JOHN E. STEELE, District Judge.
On July 30, 2018, United States Magistrate Judge Mac R. McCoy submitted a Report and Recommendation (Doc. #52) to the Court recommending that Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. #20) be granted in part and denied in part. The United States' Objections (Doc. #60) and defendant's Objections (Doc. #61) were both filed on August 27, 2018. The undersigned heard oral argument on October 2, 2018. On October 5, 2018, with the permission of the Court, the United States filed a Supplemental Objection (Doc. #67) and defendant filed a Supplemental Briefing on Suppression of Client Identification (Doc. #68). The United States' Response In Opposition to Defendant's Supplement Briefing (Doc. #72) was filed on October 19, 2018.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court accepts in part and rejects in part the Report and Recommendation; sustains in part and overrules in part defendant's objections; and sustains in part and overrules in part the United States' objections. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. #20) is granted in part as set forth below, and is otherwise denied.
After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject or modify the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1);
The Court will discuss the sequence of events, its factual findings as to those events, and its legal conclusions. The Court accepts and adopts the "Summary of the Evidence" and the "Factual Summary" set forth in the Report and Recommendation (Doc. #52, pp. 1-9), as supplemented by the additional facts set forth below. Other portions of the Report and Recommendation are discussed separately.
On August 9, 2017, Officer Zachary Ross and Officer Brandon Birch, members of the Gang Suppression Unit, were on patrol together in a marked City of Fort Myers police car. At about 12:30 p.m., the officers observed a white Toyota Camry fail to stop for a stop sign as it made a right-hand turn. Both officers had a clear look at the driver of this vehicle, but did not recognize the person. The officers attempted to make a traffic stop, but the vehicle accelerated at a high rate of speed. After a 20-30 second chase with lights and siren activated, the officers terminated pursuit for safety reasons. Both officers had seen the vehicle make a turn some distance ahead, so the officers canvased that area looking for the vehicle. Within less than a minute, the officers located the vehicle parked in the driveway at 2991 Douglas Avenue, a residential duplex. No one was in or near the vehicle, and the officers did not see the driver. Officer Birch was broadcasting their activities to other members of the Gang Suppression Unit.
Defendant does not allege any violation of his rights based on this conduct, and of course, there was none.
Officers Ross and Birch parked their police vehicle in the public street, got out, walked onto the driveway of 2291 Douglas Avenue, and approached the parked Camry to look for an occupant. The Camry was parked in the duplex's driveway, which was adjacent to an enclosed side yard shared by the two units of the duplex. Officer Ross opened the Camry's door, looked into the interior of the vehicle, and observed a firearm located between the driver's seat and the glovebox. Officer Ross seized the firearm from the interior of the vehicle, and Officer Birch photographed the firearm and secured it. Because no one was seen at or near the Camry, other officers were called, including a K-9 unit. Three other officers (canine Officer William Schulte, Officer Jari Sanders, and Officer Walter Mickey) arrived at the property. An officer called the police dispatcher about the Camry, and was informed that the vehicle had been reported stolen.
The entry onto the private property at 2291 Douglas Avenue, the opening of the Camry door, the observation of the firearm in the vehicle, and the seizure of the firearm from the interior of the vehicle were illegal.
Defendant McSwain, however, does not challenge this police conduct, and indeed has no right to do so. It is undisputed that defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the Camry or its contents, i.e., he has no "standing" to challenge the police conduct relating to the vehicle.
In the Fourth Amendment context, "standing" is a concept which "is not distinct from the merits and `is more properly subsumed under substantive Fourth Amendment doctrine.'"
Defendant told the officers at the scene that he had not been in the Camry, and testified at the suppression hearing that he was not the driver of that vehicle. Despite the Magistrate Judge's finding to the contrary, defendant continues to maintain that position. (Doc. #68, p.5, n.2.) Additionally, the Camry had been stolen, and defendant asserts no interest in the vehicle or its contents. Further, being charged with possession of the firearm which had been found in the vehicle is insufficient to create a reasonable expectation of privacy and confer standing.
