ORDER

JOHN ANTOON, II, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Petitioner Ryan D. Doak's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence ("Motion to Vacate," Doc. 3) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Respondent filed a Response to the Motion to Vacate ("Response," Doc. 5) in compliance with this Court's instruction. Petitioner filed a Reply to the Response ("Reply," Doc. 7).

Petitioner asserts two grounds for relief. For the following reasons, the Motion to Vacate is denied.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A grand jury charged Petitioner with distribution of child pornography (Count One) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(2)(B) and (b)(1) and possession of child pornography (Count Two) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2). (Criminal Case No. 6:11-cr-273-Orl-28GJK, Doc. 1.)1 Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner entered a plea of guilty to Count One. (Criminal Case, Doc. Nos. 45, 48.) The Government dismissed Count Two. (Criminal Case, Doc. 67.) On September 4, 2012, the Court entered Judgment, sentencing Petitioner to a 121-month term of imprisonment. (Id.) Petitioner did not appeal.

Petitioner initiated this action under the mailbox rule on October 30, 2017.2 (Doc. 1.)

II. ANALYSIS

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the time for filing a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence is restricted as follows:

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f).

Under § 2255(f)(1), Petitioner had one year from the date his conviction became final to file a § 2255 motion. Judgment was entered on September 4, 2012, and Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. Therefore, his conviction became final on September 18, 2012, when the time for filing an appeal expired. See Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000) (a conviction which is not appealed becomes final when the time allowed for filing an appeal expires); see also Fed. R. App. P. 4(b). Thus, under § 2255(f)(1), Petitioner had through September 19, 2013, to file his § 2255 motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(A).

The remaining provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) are not applicable. Petitioner's grounds for relief are predicated on Amendment 801 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines,3 which became effective on November 1, 2016. Amendment 801, however, is an amendment to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, not a right recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States and made retroactive to cases on collateral review. Consequently, § 2255(f)(3) is not applicable. See, e.g., Bell v. United States, No. 2:14CV1104-MHT, 2017 WL 1398665, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 16, 2017) ("Clearly, though, § 2255(f)(3) does not apply to [the petitioner's] claim, because the claim is predicated on an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines and not on a right recognized in (and made retroactive by) a decision of the United States Supreme Court."), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:14CV1104-MHT, 2017 WL 1398649 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 18, 2017).

Moreover, "[a] change or clarification of controlling law is not a `fact' within the meaning of § 2255(f)(4)." United States v. Harrison, 680 F. App'x 678, 680 (10th Cir. 2017). Therefore, Amendment 801 does not constitute a "fact," and § 2255(f)(4) is not applicable. See, e.g., Bazemore v. United States, 595 F. App'x 869, 873 (11th Cir. 2014) (noting that "[t]he plain language of [§ 2255(f)(4)] . . . refers to `facts,' and the Stewart decision is a legal opinion, not a new fact.").

Petitioner appears to assert he is entitled to equitable tolling. (Doc. 3 at 10.) The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the one-year statutory limitation period is subject to equitable tolling in limited circumstances. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 644 (2010). Equitable tolling is appropriate when a petitioner demonstrates: "`(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way' and prevented timely filing." Id. at 649 (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)); see also Lucas v. United States, 522 F. App'x 556 (11th Cir. 2013) (applying Holland to a § 2255 proceeding). To show extraordinary circumstances, a petitioner must "show a causal connection between the alleged extraordinary circumstances and the late filing of the petition." San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Lawrence v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2005)). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing the applicability of equitable tolling. Drew v. Dep't of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002).

In denying equitable tolling, the Eleventh Circuit has recognized that "a change in law is not an extraordinary circumstance for equitable tolling purposes." Bazemore, 595 F. App'x at 874 (citing Outler v. United States, 485 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2007)); see also Alvarez v. Crews, No. 13-60664-CIV, 2014 WL 29592, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2014) (concluding no extraordinary circumstance shown for equitable tolling based on change in law). Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to equitable tolling, and this case is untimely.4

Any of Petitioner's arguments that attempt to excuse his failure to file the instant motion within the one-year period of limitations and that are not specifically addressed herein have been found to be without merit.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:

DONE and ORDERED.