ORDER DISMISSING FEDERAL CLAIMS FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION AND DECLINING TO EXERCISE SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER STATE LAW CLAIMS

WILLIAM F. JUNG, District Judge.

Plaintiff's newborn baby was badly beaten, with 27 fractures on 12 ribs and massive brain damage. Dkt. 78-8 at 186. Plaintiff's parental rights were terminated after a state trial court held a hearing, at which Plaintiff testified with counsel. The court found Plaintiff did not shelter or care for her baby. The appellate court affirmed.

Plaintiff sues for damages due to termination of her parental rights. She blames her incompetent trial counsel, corrupt guardians of the now brain-damaged baby, and a group of law enforcement officers who conspired (for other reasons) against an officer favorable to her. She admits that in order to prevail, this Court must rule that both the trial judge and the Florida Second District Court of Appeal were in error. This Court dismisses the case under Rooker-Feldman.

This matter came before the Court for a hearing on May 8, 2019, upon Defendants' motions to dismiss the corrected amended complaint.1 The Court heard extensive argument from counsel on the several defense motions and then received supplemental briefing from all parties2 on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. As the Eleventh Circuit teaches, "[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine eliminates federal court jurisdiction over those cases that are essentially an appeal by a state court loser seeking to relitigate a claim that has already been decided in a state court." Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg. Corp., 881 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2018). The doctrine applies here, and Plaintiff's federal claims (Counts I-III and XII-XIII) are dismissed from this Court for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rooker-Feldman. The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims in absence of federal jurisdiction. Thus Counts IV-XI and XIV-XVI are dismissed from this Court.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Magan White had a newborn baby boy. While in Plaintiff's sole custody, the infant was beaten horrifically, mauled to within an inch of his life. He is now severely brain damaged. Dkt. 78-8 at 186. Plaintiff alleges that her live-in boyfriend was the perpetrator. Plaintiff contends that a large and devious conspiracy caused her to lose her parental rights to the infant in the ensuing parental rights termination proceeding begun by the State, during which Plaintiff was at all times represented by counsel.

Plaintiff contends that her lawyers were incompetent (Dkt. 49 at 2 n.1; Dkt. 83-1 at 23), and the guardians ad litem appointed for the infant were incompetent or corrupt for siding with the State (Dkt. 49 at 47-49; Dkt. 83-1 at 12, 23). Plaintiff contends that the Circuit Court Judge who terminated her parental rights by final written Order (Dkt. 78-8 at 182-92) after several evidentiary hearings erred and that the ruling was fraudulently induced by the conspiracy set forth in her corrected amended complaint. Likewise, appeals to Florida's Second District Court of Appeal ("Second DCA") foundered and did not correct the corrupted final judgment.

The corrected amended complaint is the third complaint Plaintiff has filed. Plaintiff sued 15 defendants in a 16-count conspiracy and racketeering complaint spanning 97 pages. The defendants are the present and former State Attorneys for the Thirteenth Judicial Circuit (Hillsborough County) and two of their Assistant State Attorneys, as well as the former and present County Sheriffs, several current and one retired Sheriff's Office deputies, a Sheriff's Office child protection investigator, and the Florida Assistant Attorney General who prosecuted the parental termination case.

Because these proceedings arise on multiple motions to dismiss, the facts as alleged in the complaint are deemed true.3 Plaintiff also filed a number of other documents for the Court to review in connection with her responses to the motions to dismiss. Dkt. 78.

The corrected amended complaint alleges federal racketeering under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (Counts I-III) and federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts XII-XIII), as well as multiple state law claims (Counts IV-XI and XIV-XVI). What the federal claims have in common is the injury sought to be recompensed. As noted in Count I, that injury is:

Dkt. 49 ¶ 265.

