PAUL A. MAGNUSON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, the Motions are granted.
On August 22, 2015, Gregg Ireland was arrested for driving under the influence. (Am. Compl. (Docket No. 27) ¶ 21.) Because Ireland's breath test revealed an alarmingly high level of alcohol, the arresting deputies took him to the hospital. (
The jail did not perform a medical intake or screening of Ireland until more than 5 hours after he arrived at the facility. (Jail Intake Form (Docket No. 83-2) at 1.) The nurse performing the screening did not have Ireland's hospital records, and thus did not see the prescription or that Ireland had been diagnosed as a chronic alcoholic. (
On August 23, a nurse informed the on-call physician, Defendant Gonzalez, of the hospital's recommendation that Ireland take potassium. (Gonzalez Dep. (Docket No. 83-2) at 52-53; Heavener Dep. at 22.) Gonzalez ordered a blood test to determine whether potassium was necessary. (Gonzalez Dep. at 52-53.) That test was scheduled for August 24.
In the early morning hours of August 24, however, Ireland became agitated and he and his cellmate got into an altercation of sorts. Corrections officers responding to the altercation ultimately tased Ireland multiple times, and punched and kicked him in an effort to force compliance with handcuffing. (Swartzentruber Rep. (Docket No. 86-3) at 1.) He was then moved to another cell for observation, but the camera in the cell did not work, so he was moved to another cell. (Sledzinski Rep. (Docket No. 86-9) at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that Ireland was unconscious at this point and was dragged to these various cells.
Because Ireland had been so agitated, the nurses on duty, Defendants Heavener and Bracy, attempted to contact Gonzalez but were unable to reach her. (Bracy Dep (Docket No. 86-2) at 35-36.) Eventually, they contacted another Corizon physician, who prescribed valium. (Corizon's Supp. Mem. (Docket No. 84) at 4.) But shortly after Ireland was put into the second cell, he became unconscious, and the valium was never administered. Jail staff performed CPR and used an AED on him, and he was transported to the hospital. (Heavener Rep. (Docket No. 86-16).)
Doctors at the hospital discovered that Ireland had suffered cardiac arrest, and that he also had septic shock and multi-organ failure. (See Autopsy Rep. (Docket No. 86-13) at 1.) Ireland was removed from life support on August 25. Plaintiff contends that the failure to give Ireland potassium, combined with the tasings and beatings, led to the cardiac arrest. Defendants contend that Ireland suffered from severe liver and heart disease and was morbidly obese, and that these conditions led to Ireland's cardiac arrest.
Plaintiff Thomas Ireland is Gregg Ireland's father and personal representative of his estate. Named as Defendants here are Corizon, LLC, the jail's private healthcare provider, Adamar Gonzalez-Figueroa, the jail's physician, Margaret Bracy and Zackary Heavener, nurses at the jail, Bill Prummell, the Charlotte County Sheriff, Tabbatha Carter, the jail's Watch Commander, and six corrections officers, Brandon Swarzentruber, Michael Wiles, Robert Sledzinski, Alan Schwocho, William Garlick, and Albert Burrows.
Summary judgment is proper only if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Ireland's § 1983 claim against the individual corrections officers alleges that they used excessive force on him, failed to intervene to prevent the excessive use of force, and interfered with Ireland's medical care.
Corrections officers, like police officers, are protected from suit for damages arising out of their discretionary duties "`as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.'"
"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees . . . from the use of force that `shocks the conscience,'"
The inquiry is whether the use of force was objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
Swarzentruber was the first corrections officer to enter Ireland's cell on August 24. He did so in an attempt to retrieve Ireland's cellmate's belongings, including a plastic "boat" in which detainees sleep. He testified that Ireland refused repeated orders to sit down, and eventually "tensed up" and took a step towards Swarzentruber. (Heavener Dep. at 41.) In response, Swarzentruber deployed his taser. (Swarzentruber Report at 1.) When Ireland then failed to comply with commands to lie flat and put his hands behind his back, Swarzentruber tased him again. (
Defendant Wiles sat on Ireland's back in an attempt to get him into restraints. Ireland lifted Wiles off the ground, and Wiles struck Ireland twice in the lower back. (Wiles Rep. (Docket No. 86-10) at 1.) Defendants assert that Ireland attempted to spit on Defendant Burrows and to bite Defendant Schwocho, who used an under-the-jaw pressure point to prevent Ireland from biting. (Sledzinski Rep. at 1.) Ireland continued fighting as the officers got his legs into shackles. (
Shortly before officers arrived in the cell with an emergency restraint belt, Ireland became unresponsive. (
Plaintiff's expert opined that all of Ireland's "resisting" can be explained by the fact that he was suffering severe alcohol withdrawal, which can include hallucinations and delirium tremens (DT) seizures.
