LESLIE R. HOFFMAN, Magistrate Judge.
This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following motion filed herein:
On May 17, 2019, judgment was entered reversing and remanding this case to the Commissioner of Social Security for further proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Doc. 27). On August 15, 2019, the Plaintiff filed a motion requesting an award of $5,400.20 in attorney fees, pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). (Doc. 28 (Motion)).
The Plaintiff's certificate of conferral pursuant to Local Rule 3.01(g) only states that the Commissioner "was unable to complete [his] review of the motion to date." (Id.).
A party seeking an award of attorney fees pursuant to the EAJA must demonstrate that he or she is eligible for an award of EAJA fees and that the amount sought is reasonable. As discussed below, the undersigned finds that the Plaintiff is eligible to recover EAJA fees and her request for EAJA fees is reasonable.
A party may recover an award of attorney fees against the government provided the party meets five requirements: 1) the party seeking the award is the prevailing party; 2) the application for such fees, including an itemized justification for the amount sought, is timely filed; 3) the claimant had a net worth of less than $2 million at the time the complaint was filed; 4) the position of the government was not substantially justified; and 5) there are no special circumstances which would make an award unjust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1), (d)(2).
The Court reversed the final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and remanded the case for further proceedings. (Doc. 26). The Supreme Court has made clear that a plaintiff obtaining a sentence-four remand is a prevailing party. Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-02 (1993). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the Plaintiff is a prevailing party.
A plaintiff must file an application for fees and other expenses within 30 days of the "final judgment in the action." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B). A final judgment is defined as a judgment that "is final and not appealable." Id. at § 2412(d)(2)(G). The Commissioner generally has 60 days in which to appeal, consequently, a judgment typically becomes final after 60 days. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). As discussed above, the plaintiff then has 30 days in which to file his or her motion for EAJA fees. Therefore, a motion for EAJA fees is timely if it is filed within 90 days after the judgment is entered. Jackson v. Chater, 99 F.3d 1086, 1095 n.4 (11th Cir. 1996). The judgment in this case was entered on May 17, 2019, and the Motion was filed 90 days later on August 15, 2019. (Docs. 27; 28). Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the Motion is timely.
The Plaintiff states that she had a net worth of less than $2 million when the complaint was filed. (Doc. 28 at 1-2). This statement is uncontroverted. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the Plaintiff's net worth was less than $2 million when the complaint was filed.
"The government's position is substantially justified under the EAJA when it is justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person — i.e. when it has a reasonable basis in both law and fact." U.S. v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995) (internal quotations omitted). The Commissioner bears the burden of proving that his position was substantially justified. U.S. v. Jones, 125 F.3d 1418, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997). Therefore, unless the Commissioner comes forth and satisfies his burden, the government's position will be deemed not substantially justified. In this case, the Commissioner has not argued that his position was substantially justified, and the time to do so has passed. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that the Commissioner's position was not substantially justified.
The undersigned finds that no special circumstances would make an award of fees unjust.
The Plaintiff provided the following information detailing the time she spent litigating the case and the requested hourly rate:
(Doc. 28 at 1). The Plaintiff has demonstrated that the hourly rate does not exceed the EAJA cap of $125.00 per hour adjusted for inflation. (Doc. 28-4). Further, the Plaintiff attached a detailed time sheet in support of the hours her counsel spent working on the appeal. (Doc. 28-2).
The Plaintiff requested that the EAJA award be paid directly to her counsel if the government determines that she does not owe a debt to the government. (Doc. 28 at 2). A plaintiff, not counsel, is generally entitled to receipt of an EAJA award. Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010). The Plaintiff assigned her right to the EAJA award to her counsel on August 12, 2019. (Doc. 28-3 (Assignment)). The Assignment, however, does not satisfy the Anti-Assignment Act, because it was executed prior to the determination of the EAJA award. See Crumbley v. Colvin, No. 5:13-cv-291(MTT), 2014 WL 6388569, at *4-5 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 14, 2014); Huntley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 6:12-cv-613-Orl-37TBS, 2013 WL 5970717, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 2013). The government, though, may exercise its discretion to honor the Assignment if it determines that the Plaintiff does not owe a debt to the government. But the undersigned recommends that the Court not order the government to do so.
Accordingly, it is respectfully
A party has fourteen days from this date to file written objections to the Report and
Recommendation's factual findings and legal conclusions. A party's failure to file written objections waives that party's right to challenge on appeal any unobjected-to factual finding or legal conclusion the district judge adopts from the Report and Recommendation. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.