JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.
THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon the bench trial held from December 3, 2012 through December 21, 2012 in Key West and Miami, Florida.
This case is the legal finale to a three year opera with a stunning libretto: two friends followed a treasure map to a hoard of gems on the floor of the Gulf of Mexico, then braved an onslaught of investor disputes and accusations of fraud in order to gain title to the massive amount of precious stones. Plaintiff JTR Enterprises, LLC, ("Plaintiff" or "JTR"), the company formed by the two divers after the initial retrieval, comes before the Court seeking title to the stones, or in the alternative, a liberal salvage award. Motivation, Inc. ("Motivation"), another treasure salvage company in Key West, intervened as a claimant, investigating its potential claim to the stones and then withdrawing the claim after determining the stones did not belong to the company.
The community of Key West, Florida is used to such stories. This case follows discoveries of treasure from the lost Spanish Galleons the Atocha and Santa Margarita, discoveries which captured the imagination of aspiring treasure seekers around the world and which are legendary in the modern salvage industry. The difference between this case and the cases of the Galleons Atocha and Santa Margarita is the striking lack of a shipwreck, or indeed any source which might tell the real story of how the stones came to be resting 65 feet deep on the surface of the ocean floor in January of 2010.
On or about January 11, 2010, friends and dive partners Jay Miscovich ("Jay")
Jay and Steve were not searching the area by happenstance. As professional maritime treasure hunters, Jay and Steve were following a lead purportedly provided by a map purchased from Jay's old acquaintance Mike Cunningham, a destitute handyman from Pennsylvania.
Steve commenced random diagnostic dives ("bounce dives") in approximately 65 feet of water without success until, on the afternoon of the third day, January 11, 2010, when Jay decided to accompany Steve on the last dive. The visibility underwater was either less than 15 feet, or 15 to 20 feet, or 20 feet (there was contradictory testimony as to this fact from Jay and Steve), and the area close to the floor of the ocean had a grey, monochromatic tone. It was during that dive that Jay, according to his testimony in court, noticed some "shiny objects" approximately fifteen feet away that he thought were pieces of broken glass "glistening on the bottom" (Testimony of Jay Miscovich, Dec. 4-5, 2012).
Professional archeologist Dr. Robert H. Baer testified that he spent two days interviewing Jay and then prepared a draft treatment from his notes. The draft treatment tells a different story about the day of the find. Most notably, Baer's draft report has Jay diving with "two friends from Mexico" instead of with Steve. Ex. 15 at 2. In addition, the draft treatment indicates that rather than picking up a
Over the next few months, Jay and Steve went back out repeatedly to retrieve more of the stones. Steve testified he went alone on a number of occasions and, whether jointly or alone, he retrieved stones from the site every time he dove on the site. The recovered material was taken to Steve's Key West home, cleaned and stored in a safe. In addition to the retrieval operations taking place in Key West, Jay and Steve also sought out potential investors for their fabulous discovery of thousands of what they believe to be lost Colombian emeralds scattered on the floor of the ocean.
According to Jay's testimony, investors contributed between $500,000 and $1,000,000. Bruce Silverstein, Jay's lawyer, testified that either he or his law firm contributed an additional $150,000 as an equity owner of JTR. Disputes with the investors group eventually landed in state court in Delaware. The Court finds that this side drama is immaterial to the Court's analysis of the Plaintiff's prayer for a salvage award and/or title to the res.
The stones were subsequently scattered across the country, and indeed, the world. Jay and Steve's first move was to bring stones to New York City and Washington, DC, where they showed the stones to potential investors as well as gemologists and other experts, including an official from the Smithsonian. Jay gave stones to a jeweler in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to have the stones cut and made into some pieces of jewelry. Jay testified in trial that the jeweler produced finished pieces of jewelry that filled four gallon-sized bags comprising "a couple hundred stones". (Testimony of Jay Miscovich, Dec. 4, 2012.) One of the investors was given some stones, one of which was made into a necklace for his wife. (Plaintiff's Second Status Report, DE #54, filed Jan. 6, 2012). Jay took bags of the stones to his ill older brother and left them for his brother to photograph.
In addition to removing stones from Key West, the pair actually planted some back into the ocean as well. Steve testified that between January and April of 2011, he filmed a promotional video at an underwater site location in approximately 35 to 40 feet of water. He placed forty stones into the water, set them on the floor of the ocean, and then proceeded to recreate the original find on film. Steve testified that they pre-counted the stones to keep track of them. According to Steve, everyone involved in the filming of the video knew it was not the actual site, and the video was never shown to anyone.