Plaintiff's claim is that the officers should have been trained to recognize the symptoms of severe alcohol withdrawal, specifically DT seizures and hallucinations. Had the officers been so trained, he contends, they would have known that Ireland was not resisting or trying to fight them, but was experiencing DT seizures, and they would not have used force on him.
But this is a failure-to-train claim, not a claim of excessive force. Plaintiff does not dispute the officers' accounts that Ireland was kicking and spitting and biting. Rather, Plaintiff contends that these actions were involuntary on Ireland's part because of the DT seizures and hallucinations and that the officers should have known that. In support, Plaintiff cites
Here, there is no evidence that any of the officers knew or even should have known of Ireland's chronic alcoholism, much less that he might suffer from DT seizures. The Court must review the situation initially from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, and then individually, to determine whether any officer "had the requisite knowledge of the seriousness of [Ireland's] medical needs."
Moreover, even if Swartzentruber and Schwocho, both of whom were on duty in the medical unit that evening, knew or should have known that Ireland was an alcoholic who was experiencing DT seizures, that knowledge cannot be imputed to the remaining Defendants, who arrived from other units after Swartzentruber reported the first use of his taser. Plaintiff's excessive-force claim against the officers is dismissed.
Plaintiff's claim that the Defendant officers failed to intervene to stop the allegedly excessive use of force fares no better. "[I]f a[n] [] officer, whether supervisory or not, fails or refuses to intervene when a constitutional violation such as an unprovoked beating takes place in his presence, the officer is directly liable under Section 1983."
Plaintiff also bases his § 1983 claim on the officers' alleged interference with Ireland's medical care. This is akin to a deliberate-indifference claim: Plaintiff asserts that Defendant officers should have known of Ireland's serious medical needs but either did not allow him to be treated or delayed his treatment. According to Plaintiff's version of the events, Ireland was unresponsive at the time he was taken out of his original cell and moved to the direct-observation cell. Moreover, Plaintiff contends that Schwocho heard Ireland make "obnoxiously weird statements" at 11 p.m. and should have known then that Ireland needed medical care because he was beginning to experience DT.
But Plaintiff has no evidence that a reasonable officer in Schwocho's position, or in the position of the other officers, would have known that Ireland needed medical care. Plaintiff offers only speculation: the officers allegedly knew that Corizon ostensibly understaffed the jail and performed ineffective intake, so they should have known that the intake form, which did not allude to Ireland's chronic alcoholism, was incorrect. Thus, they should have realized that Ireland was a chronic alcoholic who would likely experience DT. But the officers were far from deliberately indifferent to Ireland's medical needs, nor did they interfere in any way with his medical care. Indeed, they attempted to involve medical staff from the beginning of the incident. Nurse Heavener went to Ireland's cell with Swartzentruber and witnessed Ireland's aggressive stance toward Swartzentruber.
Although it is understandable that Plaintiff would like to change the circumstances surrounding his son's death, there is simply no evidence to support all of the speculative leaps his claim requires. Plaintiff's interference-with-medical-care claim fails.
Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against Sheriff Prummell are brought against him in his official capacity only. (Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) Thus, it is as if Plaintiff is bringing suit against the municipal entity, Charlotte County.
Plaintiff raises multiple instances of alleged deliberate indifference against the Sheriff. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 148-57.) He alleges that the Sheriff: knew that Corizon had a pattern of abuse at the jail; failed to train, supervise, or discipline corrections officers to ensure they did not violate inmates' constitutional rights; employed corrections officers who were unfit and "endorse[d] a code of silence at the Jail" (
Again, however, Plaintiff has no evidence to support the majority of these contentions. There is no evidence, for example, that officers at the jail had previously responded with violence to inmates with medical issues, and no evidence that these officers caused inmates injury or that the violence resulted in death. And Plaintiff's claim against the Sheriff requires him to establish a policy or custom.
Plaintiff also contends that the Sheriff may be liable for failure to train corrections officers to respond to a detainee experiencing DT. A claim of inadequate training will lie under § 1983 "where a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants [such that the failure to train] can be properly thought of as a city `policy or custom' that is actionable under § 1983."
