JONATHAN GOODMAN, District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Fifth Supplemental Rule 26 Disclosure [ECF No. 135]. In this seven-page motion,
Plaintiff does not challenge the fact that she produced these materials after the applicable deadlines. Nevertheless, she argues that the Court should not strike or exclude her supplemental disclosure because she obtained the evidence late and because she had a duty to supplement.
For the reasons outlined below, the Court
The mere fact that Plaintiff believes she is or was under a duty to supplement her discovery disclosures does not mean that complying with the duty trumps deadlines in the case and permits trial use of post-deadline disclosures, prejudicial consequences notwithstanding. If that were the rule, deadlines (for example, to furnish documentary evidence, disclose expert witness opinions and provide tangible evidence of any type) would be meaningless and parties could wait until the eleventh hour to make substantively significant disclosures and then avoid exclusion by merely submitting a last-minute disclosure, justified by the duty-to-disclose rule.
Under Plaintiff's apparent theory of the interplay between deadlines and the duty-to-supplement rule, a party could submit an expert witness report from an economist whose damages opinion is $1 million, permit the opposing party to take the expert's deposition, make a last-minute disclosure (under the duty-to-supplement rule) two days before trial that the expert now has three additional damages theories totaling $5.5 million and then be permitted to introduce the new expert opinion at trial because, as Plaintiff says here [ECF No. 138, p. 3], "we were under a duty to timely disclose all these things; and we did."
On December IS, 2011, the parties jointly moved [ECF No. 28] to enlarge the time to complete discovery, requesting that the Court extend the discovery period an additional 30 days to April 9, 2012. The Court granted the motion [ECF No. 31].
The case is specially set for a bench trial for June 26, 2012. [ECF No. 94]. On May 24, 2012, a month and a half after expiration of the already-extended discovery cutoff deadline and approximately only a month before the trial, Plaintiff served her Fifth Supplemental Rule 26 Disclosure on defense counsel. This supplement included a June 18, 2012
Dr. Pettingill's new report increased his opinion of Plaintiff's total damages from approximately $1.67 million to approximately $2.08 million. The increase is due to the inclusion of updated amounts of past medical bills (which were available to him before the discovery cutoff), a recalculation of the life-expectancy based on what Plaintiff vaguely describes as the "latest government mortality tables (which just became widely accessible on-line)" and a newer discount rate based on what Plaintiff says is "today's actual, real-world yield on government bonds." In response to the motion to strike, Plaintiff does not contend that the updated past medical bill information was somehow unavailable to Dr. Pettingill before the discovery cutoff. In addition, she does not specify when the latest government mortality tables "just" became available online (which suggests it was before the discovery cutoff), nor does she contend that her expert could not have obtained the latest tables from other sources.
Concerning Dr. Lichtblau's follow-up office visit note from May 17, 2012, Plaintiff does not explain why he could not have examined her a second time and issued a supplemental report before the discovery cutoff.
Plaintiff says that she and her counsel first learned of the DVD's existence after the discovery cutoff, when its originator "gratuitously" mentioned its existence to Plaintiff's counsel's office. Plaintiff further explains that it took approximately two weeks to obtain the video but that she promptly copied it and provided it to the defense upon receipt.
Defendant relies upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(D)(ii), which governs the timing of expert witness disclosures. To be sure, that rule provides that disclosures must be made at least 90 days before trial, absent a stipulation or a court order. However, Defendant does not discuss Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e), which concerns the issue present here — supplementing responses.
If Plaintiff's two experts had issued supplemental reports based on information that was unavailable to them by the time of the discovery cutoff, then Plaintiff would be in a different situation. But the updates provided by Dr. Pettingill and Dr. Lichtblau are based on purported new information which appears to have been available before the discovery cutoff. Although Plaintiff says that the updated medical bills were unavailable when Dr. Pettingill first prepared his report, she does not claim that the information was also unavailable by the time the discovery cutoff expired. And she does not claim that Dr. Lichtblau could not have seen her for a follow-up visit before discovery expired.
Because Defendant has already taken the depositions of these two experts and does not now have the ability to obtain additional experts to rebut the supplemental opinions or to arrange for supplemental opinions from its own witnesses, permitting Plaintiff to use these supplemental expert witness opinions would unduly prejudice Defendant. The Court is not inclined to cause this inequitable result. See Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2008) (affirming order striking expert's affidavit and noting that "the expert disclosure rule is intended to provide opposing parties reasonable opportunity to prepare for effective cross examination and perhaps arrange for expert testimony from other witnesses") (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although Plaintiff did not give Defendant a copy of the DVD until after the discovery deadline expired, she did not know of or have the DVD before the discovery cutoff. Moreover, Defendant is aware (and has been for some time) that Plaintiff was airlifted from the ship. The DVD is merely digital photographic/video evidence of what Defendant has known for some time. Because Plaintiff produced the DVD at the last minute, the Court concludes that it needs to give Defendant the opportunity to question Plaintiff about these developments in a deposition. Defendant, of course, is free to pursue the opportunity or to ignore it. If Defendant wishes to take another deposition of Plaintiff (limited to questions about her being airlifted from the ship and the circumstances surrounding the DVD), then Plaintiff shall make herself available by June 21, 2012.
Rule 26(a)(3)(B), in turn, requires the disclosures to be made "at least 30 days before trial," unless the court orders otherwise.