The theory of Plaintiff's case is that the Hillsborough County Sheriff's Office (HCSO) and the State's Attorney's Office had a personal vendetta against one HCSO Detective named Brian Boswell. According to Plaintiff, Boswell was being wrongly drummed out of the HCSO for various failures to be a "team player" and his refusal to be corrupt. The first line of the corrected amended complaint states that "[t]his case arises out of Boswell v. Gee, 18-cv-1769 (M.D. Fla. July 19, 2018)," which is Boswell's suit pending in this Court before Judge Elizabeth Kovachevich against many of these same parties, seeking recompense for the conspiracy to force Boswell out of the HCSO and to defame him. Id. ¶ 1. Indeed, at the May 8, 2019 hearing on Plaintiff's instant complaint, Boswell was present, but Plaintiff was not. Boswell and Plaintiff share lawyers.

The gist of the allegations in the corrected amended complaint is that the conspiracy to "undermine" Boswell and force him out of the HCSO caused the proper investigation of Plaintiff's boyfriend to fall apart. That boyfriend beat Plaintiff's baby. Boswell was investigating this child battery. And Boswell could have exculpated Plaintiff in her parental rights termination hearings had he been aware they were occurring. But Boswell was allegedly misled by Defendant Assistant Attorney General Kenneth Beck that the parental rights termination matter was not going to proceed. As Plaintiff explains it, the conspiracy to "get" Boswell had collateral effects, including the dropping of criminal charges against the boyfriend and the improper focus of attention to the allegedly deficient parenting of Plaintiff.

DISCUSSION

The Court has considered the parties' supplemental briefing and concludes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes it from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal claims. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review state court decisions. May v. Morgan Cty., 878 F.3d 1001, 1004 (11th Cir. 2017) (citations omitted). The doctrine is a narrow one and applies only in cases (1) brought by state-court losers (2) complaining of injuries caused by final state-court judgments (3) rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and (4) inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. Id. (citation omitted). The federal claims in this case easily satisfy the first three requirements: Plaintiff is a state-court loser who is complaining about injuries caused when the state court by final judgment terminated her parental rights in 2016 (a decision that was affirmed in 2017, see In the Interest of A.W., 226 So.3d 828 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017))—long before Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit.

The Court also concludes that Plaintiff's case invites district court review and rejection of the state court's judgments. Notably, although the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is narrow in its application, "a state court loser cannot avoid Rooker-Feldman's bar by cleverly cloaking her pleadings in the cloth of a different claim. Pretext is not tolerated." May, 878 F.3d at 1005. To determine whether a claim invites rejection of a state court decision, courts must consider whether a claim was either actually adjudicated by a state court or is "inextricably intertwined" with a state court judgment. Target Media Partners, 881 F.3d at 1286 (citation omitted). A claim is "inextricably intertwined" with a state court judgment if it asks to "effectively nullify the state court judgment, or it succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues." Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). That said, a federal claim is not "inextricably intertwined" with a state court judgment when there was no "reasonable opportunity to raise" that claim during the relevant state court proceeding. Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiff's federal RICO and § 1983 claims are inextricably intertwined with the state court's judgment terminating her parental rights because they can succeed only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues. At the hearing, this Court asked and received the following question and answer:

Transcript of 5/8/2019 hearing at 7. As Plaintiff's counsel informed the undersigned:

Id. at 16.

Id. at 18. Thus, Plaintiff asks the Court to reject not only the trial court's final order, but also the appellate court's affirmance.

Plaintiff's lawyer also clearly conceded that Plaintiff's relief requires review of the state court final judgment and requires the undersigned to conclude the state court erred. As noted at the hearing on the motion to dismiss:

Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff's lawyer candidly agreed with the undersigned that "in order for [Plaintiff] to have relief then I need to determine that that adjudicator — those facts that were adjudicated [by the state trial judge] were wrong." Id. at 26. This is an admission that this case is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment.

And even if Plaintiff's counsel had not made these concessions, the record supports the conclusion that this case is inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment. The state court, after reviewing the evidence presented to it, including Plaintiff's testimony, concluded that Plaintiff endangered her child, explaining in relevant part:

Dkt. 78-8 at 185-87.4 If the state court was correct that Plaintiff endangered her child by neglecting his injuries, then Plaintiff could not have been harmed by the anti-Boswell conspiracy alleged in her corrected amended complaint. Likewise, if the state court had not—in Plaintiff's view—erred5 by finding that she endangered her child, Plaintiff would not have suffered any of the damages alleged in her federal claims. Thus, as her counsel stated, Plaintiff's federal claims can succeed only if both the state trial and appellate courts were wrong, satisfying the first requirement for being "inextricably intertwined."