Plaintiff has no evidence of prior incidents similar to Ireland's situation. Thus, there was no deliberate indifference, and Plaintiff's failure-to-train claim against the Sheriff must be dismissed.
Plaintiff also seeks to hold the Sheriff liable under state law for wrongful death. This is a negligence claim, contending that the Sheriff negligently trained, supervised, hired, retained, and disciplined corrections officers, resulting in Ireland's death. Plaintiff also asserts that the Sheriff "did not ensure that there was a comprehensive plan for prisoners suffering substance withdrawal" or a plan "for timely emergency transport of medically needy prisoners to a hospital." (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 178-79.)
But as noted above, Plaintiff has no evidence regarding any negligent failure to train and offers no additional evidence of the other alleged failures. Other than arguing that the Sheriff did not have appropriate plans in place, he offers no evidence regarding the procedures the jail actually had in place, how those procedures were inadequate, and most importantly, how any such allegedly deficient procedure caused Ireland's death. Indeed, no expert has testified that any delay in getting Ireland to the hospital caused his death. Plaintiff's state-law claim against the Sheriff fails.
A claim against Corizon and the individual Corizon Defendants (Gonzalez-Figueroa, Bracy, and Heavener) under § 1983 requires Plaintiff to establish that these Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Ireland's serious medical needs. Thus, he "must show an objectively serious medical need and show that `the prison official's response to that need was poor enough to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'"
Plaintiff raises several policies or practices that he contends constitute deliberate indifference as to Corizon. He claims that inmate screening and intake were constitutionally inadequate, that Corizon staff at the jail routinely failed to give inmates required medication, that medical records were inadequate or routinely falsified, that Corizon failed to have a full-time physician on staff at any of its jails, that Corizon routinely short-staffs its jails, and that Corizon knew or should have known that all of its cost-cutting measures—short-staffing, not having a physician on staff, and using LPNs rather than RNs—would lead to adverse outcomes such as Ireland's death.
But as Corizon points out, Plaintiff has little evidence of these supposed policies or practices. Indeed, he has no evidence that there was a policy or practice of inadequate intake screening at the jail, or that medical records were inadequate or falsified. He notes that Defendant Heavener changed the time in a progress note on Ireland's chart from 4:00 am to 3:20 am. But this change reflected the actual time of the incident, rather than the time Heavener filled out the chart. And even if the time change was improper, a single instance does not evidence a policy or practice so widespread as to give rise to
Plaintiff's contention that Corizon did not give inmates medication relies almost solely on a newspaper investigative series regarding medical complaints at the jail. (Pl.'s Opp'n Mem. (Docket No. 94) at 11 n.9.) This investigative series included an article contending that jail medical staff, and specifically two physicians not involved in this case, did not give several inmates their prescription mental health medication.
But even if a newspaper article was admissible evidence, it does not establish any custom or practice sufficient to impose liability under
Similarly, Plaintiff has no evidence that any of the individual Corizon Defendants ignored Ireland's objectively serious medical need. He argues that intake and screening were inadequate, but none of the individual Defendants was involved with the intake and screening, so these Defendants were not on notice of any issue regarding Ireland's health. And Gonzalez's decision to do a blood test before giving Ireland the prescribed potassium was based on her medical opinion and does not constitute deliberate indifference.
Plaintiff is correct that Ireland had an objectively serious medical need on August 24, when Defendants Heavener and Bracy became involved. He contends that their failure to have Ireland transported to the hospital for more than an hour after the altercation began was deliberate indifference. But he acknowledges that, during that hour, Heavener and Bracy were attempting to reach Gonzalez on the phone. This is not deliberate indifference. The fact that Gonzalez did not answer the phone cannot make Heavener and Bracy liable. Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against the individual Corizon Defendants must be dismissed.
Corizon argues that Plaintiff's claim against it for alleged negligence is a medical negligence claim that, under Florida law, requires pre-suit notice, among other prerequisites. Fla. Stat. § 766.106(2). Plaintiff did not provide the required pre-suit notice. He argues that the claim is one for simple negligence, but the cases he cites do not support this argument. Rather, it is clear that a negligence claim against a medical provider for either failing to provide medical care or providing inadequate care is a medical negligence claim that falls within the ambit of Florida's medical-malpractice statute.
Plaintiff has failed to come forward with evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact on any of his claims. Accordingly,
