STEVEN D. MERRYDAY, District Judge.
Worthy applies under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) and challenges his conviction for burglary, for which conviction Worthy is imprisoned for fifteen years as a prison releasee re-offender. Numerous exhibits ("Respondent's Exhibit __") support the response. (Doc. 5) The respondent both admits the application's timeliness (Doc. 4 at 1) and argues that the application lacks merit. (Doc. 7)
Worthy pleaded "no contest" to charges of both burglary of an unoccupied dwelling and grand theft. Worthy was sentenced as a prison releasee re-offender on the burglary charge. In subsequent post-conviction proceedings (Respondent's Exhibits 21 and 27), Worthy unsuccessfully challenged the enhanced sentence by contending that his sentence under Florida's Prison Releasee Re-offender Act ("PRRA") violates Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), which holds that the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") is unconstitutionally vague. The only claim that Worthy presents in his current application under Section 2254 is his Johnson claim.
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Section 2254(d), which creates a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states in pertinent part:
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412S13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:
A federal court must afford due deference to a state court's decision. "AEDPA prevents defendants — and federal courts — from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) ("This is a `difficult to meet,' . . . and `highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt' . . . .") (citations omitted). And in that review "[t]he focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable, . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002).
As stated above, Worthy must prove that the state court's decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Worthy contends that Johnson should apply to Florida's PRRA. Johnson is limited to only the residual clause in the ACCA and is inapplicable to Florida's PRRA. In his reply Worthy recognizes that Johnson is inapplicable (Doc. 8 at 7) (italics original):
Johnson, which was decided in 2015, was not controlling precedent when Worthy was convicted and sentenced in 2014. The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the United States Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 412. See also Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 182 (recognizing that a federal court is limited to the record that was before the state court). Worthy cites no authority that extends Johnson to Florida's PRRA and, as a consequence, the application under Section 2254 lacks merit.
Accordingly, Worthy's application for the writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 1) is
Worthy is not entitled to a certificate of appealability ("COA"). A prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his application. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court must first issue a COA. Section 2253(c)(2) limits the issuing of a COA "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." To merit a COA, Worthy must show that reasonable jurists would find debatable both the merits of the underlying claims and the procedural issues he seeks to raise. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir 2001). Because he fails to show that reasonable jurists would debate the merits of the claims, Worthy is entitled to neither a certificate of appealability nor an appeal in forma pauperis.
Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is