MONTE C. RICHARDSON, Magistrate Judge.
The scope of this Court's review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner's factual findings).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's residual functional capacity ("RFC") determination and hypothetical question to the Vocational Expert ("VE") are not supported by substantial evidence, because the ALJ failed to incorporate the opinion of Cathy Whitley, M.D., an examining physician, with regard to Plaintiff's shortness of breath upon exertion. The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. The Court agrees with the Commissioner.
At step two of the five-step sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: (1) coronary artery disease ("CAD"), status post coronary artery bypass graft ("CABG"), times three, and (2) chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"). (Tr. 12.) The ALJ then found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform a reduced range of light work, restricting Plaintiff to "no concentrated exposure to extreme heat, respiratory irritants, or wetness/humidity," and finding her "capable of performing simple tasks with little variation that take a short period of time to learn (up to an[d] including 30 days)" and "to deal with the changes in a routine work setting." (Tr. 13.)
In doing so, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's subjective complaints and daily activities, the treatment notes, the objective medical records, Dr. Whitley's examination findings and opinions, and the opinions of Thomas Bixler, M.D., a State agency non-examining physician. (Tr. 13-17.) The ALJ addressed Dr. Whitley's September 15, 2014 examination as follows:
(Tr. 15.) The ALJ then addressed Dr. Whitley's opinion as follows:
(Tr. 17.) Further, the ALJ noted that the reviewing physician, Dr. Bixler, "opined that the claimant [was] capable of medium work"; however, "[h]earing level evidence establishe[d] greater limitations," and, thus, the ALJ gave Dr. Bixler's opinions "little weight." (Id.) The ALJ concluded that his RFC determination was supported by his "thorough review of the medical evidence of record, Dr. Whitley's fairly normal examination, and normal cardiac diagnostic studies after the claimant's CABG." (Id.)
The ALJ's RFC determination and hypothetical question to the VE are supported by substantial evidence. First, the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of Dr. Whitley's opinion. Dr. Whitley opined that Plaintiff had "limitations for activities requiring mild or greater exertion" (Tr. 385), but, as the ALJ pointed out, Dr. Whitley did not quantify "mild or greater," did not specify what types of activities Plaintiff could engage in or was limited in, and did not provide any environmental restrictions (see Tr. 17). As such, the ALJ was justified in discounting Dr. Whitley's statement.
To the extent Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to state "what weight was given to Dr. Whitley's overall assessment" (Doc. 20 at 5), this argument is misplaced, because there was no "overall assessment" that the ALJ failed to weigh. Dr. Whitley's statement that Plaintiff had "limitations for activities requiring mild or greater exertion" was the only statement contained in her Medical Source Statement ("MSS"). (Tr. 385.) Further, Dr. Whitley's examination was generally unremarkable. (See Tr. 383-85.) It revealed, in relevant part:
(Tr. 384.)
In light of these unremarkable examination findings, it appears that Dr. Whitley's MSS was based on Plaintiff's subjective complaints. (See Tr. 382-83 ("The claimant complains of shortness of breath on exertion. She had actually noticed this for several months prior to her heart attack. She had been treated for pneumonia in 04/13. She states that she gets short of breath with walking a couple of blocks. She thinks this is actually somewhat better since she quit smoking.").) Also, while Dr. Whitley diagnosed Plaintiff with exertional shortness of breath and exertional chest pain, she noted that the etiology of both of these diagnoses was unclear. (Tr. 385.) Based on the foregoing, the ALJ did not err in his evaluation of Dr. Whitley's opinion.
Aside from "Dr. Whitley's fairly normal examination," as the ALJ noted, his RFC determination is also supported by the medical evidence of record, including Plaintiff's normal cardiac diagnostic studies after the claimant's CABG.
(Tr. 16.)
The ALJ's above-quoted findings are supported by substantial evidence. (See, e.g., Tr. 298 (noting ejection fraction of 55-60 percent), Tr. 401, Tr. 416, Tr. 523-24, Tr. 527-28, Tr. 532, Tr. 535, Tr. 557 (noting a normal stress ECG), Tr. 562 ("No acute cardiopulmonary disease."), Tr. 575, Tr. 591, Tr. 605, Tr. 659-60, Tr. 694, Tr. 701, Tr. 713, Tr. 730; cf. Tr. 34 ("I get out of breath real easy. I mean, I'm good like for the first couple of hours. . . . I'm not real speedy; but I'm not real slow, either. . . . And then, afterwards, I'll get really tired and lethargic. I want to lay down, or sit down, or something, and . . . I get dizzy sometimes with it, and I fall. I actually fell coming over here."), Tr. 36 (testifying that Plaintiff gets chest pains, lasting a few seconds to a minute, if she over-exerts herself "a lot," or when she goes to lay down or gets up in a hurry), Tr. 723 & 736 (noting shortness of breath and chest pain).)
As to Plaintiff's COPD, the ALJ stated:
(Tr. 16.)
These findings are also supported by substantial evidence in the record. (See, e.g., Tr. 37 ("[W]hen I first had [COPD], it was like I was short of breath; but they determined that I don't have the COPD."), Tr. 286, Tr. 393, Tr. 403-04 (noting oxygen saturation at 100 percent and no shortness of breath), Tr. 452 (noting that an April 2015 CT scan of the chest demonstrated mild chronic changes), Tr. 475 (noting no shortness of breath), Tr. 477 (noting a normal exam and oxygen saturation at 100 percent), Tr. 597, Tr. 605, Tr. 624, Tr. 713, Tr. 730; see also Tr. 333 ("No underlying history of COPD or asthma but she has been [] a long-term smoker for many years. . . ."), Tr. 371 (noting improvement in Plaintiff's activity level as of July 2014), Tr. 562 ("No acute cardiopulmonary disease.").)
Based on the foregoing, the ALJ's RFC assessment and hypothetical question to the VE are supported by substantial evidence; thus, any argument that the ALJ improperly relied on the VE's testimony is rejected. The ALJ was not required to include in the hypothetical question any limitations or opinions that he had properly rejected. See Crawford, 363 F.3d at 1161 (stating that the ALJ is not required to include findings in the hypothetical question that the ALJ has properly rejected as unsupported by the record). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff argues that the hypothetical question was inconsistent with Dr. Whitley's opinion, the ALJ was not required to include opinions or statements that he had properly rejected.
The Court does not make independent factual determinations, re-weigh the evidence, or substitute its decision for that of the ALJ. Thus, the question is not whether the Court would have arrived at the same decision on de novo review; rather, the Court's review is limited to determining whether the ALJ's findings are based on correct legal standards and supported by substantial evidence. Based on this standard of review, the Court concludes that the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act for the time period in question should be affirmed.
Accordingly, it is
1. The Commissioner's decision is
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