Officers determined from the neighbor in Unit B that the Camry belonged to the people in Unit A; that Rodjay Jackson, a/k/a Gator (hereinafter Rodjay) lived in Unit A; and that Rodjay was not in Unit B. Officer Ross stated at the scene that there was a good chance Rodjay was in Unit A of the duplex. While remaining on the property outside the gated area, officers pulled up Rodjay's image from the Sheriff's Office warrants database. After viewing the picture, Officer Ross stated multiple times that he was 100% certain that Rodjay had been the driver of the Camry. Officer Birch, however, did not believe from the photo that Rodjay was the person driving the Camry. Officer Birch was previously familiar with Rodjay, and believed Rodjay was not the driver. Officer Birch told other officers at the scene that they could identify the driver if they saw him because they had obtained a good look at the driver.
Officers then opened a gate to the side yard shared by both units of the duplex, approached the front and back doors of Unit A, and attempted to get Rodjay and the other occupants to leave the duplex. Among other things, the officers, with weapons drawn, set up a perimeter around the duplex, loudly knocked on the door and told the occupants the house was surrounded, and loudly requested that Rodjay come out with his hands up because the officers did not want to "send the dog in there." (Doc. #49, p. 83.) One officer announced that the officers would not leave until Rodjay came out. Officer Birch asked Officer Newberry to bring "the tool" because they were going to breach the door. (
Officers had learned that Elizabeth McIntosh, who was personally known to some of the officers, was the owner of Unit A. Officers unsuccessfully attempted to contact her for the key so she could open the door and they would not have to smash the door, because the officers were "coming in." (
About fifteen minutes after the first officers arrived, and while the officers were still trying to get the occupants out of Unit A, Ms. McIntosh arrived to get some work clothes from her residence. Ms. McIntosh described the duplex as being "surrounded" by officers. Officer Sanders falsely told Ms. McIntosh that Rodjay had been driving the stolen vehicle and that officers watched him run from it. Ms. McIntosh did not believe this, and told the officers that the driver was someone else in the apartment. Ms. McIntosh also told the officers that she was on probation and did not want to go to jail.
Officer Birch again told Rodjay to open the door because his mother was present and was going to open the door for police, and that the "gig's up." Ms. McIntosh called the occupants inside the apartment on her cell phone, and loudly instructed Till (Rodjay's girlfriend) to open the door. The door was eventually opened, Till and Rodjay came out together, and Rodjay was handcuffed. Ms. McIntosh told the officers that someone else was inside the unit, and Officer Sanders told Ms. McIntosh to tell the person to come out. Ms. McIntosh told Till to tell defendant to come outside; Till went back inside the unit and did so, and defendant came out of the unit. No officer ever crossed the threshold of the door, entered the unit, or searched inside the unit.
Rodjay was briefly detained while handcuffed, but the officers quickly determined that he was not the person they saw driving the Camry. When defendant exited the unit, Officers Ross and Birch identified him as the Camry's driver, and defendant was arrested and handcuffed. Officer Ross was now sure defendant (not Rodjay) had been the driver, and felt he had been misled by the hair depicted in Rodjay's booking photograph. Once Officer Ross saw defendant in person, he immediately had no doubt that defendant had been the driver. Officer Birch told defendant he was going to jail because he had been in the Camry, and defendant responded that the was not in the car at all. Defendant was arrested for fleeing and eluding and possession of a firearm, and taken to the police station.
It is undisputed that the officers had no search warrant. Defendant asserts that the officers' approach to Unit A and their subsequent conduct violated the "knock and talk" exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. As the Report and Recommendation stated, the government did not necessarily contest this point, but argued that no evidence should be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. (Doc. #52, p. 28.)
The "knock and talk" exception allows officers to "do no more than any private citizen might do."
