PAUL C. HUCK, District Judge.
Melvin E. Gavron alleges that Defendant Weather Shield Manufacturing, Inc. made misrepresentations regarding windows and doors that it sold, thereby breaching its express warranty and violating the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA"). Weather Shield filed a Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Fourth Amended Complaint, Gavron's FDUTPA claim, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies Weather Shield's Motion to Dismiss.
Weather Shield designs, manufactures, and sells a Legacy Series of windows and doors. Individually and on behalf of a class of similarly-situated individuals, Gavron accuses Weather Shield of designing, manufacturing, marketing, selling, and distributing windows and doors that were materially defective. Specifically, the putative class alleges that Weather Shield breached its express warranty (Count I) and violated FDUTPA (Count II). Gavron defines the putative class as "[a]ll persons and/or entities in Florida who own real property in which Weather Shield Legacy windows and/or doors are installed."
Gavron then contacted Weather Shield, which gave him the name of a certified Weather Shield installer—American Advantage Window Replacement—that he hired to address the leakage problem. American Advantage removed and reinstalled the doors, which it said were previously incorrectly installed. American Advantage also caulked the windows with silicone. Despite these corrections, the windows and doors continued to leak. Additionally, the doors began to delaminate, swell, and rot, and the glass of the windows distorted due to excess moisture. When Gavron and his contractor called Weather Shield for assistance, they were informed that Weather Shield believed the problem was faulty installation. When Gavron and his contractor removed one of the leaky doors and deconstructed it, they found that the door had not been manufactured in compliance with testing documentation and product approvals filed with the Miami-Dade Building Code Compliance Office's ("BCCO") Product Control Division. Gavron and his contractor documented this process with photographs.
Gavron's contractor contacted a Weather Shield representative, who agreed that the doors were not manufactured in accordance with the BCCO's notice of acceptance, which included specifications for the Legacy Series doors. Despite this, a Weather Shield representative notified Gavron's contractor that Weather Shield would not honor the warranty on the products. A BCCO representative then visited Gavron's property. On July 8, 2010, after this visit, the BCCO issued a report finding "several non-conformities" in the Weather Shield doors and windows that Gavron purchased, as compared to the specifications that the BCCO approved. Furthermore, in August 2010, after conducting an audit of Weather Shield's manufacturing facilities, the BCCO issued another report finding that Weather Shield exercised "inadequate Quality Control over miscellaneous aspects of the fabrication process."
Gavron alleges that Weather Shield advertised and represented that the Legacy Series windows and doors were properly sealed and reinforced, such that they would resist air and water infiltration.
Gavron alleges that Weather Shield knew that these defects would be unknown and not easily discoverable by consumers and, therefore, would defeat the consumers' ordinary, foreseeable, and reasonable expectations concerning the performance of Weather Shield Legacy Series doors and windows. Gavron further alleges that these representations are misleading to consumers in the absence of a disclosure that such defects exist.
Weather Shield filed its Motion to Dismiss Count II on January 18, 2011. After Gavron responded, Weather Shield filed its Reply on February 7, 2011. On February 23, 2011, the Court held a hearing on the Motion. At the hearing, the Court decided, and the parties agreed, that the Court should stay the case pending the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Fitzpatrick v. General Mills, Inc., an appeal from this Court's decision to certify a FDUTPA class action, which addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff pleading a FDUTPA claim must plead reliance on alleged misrepresentations by a defendant. The Eleventh Circuit entered its decision in that case on March 25, 2011. See Fitzpatrick v. General Mills, Inc. (Fitzpatrick II), 635 F.3d 1279
A consumer's claim for damages made pursuant to FDUTPA "has three elements: (1) a deceptive act or unfair practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages." Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So.2d 860, 869 (Fla.2d Dist.Ct.App.2006). Defendant Weather Shield contends that Plaintiff Gavron has not sufficiently pled causation. Weather Shield also argues that Gavron fails to sufficiently allege that Weather Shield was aware that the Legacy Series doors and windows contained material defects. The Court considers these arguments, in turn, below.
In its supplemental briefing to the Court, Weather Shield explains that its causation argument is that Gavron has failed to allege reliance on Weather Shield's alleged misrepresentations.
