based on a failure to accommodate a religious practice is straightforward: An employer may not make an [employee's] religious practice, confirmed or otherwise, a factor in employment decisions." Id. at 2033. This is precisely what Newsome has alleged—that Dollar General made Newsome's religious practice requiring Sundays off a factor in its decision to terminate her employment. See Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2033. Whether Dollar General offered Newsome a reasonable accommodation or was unable to do so without undue hardship is a defense to this action that Newsome is not required to plead or prove. See Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2032 n.2 (explaining that the statute "place[s] upon the employer the burden of establishing an `undue hardship' defense"); id. at 2036 (Alito, J., concurring) ("[A] plaintiff need not plead or prove that the employer wished to avoid making an accommodation or could have done so without undue hardship."); see also Dixon v. Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 855 (11th Cir. 2010) ("Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to `demonstrate that he is unable to reasonably accommodate an employee's . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.'" (quoting Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2007))). Having determined that Count I of the Complaint alleges a claim of intentional religious discrimination based on the theory that Newsome was terminated due to her religious practice, the Court will next consider whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to Newsome's religious discrimination and retaliation claims.9

IV. Applicable Law10

A. Religious Discrimination

Title VII provides "that it is unlawful for an employer `to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.'" Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1561 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1)).11 To establish a prima facie case of religious discrimination in a case such as this, a plaintiff must present evidence that: "(1) [she] had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an employment requirement; (2) [she] informed [her] employer of [her] belief; and (3) [she] was discharged for failing to comply with the conflicting employment requirement." See Morrissette-Brown v. Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr., 506 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Beadle v. Hillsborough Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 29 F.3d 589, 592 n.5 (11th Cir. 1994)). Here, Newsome contends that pursuant to her bona fide religious beliefs, she attends religious services on Sunday mornings, which conflicts with her ability to work on Sundays. See Response at 10; Newsome Dep. at 13-14, 75-76, 87. She also asserts that she informed Dollar General of her religious practice. See Response at 10; Newsome Dep. at 83.12 As to the third element, neither party contends that Newsome was terminated for failing to show up for work on Sundays as scheduled. Nevertheless, if Dollar General terminated Newsome's employment to avoid providing her with a religious accommodation, then such action could still constitute a violation of Title VII. See Abercrombie, 135 S. Ct. at 2032-33.13 Significantly, it is Newsome's burden to prove that her religious practice, or the desire to avoid accommodating that practice, was a motivating factor in Dollar General's decision to terminate her. See id. at 2032 n.2 (explaining that it is the plaintiff's burden to prove that an adverse employment action was because of her religious practice). If a plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to `demonstrate[] that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's . . . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business.'" See Morrissette-Brown, 506 F.3d at 1321 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j)).

In this case, Newsome relies on circumstantial evidence to prove Dollar General's discriminatory intent,14 and as such her claim is subject to the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Vessels v. Atlanta Independent Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767 (11th Cir. 2005)).15 When relying on the McDonnell Douglas framework to support a claim of discrimination, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. A plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII by showing that she was: "(1) a member of a protected class; (2) subjected to an adverse employment action, (3) treated less favorably than similarly situated employees outside of [her] class, and (4) qualified to do the job." Walker v. Indian River Transport Co., ___ F. App'x ___, 2018 WL 3602926, at *6 (11th Cir. July 27, 2018) (citing McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1373 (11th Cir. 2008)); see also Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562. "To make a comparison of the plaintiff's treatment to that of [an employee outside plaintiff's protected class], the plaintiff must show that [she] and the employees are similarly situated in all relevant respects." Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1562. If a plaintiff cannot identify a similarly situated comparator who was treated more favorably than herself, "summary judgment is appropriate where no other evidence of discrimination is present." Id.

If the plaintiff presents a prima facie case, that evidence "creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee," and the burden of production shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981); Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264. If the defendant meets this burden of production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the stated reason is a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination and was not the "true reason for the employment decision." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256; Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264; Holifield, 115 F.3d at 1565 ("[T]he plaintiff has the opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant's articulated reason for the adverse employment action is a mere pretext for discrimination." (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804)). A plaintiff may satisfy this burden "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. "Despite these shifts in the burden of production, the ultimate burden of persuasion remains on the plaintiff to show that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her." Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1264.