That this case is inextricably intertwined — indeed identical — to the child termination case can be seen by Plaintiff's recent action. Well after the final order (of November 1, 2016) was affirmed (on May 31, 2017), Plaintiff filed on March 5, 2019 a "Motion to Reopen Termination of Parental Rights" before the state trial court. Dkt. 78-5. The very first sentence, line, paragraph, and exhibit in the statement of facts to this state court Motion to Reopen refer to the original complaint in the present federal suit. Id. at 3. Plaintiff also attaches the original complaint from the instant federal lawsuit to the Motion to Reopen as pertinent facts "as explained in detail" therein. Id. at 3, 61-155. Likewise, as part of the facts in Plaintiff's appellate brief on the denial of the motion to reopen, Plaintiff refers to her federal court complaint. Dkt. 83-1 at 13.6 By these filings, Plaintiff has shown that the instant case is not just factually intertwined with the state court case but is factually identical.

In her supplemental brief, Plaintiff contends that her federal claims are not inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment because she is "not seeking to have the instant federal court restore her parental rights." Dkt. 83 at 3. Instead, she argues, she is merely seeking damages, which she could not have received in the state court proceeding. Id. But the Eleventh Circuit has rejected this argument in a case with very similar facts. In Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1333, the plaintiffs brought § 1983 claims for damages caused in connection with a proceeding to remove a child from a mother's custody. The plaintiffs argued that their § 1983 claims were not "inextricably intertwined" with the state court judgment because they were seeking damages, not injunctive relief preventing enforcement of the state court judgment and returning custody to the plaintiff. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that argument, reasoning, "[O]ur decisions focus on the federal claim's relationship to the issues involved in the state court proceeding, instead of the type of relief sought by the plaintiff." Id.

The Court also concludes that Plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise her claims in the state court proceeding. Plaintiff was at all times represented by counsel. Plaintiff certainly knew of Detective Boswell as he investigated the child battery and interviewed her. There is no indication that Plaintiff's lawyers subpoenaed Boswell or sought to interview him. Boswell, of course, had no personal knowledge of any of the events. The Court recognizes that Plaintiff contends she did not learn about the anti-Boswell conspiracy until after the state court proceeding had concluded (and discusses the point further, infra), but there is no indication that the state court could not have considered Plaintiff's arguments about the anti-Boswell conspiracy had she known about it at the time. Indeed, Plaintiff filed the motion to reopen asking the state court to reopen her case based, in part, upon newly discovered "Boswell conspiracy" evidence and alleged misconduct by a party due to withholding of "exculpatory Brady material." Dkts. 78-5 through 78-8.

In that motion to reopen, she made essentially the same arguments posited by her corrected amended complaint, including the claims that the anti-Boswell conspiracy caused inappropriate negative attention to be focused on her parenting, led to false information being included in the initial petition for termination of parental rights presented to the state court, and resulted in Boswell's exculpatory testimony being withheld from the state court and Plaintiff's counsel. This argument, plus citing and attaching her original federal complaint to the motion as Exhibit A to the "Facts" section (Dkt. 78-5 at 61-155), is sufficient to show that the state court had the ability to consider the issues raised in this federal action. See Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1334 (concluding that plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to raise constitutional challenges in state court custody proceeding because they were parties to and participated in the proceeding and the state court had the ability to hear their constitutional arguments).

In her supplemental brief, Plaintiff does not explicitly argue that she had no reasonable opportunity to raise her claims in the state court proceeding.7 She does note, however, that to recover damages she had to file an action separate and apart from the dependency proceeding, which does not allow for recovery of damages. But having a "reasonable opportunity to raise" a claim during the relevant state court proceeding does not require that the federal-court plaintiff could have asserted a stand-alone damages claim in the state court action. For example, in Goodman, the plaintiffs brought § 1983 claims in federal court for damages allegedly suffered in connection with a child custody proceeding. As in this case, the Goodman plaintiffs presumably could not have asserted a § 1983 counterclaim in the child custody proceeding. Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit found that the plaintiffs had a reasonable opportunity to raise their claims in state court because state law permitted constitutional challenges to a juvenile court's orders to be brought in juvenile court. Goodman, 259 F.3d at 1334.

