JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, District Judge.
In this action alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 et seq. ("TCPA"), Plaintiff alleges that Defendant used an automated telephone dialing system ("ATDS") to send text messages to his cellular phone without his consent. (Dkt. 20, Amended Complaint, ¶ 11).
According to Plaintiff, he provided his cellular phone number to Defendant to schedule an appointment to have his windshield replaced. (Dkt. 40-2, Jason Gaza Dep., at 8:2-11). Sometime in October 2015, Defendant replaced the windshield. (Id. at 9:4-6; Ex. A). Between March 30, 2017 and July 12, 2017, Plaintiff received five text messages from the number "332222" which included Defendant's business telephone number in the message. (Id. at 12:14; Ex. B). His "Google" search of the "332222" number showed that it belonged to "a Textedly website," which described itself as a "texting platform." (Id. at 13:10-15; 17:12-17). Based on his review of the Textedly website and his understanding of the TCPA, Plaintiff believes Defendant utilized an ATDS to send the messages. (Id. at 20:2-11).
Defendant contends that it is entitled to summary judgment because Plaintiff fails to produce any evidence establishing that an ATDS was used to send the text messages sent to Plaintiff, an essential element of a cause of action under § 227(b)(1).
Summary judgment is appropriate where "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A genuine factual dispute exists only if a reasonable fact-finder `could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the [non-movant] is entitled to a verdict.'" Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)). A fact is material if it may affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997).
The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine disputes of material fact that should be decided at trial. Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). If the moving party fails to demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute, the motion should be denied. Kernel Records, 694 F.3d at 1300 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 160 (1970); Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 606-08 (11th Cir. 1991)). Once the movant adequately supports its motion, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show that specific facts exist that raise a genuine issue for trial. Dietz v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 598 F.3d 812, 815 (11th Cir. 2010).
Relevant here, Plaintiff, the nonmoving party, must "go beyond the pleadings," and designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine dispute. Jeffery v. Sarasota White Sox, Inc., 64 F.3d 590, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). A mere scintilla of evidence in the form of conclusory allegations, legal conclusions, or evidence that is merely colorable or not significantly probative of a disputed fact cannot satisfy a party's burden. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991); Kernel Records, 694 F.3d at 1301.
The TCPA prohibits the use of an ATDS to call or text a telephone number assigned to a cellular telephone service (other than for purposes of an emergency), without the prior express consent of the "called party." 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii). "The term `automatic telephone dialing system' means equipment which has the capacity—(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers." 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(1).
To succeed on his TCPA claim, Plaintiff must establish that Defendant sent text messages to his cellular phone using an ATDS. Defendant contends that he fails to show that the text messages were sent by an ATDS. The undisputed evidence confirms Defendant's contention. Anthony Prieto, Defendant's corporate representative, testified that the text messages sent on behalf of Defendant utilized manual entry, uploading, and the eventual use of an online website. According to Prieto,
Based on Prieto's uncontradicted testimony, there is nothing in the record establishing that Defendant used an ATDS to send the text messages to Plaintiff. Indeed, the record is silent as to how the Textedly website/platform sends messages, and more importantly, how the messages were sent to Plaintiff. And, as Prieto testified, what happens after "send" is pressed, i.e. "the inner workings," is a question for Textedly.
In an effort to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists,
In an effort to "go beyond the pleadings," Plaintiff contends that Defendant used an ATDS because its corporate representative "admitted to picking a date and time to send text messages from a database uploaded into the Textedly, computer portal/system upon which Defendant relies to `blast' its unwitting customers at a future `time and date' evidencing the true nature of Defendant's unlawful conduct." (Dkt. 41, pp. 5-6). Plaintiff contends that because Defendant pre-scheduled the sending of the text messages, "the element of human intervention" was removed. (Id. at p. 6).
Plaintiff's arguments are unpersuasive. First, the arguments are not supported by citation to any legal authority. Second, as noted, there is no evidence in the record that explains how the messages were sent. One characteristic of an ATDS is that the equipment itself "
In sum, there is no material factual dispute about whether Defendant used an ATDS to send text messages to Plaintiff's cellular phone. Plaintiff's TCPA claim therefore fails as a matter of law. See Gaza v. LTD Fin. Servs., L.P., No. 8:14-cv-1012, 2015 WL 5009741, *4 (M.D. Fla. August 24, 2015) ("TCPA claims fail as a matter of law because [plaintiff] failed to establish a genuine issue for trial with respect to whether the calls were placed using an ATDS").
Accordingly, Defendant's Dispositive Motion for Final Summary Judgment (Dkt. 40) is