Order

PATRICIA D. BARKSDALE, Magistrate Judge.

Robert Rockwell Turner, Jr., proceeding without a lawyer and in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, sues Tracy Baldwin, a deputy clerk for the Suwannee County Clerk of Court, and Lamar Jenkins, the Suwannee County Property Appraiser. Doc. 7. At the Court's direction, Doc. 4, Mr. Turner filed an amended complaint. Docs. 7, 7-1.

Ms. Baldwin and Mr. Jenkins move to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Docs. 15, 16. Ms. Baldwin alternatively moves for a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Doc. 16.

In the amended complaint, Mr. Turner alleges the following facts. On February 13, 1995, he applied for an ad valorem homestead tax exemption for 5.45 acres of property, parcel number 32-03S-14E-0287800.3000.1 Doc. 7 at 1; Doc. 7-1 at 1. The homestead exemption was "continuous and automatic." Doc. 7 at 1-2. On November 18, 2014, Ms. Baldwin warned of a tax sale of the property without mentioning its homestead status. Doc. 7 at 2. In 2015, Mr. Jenkins removed the homestead tax exemption without a verifiable signed complaint. Doc. 7 at 2. Ms. Baldwin's and Mr. Jenkins's actions resulted in the property being sold for $3,540.45, which was less than half its assessed value despite that Fla. Stat. § 197.502 requires a minimum bid of half the assessed value for homesteads, and resulted in Mr. Turner receiving no consideration from the sale.2 Doc. 7 at 3.

To the amended complaint, Mr. Turner attaches a letter from a lawyer with Three Rivers Legal Services, Inc., to Suwannee County dated November 29, 2016. Doc. 7-1. In the letter, the lawyer, referencing Florida's sunshine laws, requests documents relating to the property, "including documents associated with the assessment of the property prior to the tax sale, and removal of the homestead exemption status of the property prior to the tax sale." Doc. 7-1 at 1. The lawyer adds,

Doc. 7-1 at 1-2.

Citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Mr. Turner demands $38,000 for the loss of his property and $38,000 in punitive damages.3 Doc. 7 at 3.

To his motion to dismiss, Mr. Jenkins attaches a final order of dismissal in Turner v. Jenkins, No. 2017-CA-68, an earlier action Mr. Turner had brought against Mr. Jenkins in the Circuit Court, Third Judicial Circuit, Suwannee County, Florida. Doc. 15-1. In the order, the state court dismisses Mr. Turner's challenge of Mr. Jenkins's denial of a homestead tax exemption on the property4 for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ruling that Mr. Turner filed the action outside the 60-day period under Fla. Stat. § 194.171(2) for challenging tax assessments and that Mr. Turner lacked standing because he no longer owned the property.5 Doc. 15-1. The court found that, for the 2016 tax year, Mr. Jenkins had certified the tax roll for collection on October 4, 2016, making December 3, 2016, the last day Mr. Turner could challenge the assessment and making his complaint filed on April 10, 2017, and any complaint about earlier tax years outside the 60-day statutory period. Doc. 15-1 at 2-3. Mr. Turner appealed an order denying a motion for rehearing to Florida's First District Court of Appeal without success. See docket in Turner v. Jenkins, No. 1D18-509 (Fla. 1st DCA). Three months after his state-court appeal ended, Mr. Turner filed this action here. Doc. 1.

In response to the motions to dismiss, Mr. Turner states this is not an "ad valorem tax case"; rather, this case "involves Mr. Lamar Jenkins Suwanee County Property Appraiser REMOVAL of my existing homestead exemption for the 2015 tax year without a verifiable signed complaint." Doc. 18 at 1. He adds, "I am contesting the legality of the 2015 homestead exemption removal without a verifiable signed complaint" and "I am contesting the loss of my homestead property without a jury trial." Doc. 18 at 2. He states he includes a copy of his "Homestead Exemption Receipt" for the 2015 tax year, Doc. 18 at 2, though he includes no receipt. He cites cases addressing procedural due process and government takings. Doc. 18 at 2-3 (citing Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921), and Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795)).

A court must construe a pleading drafted by a pro se litigant liberally and hold the pleading to a less stringent standard than one drafted by a lawyer. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998). Liberal construction does not mean serving as de facto counsel. GJR Invs., Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). Liberal construction means that a federal court sometimes must "look beyond the labels used in a pro se party's complaint and focus on the content and substance of the allegations" to determine if a cognizable remedy is available. Torres v. Miami-Dade County, 734 F. App'x 688, 691 (11th Cir. 2018).

Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives another of a federal right. Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (internal quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). "The first step in any such claim is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed." Id. "The validity of the claim must then be judged by reference to the specific constitutional standard which governs that right[.]" Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).

