ALAN S. GOLD, District Judge.
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Teledyne Continental Motors Inc.'s ("Teledyne" or "Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to the General Aviation and Revitalization Act
On June 30, 2006, an aircraft took off from La Aurora International Airport in Guatemala City, Guatemala headed to Poptun Airport, Peten, Guatemala. The Cessna aircraft, equipped with a Teledyne engine, had two people on board and intended to bring back to Guatemala City an additional three people ("the Obregon decedents"), at least two of whom had been seriously injured in a traffic accident and needed medical care in Guatemala City. The aircraft took off from the Poptun Airport with a total of five people on board, and when in the air over San Luis, Peten, reported having engine troubles or failures. The aircraft ultimately crashed, and all five people aboard the plane died in the accident. Plaintiffs, on behalf of the decedents, filed five separate multi-count lawsuits on June 27, 2008 and June 30, 2008. The lawsuits were consolidated for pretrial purposes. The counts currently at issue are Plaintiffs' tort claims for negligence and strict liability against Defendant Teledyne.
Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes summary judgment when the pleadings and supporting materials
The party that is "seeking summary judgment must demonstrate that `there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' The moving party bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those materials that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 840 (11th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to go beyond the pleadings and designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The court's focus in reviewing a motion for summary judgment is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Bishop v. Birmingham Police Dep't, 361 F.3d 607, 609 (11th Cir.2004). In determining whether to grant summary judgment, the court must remember that "[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. However, where no reasonable juror could find in the non-moving party's favor, summary judgment is appropriate. Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir.1997).
The motion before the Court is the fourth summary judgment motion filed by Defendant. See
As noted above, a party moving for summary judgment "must demonstrate that. . . [it] is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law . . . [and] bears the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for its motion and of identifying those materials that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Rice-Lamar v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 232 F.3d 836, 840 (11th Cir.2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In order to facilitate the process of ascertaining the material facts, the Southern District of Florida has promulgated local rules requiring that a party moving for summary judgment submit a statement of undisputed material facts "supported by specific references to pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits on file with the Court." S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.5(C).
As is evident from the language of the rule, the requirement that each material fact be "supported by specific references to pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits on file with the Court" is mandatory, not optional. Id. ("The statement of material facts submitted either in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall . . . be supported by . . . .") (emphasis added). Despite the clear mandate of S.D. Fla. L.R. 7.5(C), and despite the fact that I expressly cautioned the parties regarding this very same issue, see
While there is case law indicating that I have the authority to strike Defendant's motion for summary judgment motion as a result of its failure to comply with this Court's local rules, see, e.g., Gonzalez v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 2008 WL 4277258, *1 (E.D.Mich. Sept. 17, 2008) (striking summary judgment motions for failure to comply with local rules), I decline to invoke such a draconian remedy. Instead, I have conducted an independent review of the record and the relevant submissions in order to determine whether summary judgment should be granted pursuant to GARA's statute of repose. Having reviewed the relevant submissions, I conclude that Defendant has failed to demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law pursuant to GARA. Critically, there is insufficient competent evidence to establish a number of facts critical to Defendant's GARA defense. Instead, Defendant relies on a number of unsworn documents that are not based on personal knowledge in an attempt to establish the essential elements of its GARA defense.
Even if Defendant had come forward with competent evidence setting forth the undisputed material facts necessary to avail itself of GARA's statute of repose, Plaintiffs would still prevail because GARA does not apply to Plaintiffs' claims. As noted above, the basis for this Court's jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). A federal district court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state in which it sits. Grupo Televisa, S.A. v. Telemundo Commc'ns Group, 485 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir.2007). In doing so, a district court must first characterize the nature of the claims and issues before it and "determine whether [they] sound[] in torts, contract, property law, etc." Id. at 1240. Once this characterization is complete, the district court must then determine the choice of law rules that the forum state applies to those issues and apply those rules to determine the governing substantive law. Id. (citing Acme Circus Operating Co., Inc. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538, 1540 (11th Cir.1983)).
The forum state for the instant tort actions is Florida. Thus, I must apply the Florida choice of law rules applicable in actions sounding in tort. In determining and applying the law of Florida, I "must follow the decisions of the state's highest court, and in the absence of such decisions on an issue, must adhere to the decisions of the state's intermediate appellate courts unless there is some persuasive indication that the state's highest court would decide the issue otherwise." Flintkote Co. v. Dravo Corp., 678 F.2d 942, 945 (11th Cir.1982) (citations omitted). In Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So.2d 999 (Fla.1980), the Florida Supreme Court abrogated the traditional choice of law rule known as "lex loci delicti" and adopted the modern "most significant relationship" test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § § 145-146 (1971). Thus, Florida law now holds "that in tort actions involving more than one state, all substantive issues should be determined in accordance with the law of the state
Here, Plaintiffs and Defendant agree that Guatemala has the most significant relationship to the tort claims at issue. See
As Plaintiffs correctly point out, the Florida Supreme Court "has held that in tort actions involving more than one state, all substantive issues should be determined in accordance with the law of the state having the most `significant relationship' to the occurrence and the parties." Merkle, 737 So.2d at 542 (emphasis added). Because this is unquestionably a tort action involving more than one state, the issue that must be resolved is whether statutes of repose are "substantive" or "procedural" under Florida choice of law principles.