The Report and Recommendation found that the conduct of the officers clearly exceeded the scope of a proper knock and talk encounter, and violated the Fourth Amendment. (Doc. #52, pp. 31-32.) The Report and Recommendation found that the officers were essentially "an armed battalion" which "launch[ed] a raid" on Unit A. (
While both parties now agree, and the Court concurs, that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, the more problematic issue is whether defendant has standing to challenge this police conduct. The Court finds that defendant has standing to challenge the police conduct in and near the areas of ingress and egress of Unit A, regardless of his status as an overnight guest. The Court declines to accept the more expansive standing recommended by the Report and Recommendation, or its reliance on defendant's status as an overnight guest.
The Report and Recommendation essentially found that defendant had been an overnight guest in Unit A on the night of August 8, 2017; had left Unit A sometime the next morning; was driving the Camry the next afternoon; fled from the police while driving the Camry; and had returned to Unit A and entered it shortly before the arrival of the police. (Doc. #52, pp. 12-19.) The Report and Recommendation found that defendant's status as an overnight guest on August 8 gave him standing to challenge the police conduct in the shared side yard of the duplex, which it refers to as "the curtilage," at the time of his August 9 arrest. (Doc. #52, p. 19.)
The Court finds that defendant has standing to challenge the police conduct at and near the ingress/egress areas of Unit A, regardless of whether his status as an overnight guest continued through the time of his arrest. As a result, and as discussed below, the Court finds that it is unnecessary to determine whether defendant maintained his status as an overnight guest through the time of his arrest, or whether he has standing as to other areas which may be considered curtilage. The Court rejects those portions of the Report and Recommendation which find standing to challenge conduct beyond the areas of ingress/egress of Unit A.
The Court accepts the credibility findings set forth in the Report and Recommendation, and agrees with the factual finding that defendant was an overnight guest at Unit A on August 8, 2017. A defendant's "status as an overnight guest is alone enough to show that he had an expectation of privacy in the home that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."
It is not clear that defendant's status as an overnight guest continued after he left Unit A and returned some time later but neither the parties nor the Report and Recommendation cite any binding authority on this issue, and the Court need not resolve the issue in order to resolve this case. The Court assumes for purposes of the motion that defendant's status as an overnight guest did
The police conduct at and near the areas of ingress and egress of Unit A may be challenged by defendant because it directly affected his own person, regardless of whether he then retained the status as an overnight guest. The conduct of the police caused defendant to exit a residential unit so officers could look at him and, having done so, arrest him. Whether viewed as a search
Here, the actions of the police caused defendant to exit the unit, which resulted in observation of him by the officers, their determination that he had been the driver of the Camry, and his arrest. Thus, defendant has standing to challenge the police conduct at and near the areas of ingress and egress of Unit A.
The Report and Recommendation found that despite the Fourth Amendment violation, and defendant's standing to challenge the police conduct, suppression of evidence was not required because the exclusionary rule did not apply. (Doc. #52, pp. 33-38.) The Report and Recommendation found that "[i]n order for the exclusionary rule to apply, the violation must be the but-for cause of the evidence obtained.
The Court declines to accept the Report and Recommendation's determination that the exclusionary rule did not apply to the facts of this case. Rather, the Court finds that the violations of the Fourth Amendment by the officers were the but-for cause of defendant's exit from Unit A, and that the exclusionary rule requires suppression of certain evidence.
Ordinarily, evidence obtained in violation of an individual's rights under the Fourth Amendment "may not be used by the government in a subsequent criminal prosecution."
But the existence of a Fourth Amendment violation and defendant's standing to assert the violation "does not necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies."
The Report and Recommendation correctly stated that the exclusionary rule applies only if the Fourth Amendment violation is the but-for cause of obtaining the evidence.