Because Mr. Turner proceeds without a lawyer, the Court liberally construes his amended complaint as asserting a federal claim for damages under § 1983 for violations of the procedural due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against the deprivation by state actors of a constitutionally protected interest in property without due process, Zimmerman v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125 (1994).6 The Court discerns no other possible federal claim.

The comity doctrine is a "doctrine of abstention," Perry v. Coles County, 906 F.3d 563, 587 (7th Cir. 2018), that reflects the "belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in separate ways, Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n, Inc. v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100, 112 (1981).

The comity doctrine applies in state taxation cases, restraining "federal courts from entertaining claims for relief that risk disrupting state tax administration." Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. 413, 417 (2010); accord Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 586 (1995) ("We have long recognized that principles of federalism and comity generally counsel that courts should adopt a hands-off approach with respect to state tax administration."); Dows v. City of Chicago, 78 U.S. 108, 110 (1870) ("It is upon taxation that the several States chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible.").

Although § 1983 appears to give state taxpayers a federal cause of action, the comity doctrine "counsels lower federal courts to resist engagement in certain cases falling within their jurisdiction" and has limited the scope of § 1983. Levin, 560 U.S. at 421. The comity doctrine bars taxpayers from bringing § 1983 claims for damages questioning the validity of the state tax systems. Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 116. The bar applies to both tax assessment practices and tax collection practices. Ayers v. Polk County, 697 F.2d 1375, 1376 (11th Cir. 1983).

Taxpayers alleging that their federal rights have been violated by state or local tax practices therefore must seek relief through state remedies, so long as those remedies are "plain, adequate, and complete." Fair Assessment, 454 U.S. at 116. "Plain, adequate, and complete" refers to "the obvious precept that plaintiffs seeking protection of federal rights in federal courts should be remitted to their state remedies if their federal rights will not thereby be lost." Id. at 116 n.8. The "touchstone" for whether a taxpayer has remedies that are "plain, adequate, and complete" is whether he is entitled to a "`full hearing and judicial determination at which she may raise any and all constitutional objections to the tax.'" Amos v. Glynn Cty. Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1255 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1981)), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Velazquez v. S. Fla. Fed. Credit Union, 546 F. App'x 854, 856 (11th Cir. 2013). The state remedy need not be equal to or better than the federal remedy. Ayers, 697 F.2d at 1377.

Where a § 1983 action is "grounded in an allegation of an unconstitutional tax scheme, to survive dismissal the plaintiff must demonstrate that there is no plain, adequate, and complete state remedy available." Winicki v. Mallard, 783 F.2d 1567, 1570 (11th Cir. 1986). "The initial burden, then, is upon the plaintiff to make such a showing. Unless he is able to do so, the federal courts may properly refuse to entertain his [§] 1983 action." Id.

Based on principles of comity, abstention is warranted. To award Mr. Turner the damages he seeks, the Court would have to decide that Ms. Baldwin's and Mr. Jenkins's administration of procedures for applying and removing the homestead tax exemption and for effectuating the tax sale violated Mr. Turner's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Deshazo v. Baldwin County, Civ. Action No. 06-0174-WS-C, 2006 WL 2091754, at *6 (S.D. Ala. July 25, 2006) (unpublished) ("Any attempt, including this one, to declare a tax sale illegal or to recover damages on the ground of illegality is barred by the comity doctrine.").

Mr. Turner has not met his burden of showing the unavailability of plain, adequate, and complete state remedies, and the order dismissing the action he first tried to bring in state court shows otherwise. See Doc. 15-1; Fla. Stat. Title XIV ("Taxation and Finance"), Ch. 194 ("Administrative and Judicial Review of Property Taxes"). That the state court ruled it was without jurisdiction to decide the action does not change the result; Mr. Turner could have avoided the ruling by filing the state action sooner or with a successful argument that asserted procedural irregularities meant the 60-day period had not been triggered. See, e.g., Miles v. Parrish, 199 So.3d 1046 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (holding "statute of nonclaim under section 194.171" was not triggered because of property appraiser's failure to follow statutory mandates).

Where principles of comity warrant abstention, a court need not address the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, as another basis for dismissal. Levin, 560 U.S. at 432; see also Perry v. Coles County, 906 F.3d 563, 587 (7th Cir. 2018) (observing federal courts may choose among threshold grounds for dismissal and analyzing dismissal solely under comity principles); Homewood Village LLC v. Unified Gov't of Athens-Clarke County, 677 F. App'x 623, 625 n.1 (11th Cir. 2017) (declining to address Act because dismissal was warranted based on principles of comity).

Here, because principles of comity warrant abstention, the Court need not address Mr. Jenkins's arguments about the Tax Injunction Act or Ms. Baldwin's arguments about the need for a more definite statement of the claim.7

The motions to dismiss, Docs. 15, 16, are granted in part to the extent the action is dismissed without prejudice based on principles of comity warranting abstention.8 The clerk is directed to close the file.