This very question was squarely addressed by the Florida Supreme Court in the case of Merkle v. Robinson. In Merkle, the Court held that "statute of limitation choice of law questions" must be treated "the same as `substantive' choice of law questions which . . . Florida decides pursuant to the `significant relationship' test." Id. at 542-43. Recognizing that the particular statute at issue "[was] characterized as a statute of repose" as opposed to "a statute of limitation," the Court expressly concluded that the distinction between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose "has no bearing on the choice of law question since whether a jurisdiction applies a statute of repose . . . in a given case is simply the `law' of that jurisdiction which is employed after application of the `significant relationship' test determines which jurisdiction's law is to be applied." Id. at 543 n. 6 (emphasis added). Thus, in light of the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Merkle, it is clear that GARA's statute of repose does not apply in to bar Plaintiffs' tort claims, as Guatemalan law governs "all substantive issues" in this tort action,
Finally, I note that even if GARA were applicable to the claims at bar—which it is not—Defendant's motion for summary judgment would still warrant denial because a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding the applicability of GARA's emergency exception to at least three of the five Plaintiffs' claims. As noted above, see note 3, supra, there are four statutory exceptions to GARA's eighteen-year repose provision. One of the four exceptions provides that GARA's statute of repose does not apply "if the person for whose injury or death the claim is being made is a passenger for purposes of receiving treatment for a medical or other emergency." GARA § 2(b)(2).
It is "well-established law" that a person's intent or purpose in undertaking a certain course of action is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury. See Robinson v. Tyson Foods, 595 F.3d 1269, 1278 (11th Cir.2010) (citing Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Activewear of Fla., Inc., 931 F.2d 1472, 1476 (11th Cir.1991)). This case is no exception. Here, the "purpose[]" of the persons who "made" the three Obregon decedents passengers aboard the aircraft is critical to determining whether GARA's emergency exception applies, as the exception applies only "if the person for whose injury or death the claim is being made is a passenger for purposes of receiving treatment for a medical or other emergency." GARA § 2(b)(2) (emphasis added). Having reviewed the evidence presented, I conclude that Defendant has failed to demonstrate that, drawing all inferences in favor of the Plaintiffs, there is no genuine issue of material fact as to why the Obregon decedents were "made passenger[s]" on the flight at issue. In other words, because a reasonable juror could find that the three Obregon decedents were "made [] passenger[s] for purposes of receiving treatment for a medical or other emergency,"
Based on the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Stay
The subject of Defendant's Motion to Stay is an order I issued on April 26, 2010 denying Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Since the issuance of the Summary Judgment Order, Defendant has sought appellate relief from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit by way of a collateral order appeal and a petition for writ of mandamus. Defendant now requests that I stay these proceedings "until such time as the Eleventh Circuit disposes of the Appeal and Writ Petition proceedings."
As Defendant correctly points out, a party must demonstrate the following four factors in order to obtain a stay pending appeal: "1) that the movant is likely to prevail on the merits on appeal; 2) that absent a stay the movant will suffer irreparable damage; 3) that the adverse party will suffer no substantial harm from the issuance of the stay; and 4) that the public interest will be served by issuing the stay." Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450, 1453 (11th Cir.1986).
Here, Defendant argues that it is likely to succeed on the merits in the appellate proceedings for a number of reasons. Curiously, however, not one of Defendant's arguments addresses the holding of the Summary Judgment Order; instead, Defendant focuses only on dicta. This, in and of itself, is sufficient reason to deny Defendant's motion to stay, as Defendant has failed to demonstrate that it is likely to succeed in overturning the holding of my Summary Judgment Order on appeal. Regardless, for the sake of completeness, I will explain why the holding of my Summary Judgment Order was not in error and why this case must proceed to trial.
As noted above, I denied Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment because the competent record evidence presented was insufficient to warrant a grant of summary judgment. Simply put, it was clear that too many questions of fact remained outstanding for me to determine, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs' claims were barred by GARA. In fact, even with the benefit of six additional months to prepare, Defendant is still unable to provide the Court with a clear picture of the undisputed facts underlying its GARA defense. Just today, for example, Defendant informed this Court, for the very first time, that: (1) there were actually two separate engines used by the subject aircraft since 1977 (as opposed to a single engine that was subsequently converted); and (2) that the engine that allegedly failed underwent a series of significant modifications, additions, and maintenance procedures since it was installed in the subject aircraft.
I also note that Defendant appears to have erroneously assumed that I completely foreclosed the application of GARA to Plaintiffs' claims. I have not. To the contrary, as I made clear to the parties during the two pre-trial conferences, I welcome additional argument and briefing on the GARA issues, and I intend on submitting the factual questions relative to Defendant's GARA defense to the jury (e.g., the jury will need to determine whether the five passengers aboard the aircraft at issue were "being made passenger[s] for purposes of receiving treatment for a medical or other emergency." GARA § 2(b)(2)).
Furthermore, I invite the parties to more thoroughly brief the difficult question of GARA's preemptive scope, which was relegated to a mere footnote in Defendant's summary judgment reply brief.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that Defendant has failed to demonstrate that it is likely to succeed on the merits in the appellate proceedings. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