As both parties are aware, the Court is familiar with the discordant decisions in the Florida appellate courts regarding a plaintiff's obligation pursuant to FDUTPA to plead his reliance on an alleged misrepresentation. See Fitzpatrick v. General Mills, Inc. (Fitzpatrick I), 263 F.R.D. 687, 694-95 (S.D.Fla.2010); In re Court Reporting Firms, 715 F.Supp.2d 1265, 1281-82 (S.D.Fla.2010). In fact, the Court has noted its concern regarding the conflicting decisions in the Florida appellate courts. 263 F.R.D. at 694. While disagreements persist in the Florida appellate courts, the Eleventh Circuit has simplified the issue for this Court. In Fitzpatrick II, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed this Court's reasoning in Fitzpatrick I that a plaintiff need not allege reliance on an allegedly false statement in order to state a claim pursuant to FDUTPA. Fitzpatrick II, 635 F.3d at 1283 ("In its analysis, the district court repeatedly stated that a plaintiff need not prove reliance on the allegedly false statement to recover damages under FDUTPA, but rather a plaintiff must simply prove that an objective reasonable person would have been deceived. And, this is correct.").
In light of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Fitzpatrick II, the Court finds that Gavron need not allege his reliance on Weather Shield's alleged misrepresentations in order to state a FDUTPA claim. Without citing to case law indicating that the Court has discretion to do so, Weather Shield argues strenuously that the Court may disregard the Eleventh Circuit's pronouncements of law regarding whether a plaintiff asserting a FDUTPA cause of action must allege reliance. The Court declines Weather Shield's invitation to "reverse" the Eleventh Circuit on this issue. Gavron alleges facts indicating that Weather Shield made misleading representations that would deceive an objectively reasonable person. Thus, in accordance with the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of FDUTPA, the Court finds that Gavron adequately has alleged causation.
Weather Shield also argues that Gavron's FDUTPA cause of action fails to state a claim because Gavron does not allege that Weather Shield had knowledge of the defects that Gavron alleges. Weather Shield's argument assumes that a defendant must have knowledge of an alleged defect in order to state a FDUTPA claim. Weather Shield relies solely on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) and its progeny in arguing that Gavron has not pled knowledge sufficiently, pursuant to Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In turn, Gavron argues that a plaintiff asserting a FDUTPA claim is not required to plead a defendant's knowledge of an alleged defect. The Court finds that FDUTPA does not require Weather Shield to have subjective knowledge of alleged defects in order for Gavron to state a viable FDUTPA claim.
It is perhaps telling that Weather Shield, in support of its argument, does not cite to any case specifically discussing FDUTPA's requirements. As discussed previously, a consumer's claim for damages made pursuant to FDUTPA "has three elements: (1) a deceptive act or unfair practice; (2) causation; and (3) actual damages." Rollins, Inc. v. Butland, 951 So.2d 860, 869 (Fla.2d Dist.Ct.App.2006). FDUTPA proscribes "[u]nfair methods of competition, unconscionable acts or practices, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce. . . ." Fla. Stat. § 501.204(1). The Court's research reveals that the Florida Supreme Court teaches that a deceptive act occurs when "there is a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to mislead the consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances, to the consumer's detriment." PNR, Inc. v. Beacon Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 842 So.2d 773, 777 (Fla.2003) (citing Millennium Commc'ns & Fulfillment, Inc. v. Office of the Attorney Gen., 761 So.2d 1256, 1263 (Fla.3d Dist.Ct.App.2000)). Thus, the Act focuses on whether an act is deceptive, not whether a defendant knew that the allegedly violative conduct was occurring. See Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Federal Trade Comm.'n, 849 F.2d 1354, 1368 (11th Cir.1988) (stating, in the context of a Federal Trade Commission Act violation case, "[g]iven that a practice may be deceptive without a showing of intent to deceive, it is apparent that a practice may be found unfair to consumers without a showing that the offending party intended to cause consumer injury").
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Gavron states a FDUTPA claim in Count II of the Fourth Amended Complaint. Therefore, Weather Shield's Motion to Dismiss COUNT II is DENIED.
(4th Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 54.)