Although acknowledging that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies, see Response at 7, Newsome appears to concede that she cannot satisfy her prima facie burden because she is unable to identify any comparators, id. at 8-9. Nonetheless, Newsome contends that summary judgment is inappropriate because she has otherwise presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish a triable issue regarding Dollar General's discriminatory intent. See id. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has long recognized that the McDonnell Douglas framework is not the only means of proving a case of discrimination. See Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). Even without comparators, "[a] triable issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a `convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.'" Id. (internal footnote omitted) (quoting Silverman v. Bd. of Educ., 637 F.3d 729, 733 (7th Cir. 2011)).

B. Retaliation

Under Title VII an employer is also prohibited from retaliating against an employee "because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice . . . or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). "A prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII requires the plaintiff to show that: (1) she engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." See Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 970 (11th Cir. 2008). As with a substantive religious discrimination claim, if an employer articulates legitimate reasons for its actions, a plaintiff must then "`show that the employer's proffered reasons for taking the adverse action were actually a pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct.'" See McCann, 526 F.3d at 1375 (quoting Sullivan v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th Cir. 1999)). To establish pretext, a plaintiff must demonstrate "`such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.'" Id. (quoting Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir. 2004)).

V. Discussion

Newsome's religious discrimination claim is premised on her contention that she was terminated "because she made complaints that Tillerson was not allowing her to take Sundays off." See Response at 10.16 As this is the same theory on which she premises her retaliation claim, the Court will consider these claims together. For the reasons set forth below, Newsome fails to present evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that her requests for Sundays off or her complaints about not receiving Sundays off motivated Dollar General's decision to terminate her employment.

Newsome contends that she can establish a causal connection between her complaints and her termination because: (1) another employee had been told, prior to Newsome's misconduct, that "they were planning to terminate [Newsome] as soon as they could train a new key holder," (2) after Newsome complained to the ERC Tillerson began nitpicking her work, and (3) she was terminated only two months after her call. See Response at 9, 13-24. Specifically, Newsome relies on the testimony of Samantha Clay, who worked as a cashier and stocker at Dollar General for three or four months, leaving in January or February of 2015. See Clay Dep. at 5-6, 15. According to Clay, Strickland was training Clay to be a keyholder and told her that someone might leave, and stated that "`[w]e going to get rid of [Newsome.]'" See Clay Dep. at 13.17 Clay did not testify as to when that conversation occurred, nor does Clay know why Dollar General planned to terminate Newsome's employment. According to Newsome, this evidence establishes that Tillerson planned to terminate her long before she violated closing procedures. See Response at 13. However, because Clay left her employment with Dollar General in January or February of 2015, her conversation with Strickland also would have occurred before Newsome called the ERC to complain about Tillerson's refusal to give her Sundays off. Likewise, this incident also would have pre-dated Newsome's conversation with Tillerson in mid-March or early April about alternating Sundays so Newsome could attend church. See Newsome Dep. at 57, 64. As such, this evidence actually undermines Newsome's contention that Tillerson wanted to fire her based on discriminatory or retaliatory reasons.18 Nevertheless, because, as discussed below, Dollar General has come forward with a non-discriminatory reason for Newsome's termination, the Court will assume without deciding that the two-month span between Newsome's complaint to the ERC and her termination is sufficient to satisfy her prima facie burden and focus on the question of pretext. Compare Robinson v. LaFarge N. Am., Inc., 240 F. App'x 824, 829 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[Plaintiff] established a prima facie case, as the demotion occurred only about two months after he filed a grievance.") with Williams v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 411 F. App'x 226, 229-30 (11th Cir. 2011) (finding that plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case of retaliation because a two-month gap was insufficiently proximate to establish causation).

Dollar General offers a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Newsome. Specifically, Dollar General presents evidence that it terminated Newsome's employment because she failed to comply with proper closing procedures—she counted the money with the door open and the cashier sitting in the office and failed to conduct bag checks. See Motion, Ex. 2 at 9-10. Newsome does not deny that she engaged in this misconduct, nor does she identify any other key holder who committed similar acts and was not terminated. Nonetheless, Newsome argues that she has presented sufficient evidence of pretext because: (1) Tillerson also failed to follow proper closing procedures and was not terminated, and (2) Newsome followed the closing procedures as taught to her by Tillerson. See Response at 15. Neither argument has merit.