Similarly, in Uberoi v. Supreme Court of Florida, 819 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2016), the plaintiff sued the Florida Supreme Court in federal court after her application for admission to the Florida Bar was denied. She alleged, in part, that the Florida Supreme Court's decision violated 11 U.S.C. § 525(a), which prohibits governmental units from discriminating against a person solely because that person is a federal bankruptcy debtor. Id. at 1312. Again, the plaintiff presumably could not have brought a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) in the Florida Supreme Court proceeding related to her bar application. Nonetheless, the Eleventh Circuit found that she had the opportunity to raise her claims before the state court, reasoning, "[T]he . . . allegations about her financial irresponsibility and bankruptcy [made by the Florida Board of Bar Examiners] gave her the opportunity to argue, either in her written answer or at the formal hearing (or both), that it was improper for the Board to consider her bankruptcy filing." Id. at 1313 (citation omitted).

Similar to the plaintiffs in Goodman and Uberoi, Plaintiff was a party to the state court proceeding, was represented by counsel, and (with the exception of a hearing she failed to attend) appears to have participated fully in that proceeding, including multiple evidentiary hearings. She had notice that she was being accused of endangering her child and had the opportunity to raise any and all arguments and evidence to counter that accusation, which is ordinarily enough for Rooker-Feldman purposes.

That leaves Plaintiff's claim that she did not learn about the anti-Boswell conspiracy until she was contacted as potential witness in Boswell v. Gee,8 a case filed in 2018. Dkt. 49 at 5 n.6. The Court will assume for the sake of argument that this means that Plaintiff could not have learned about Boswell and his allegedly exculpatory testimony before 2018 because Defendant Beck somehow acted wrongly in keeping Boswell from testifying in the state court proceeding and the anti-Boswell conspiracy generally left Plaintiff in the dark as to what was really happening.9 This amounts to a claim of extrinsic fraud—that is, fraud that keeps a person from knowing about or asserting their rights. See Valentine v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 635 F. App'x 753, 757 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).10 But the Eleventh Circuit has never recognized an extrinsic fraud exception to Rooker-Feldman and has affirmatively declined to do so. See Scott v. Frankel, 606 F. App'x 529, 532 & n.4 (11th Cir. 2015) (refusing to recognize extrinsic fraud exception to Rooker-Feldman and affirming dismissal on Rooker-Feldman grounds where plaintiff alleged a wide-ranging conspiracy to silence his criticism of a federal agency by, among other things, having his license to practice law suspended).11

Ultimately, Plaintiff's federal claims are among those barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. For her to succeed on those claims, as Plaintiff's counsel concedes, this Court would have to find that the state court ruled erroneously when it found that she endangered her child and terminated her parental rights. In addition, Plaintiff had a reasonable opportunity to raise the claims she pursues in this case in the state court proceeding. Moreover, advised by counsel, she testified at a full and fair final evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal claims, and they must be dismissed.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court concludes that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars it from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's federal claims. Thus, Counts I, II, III, XII, and XIII of the corrected amended complaint (Dkt. 49) are dismissed from federal court for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.

As to the state law claims, the corrected amended complaint does not assert a jurisdictional basis for those claims. Given that most (if not all) of the parties appear to be based in Florida, the Court presumes that Plaintiff must be asking the Court to invoke its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Under § 1367(c)(3), a district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, as has occurred here. Dismissal of state law claims is "strongly encouraged" where the federal claims are dismissed prior to trial. See Farquharson v. Citibank, N.A., 664 F. App'x 793, 798 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Baggett v. First Nat'l Bank of Gainesville, 117 F.3d 1342, 1353 (11th Cir. 1997)). Accordingly, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims (Counts IV-XI and XIV-XVI). They are dismissed from this Court as dehors federal jurisdiction. The motions to dismiss (Dkts. 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, and 64) are granted. The Clerk is directed to terminate any pending motions/deadlines and to close the case.

DONE AND ORDERED.