Had the officers done what the law required, they would have approached Unit A, knocked, waited a reasonable time for a response, and when none came, left. That is obviously not what the officers did in this case. Without a search warrant or any other legal authority, and without probable cause as to defendant McSwain, the officers essentially laid siege to Unit A until all occupants exited the premises. To accomplish their stated intent of compelling Rodjay and all other occupants to exit Unit A, the officers utilized a number of strategies: Armed officers surrounded the property, particularly the areas of ingress and egress; officers loudly knocked on the door and demanded the occupants exit the premises; officers threatened to send a dog into the unit if the occupants failed to exit; an officer falsely told Ms. McIntosh that her son had been seen driving the stolen Camry and had been seen leaving the Camry; and an officer told Ms. McIntosh to have Rodjay exit the premises so they would not have to send a dog in or use a tool to break in. The fact that Ms. McIntosh, a person on probation who had been lied to by an officer as to her son's conduct, acquiesced to the officer's request does not relieve the officers from being the "but for" cause of the conduct. The Fourth Amendment is not nearly so anemic as to allow the conduct in this case to summarily evade consideration of suppression of evidence as a deterrence to future misconduct.
Whether the exclusionary rule applies depends on a cost-benefit analysis that takes into account the deterrent value served by suppression and "the substantial social costs generated by the rule."
Here, the conduct of the officers at Unit A rose to this level. The conduct was clearly deliberate, and therefore exclusion of evidence can meaningfully serve as a deterrent. Additionally, because the conduct was abundantly culpable from the time of the entry onto the property, deterrence is worth the admittedly high cost of suppression of evidence. The police conduct in this case is a far cry from those fact patterns where the Supreme Court has not applied the exclusionary rule despite a Fourth Amendment violation.
It is well established that a defendant's person will not be suppressed even if he was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Defendant seeks to suppress the buccal swab (and its test results) on free-standing grounds independent of the events at Unit A. The Report and Recommendation recommended this aspect of the motion be granted, and the swab and test results suppressed. (Doc. #52, pp. 38-45.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court declines to accept this portion of the Report and Recommendation. The Court finds that, under the circumstances of this case, taking the buccal swab did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and that suppression is therefore not required independent of the events at Unit A.
Defendant was taken to the police station, where a buccal swab was taken without a search warrant or defendant's consent. The testimony of the officers was clear that the buccal swab was taken pursuant to a Florida statute and for investigative purposes, i.e., to compare with any DNA which may be found on the firearm seized from the Camry. Defendant seeks to suppress the buccal swab and its test results because it was obtained in violation of Fla. Stat. § 943.325(13)(b) and the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. (Doc. #20, pp. 5-6.)
There is no doubt that the taking of the buccal swab in this case was a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
A Florida statute requires any "qualifying offender" who is arrested in Florida to submit a DNA sample to a department-designated facility. Fla. Stat. § 943.325(7)(a). This DNA sample must be submitted at the time the person is booked in a jail, correctional facility, or juvenile facility. Fla. Stat. § 943.325(7)(b) ("Arrested qualifying offenders must submit a DNA sample at the time they are booked into a jail, correctional facility, or juvenile facility.")
While taking the DNA sample is mandatory under the Florida statute, its use is limited. The "analyses of DNA samples collected under this section shall be used only for law enforcement identification purposes or to assist in the recovery or identification of human remains or missing persons and may not be used for identification of any medical or genetic condition." Fla. Stat. § 943.325(13)(b). In
The officers in this case did not violate the Florida statute by taking the buccal swab. The swab was taken during the booking process of a person arrested in Florida and committed to the jail for a felony offense. The statute mandated taking the swab. While the officer had the additional subjective intent to use the swab and its test results for investigative purposes in connection with the firearm, such an intent does not invalidate the taking of the swab. Rather, the officer is simply precluded from relying on the statute as justification for the search. Thus, the DNA sample and its testing results may not be used for this type of investigative purpose or in a criminal prosecution.
The parties focus on the Fourth Amendment, with defendant asserting a warrant or consent was required, and the government asserting the conduct in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment. It has often been held that the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.
In
This case involves a factor which did not appear in
Here, the record establishes that defendant was on state probation at the time of his arrest in this case. The Court therefore applies the balancing test described in
Accordingly, it is now
1. The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. 52) is accepted and adopted in part, and rejected in part, as set forth above.
2. Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence (Doc. #20) is
3. The Clerk of Court shall schedule a supplemental hearing by separate notice.