Tillerson's alleged failure to follow closing procedures is unhelpful to Newsome because Tillerson's purported misconduct is materially distinct from Newsome's. Significantly, "`Title VII does not take away an employer's right to interpret its rules as it chooses, and to make determinations as it sees fit under those rules.'" See Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Nix v. WLCY Radio/Rahall Comm'ns, 738 F.2d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir. 1984)). Indeed, this Court does "not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's business decisions." See Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000). Here, Newsome argues that Tillerson failed to comply with closing procedures based on evidence that Tillerson failed to conduct bag checks.19 See Response at 3; Strickland Dep. at 14. While a failure to present bags was noted at the conclusion of Newsome's termination form, the primary violation recounted on the form is Newsome's act of counting the store's money at closing with the door open and the cashier sitting in the office. See Motion, Ex. 2 at 9. In addition, the form notes that Newsome had previously received a written counseling on her failure to comply with the required closing procedures. Id. Newsome offers no evidence that Tillerson engaged in similar misconduct concerning money-handling procedures, much less that she repeated this misconduct after being counseled on the proper procedures. Dollar General reasonably could view Tillerson's purported failure to perform bag checks as materially distinct from Newsome's failure to properly handle the store's cash, and as such, Tillerson cannot serve as a valid comparator for purposes of establishing pretext. See Rioux v. City of Atlanta, 520 F.3d 1269, 1280 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the "quantity and quality of the comparator's misconduct [must] be nearly identical to prevent courts from second-guessing employer's reasonable decisions"); Maniccia, 171 F.3d at 1368-69.

Additionally, Newsome's contention that she was merely following the closing procedures as were taught to her by Tillerson is not supported by the evidence. While it may be that Tillerson initially trained Newsome improperly, it is undisputed that in February, Tillerson instructed Newsome that: (1) no one is permitted in the office the last hour the store is open, (2) when she counts the cash the office door is to be closed and locked, and (3) she must present her bags when leaving the store. See Motion, Ex. 2 at 4; Newsome Dep. at 36-37 ("She basically told me the door have to be closed while I count money, and that the double doors have to be locked before counting the money now."). When counseled in February, the form specifically warned Newsome that failure to comply with these procedures could lead to termination. See Motion, Ex. 2 at 4. Accordingly, Newsome's termination for counting the money with the office door open and the cashier present is entirely consistent with the instructions she received in February, regardless of any prior erroneous training. Thus, Newsome has failed to show any "weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in [Dollar General's] proffered legitimate reasons for its actions [such] that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence." Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1265 (internal quotations omitted).

To the extent Newsome contends that she has otherwise established a "convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence," the Court is not persuaded. Specifically, Newsome relies on the following additional evidence to establish that the real reason for her termination was discrimination or retaliation: she was "subjected to harassment and discipline by Tillerson because of her requests to have Sundays off for religious reasons,"20 and Tillerson remarked to other Dollar General employees that she did not believe that [Newsome] was actually religious.21 See Response at 9. One off-hand remark, without any context, and Newsome's subjective impression that Tillerson was picking on her simply do not constitute a mosaic much less a "convincing mosaic" sufficient to permit an inference of discrimination.22 See Beckles v. Fed. Express Corp., 489 F. App'x 380, 384-85 (11th Cir. 2012); see also Truesdale v. CSX Transp., No. 3:15-cv-1373-J-32PDB, 2017 WL 4182327, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2017) (citing Connelly v. Metro. Atl. Rapid Transit Auth., 764 F.3d 1358, 1364-65 (11th Cir. 2014) (describing the compelling evidence of discrimination present in Smith and distinguishing the plaintiff's "considerably weaker" evidence))). Based on the record before this Court, no reasonable juror could find that Dollar General more likely than not terminated Newsome for a discriminatory or retaliatory reason as opposed to the entirely legitimate reason that after being warned that failure to follow closing procedures could result in termination, Newsome again failed to follow money handling procedures for store closing. Accordingly, Dollar General's Motion is due to be granted.

In light of the foregoing, it is

ORDERED:

DONE AND ORDERED.