At some point, representatives from the CBS program Sixty Minutes came to be in touch with Jay and Steve. Over several months between the fall of 2011 and early 2012, the CBS crew filmed footage for the segment, both in the ocean and interviews on dry land,
Expert reports in evidence as well as testimony during trial established that at least a portion of the stones in evidence have epoxy or oil on them. Testimony indicates that such epoxy is a modern material that would not have been in existence prior to the 19th century and would have disintegrated entirely given enough time under water.
On September 6, 2012, JTR filed its Complaint against "An Unknown Quantity of Colombian Emeralds, Amethysts and Quartz Crystals located within 3,000 yards of a point located at coordinates 24°57.79" North Latitude and 81°55.54" West Longitude" ("the emeralds") (DE #1), along with a Motion to Appoint a Custodian (DE #3) and a Motion for Issuance of Warrant In Rem (DE #4). Pursuant to this Court's well-established procedure for admiralty cases, the Court moved promptly to appoint Plaintiff JTR Substitute Custodian of the In Rem Defendant and issue a Warrant In Rem. (DE #5 and 6, respectively, filed September 7, 2011). JTR published "Notice of Action In Rem and Arrest of Property" in The Citizen, a newspaper in Monroe County, Florida (see
The record suggests a systemic difficulty in achieving the delivery of the res into the jurisdiction of the Southern District of Florida. JTR's status report from September 30, 2011 (DE #7) indicated that JTR had leased safe deposit boxes in Key West where "[t]he majority of the recovered items" were currently in holding, and that the Plaintiff/Substitute Custodian was in the process of coordinating the transport of "[t]he remaining recovered items... [from] a bank vault in New York ... to a bank in South Florida." Plaintiff also noted in its report that "36 representative sample emeralds have been provided to the Smithsonian National Museum of Natural History in Washington, D.C." (DE #7).
After Plaintiff JTR and Intervenors Clawdb LLC et al. filed multiple notices to the Court
In fact, JTR's second status report, filed January 6, 2012, stated that JTR "anticipates that the transport of the [emeralds still in New York] will occur before the end of [January]." (DE #54, filed January 6, 2012). The report also noted that emeralds from the res had been provided
The efforts to require Plaintiff to comply with the normal procedure of establishing admiralty jurisdiction in a United States District Court by delivery of the res of found property to a court-appointed Substituted Custodian continued through early 2012, resulting in court hearings on June 18, 2012 and then July 30, 2012.
Of the two claims initially entered in response to the published notice, neither remains today. On the eve of trial, the Intervenors Clawdb LLC et al., who indicated multiple times over the course of the record that their interest in the res is solely a security interest contingent upon JTR perfecting title or a salvage lien pursuant to a separate settlement approved by the Delaware Chancery Court, (see, e.g., D.E. #17), voluntarily dismissed their claims with prejudice (DE #176, filed November 29, 2012). Claimant Motivation attempted to withdraw its claims while reserving claims for Rule 11 sanctions. (DE #118).
The standard procedure for Admiralty cases in the Southern District of Florida is
In the case at bar, it took an extraordinary amount of time for the allegedly discovered material to be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Southern District of Florida. On the basis of this record, the Court cannot find that the material currently under the Court's arrest comprises the same material retrieved from the floor of the Gulf of Mexico, or that the material under the Court's arrest is the entire res. Nor can the Court be certain that the material shown to the expert witness, examining the stones prior (and during) trial was the same material retrieved from the ocean floor and the same material contained by the res under the Court's arrest.
In 1879, Supreme Court Justice Nathan Clifford described salvage as "the compensation allowed to persons by whose voluntary assistance a ship at sea or her cargo or both have been saved in whole or in part from impending sea peril, or in recovering such property from actual peril or loss, as in cases of shipwreck, derelict, or recapture." The `Sabine', 101 U.S. 384, 384, 25 L.Ed. 982 (1879). Justice Clifford's oft-cited decision provided three necessary elements to make a claim in salvage: "1. A marine peril. 2. Service voluntarily rendered when not required as an existing duty or from a special contract. 3. Success in whole or in part, or that the service rendered contributed to such success." Id.
The element of marine peril is not limited to ships currently afloat; courts have allowed historic shipwrecks to satisfy peril as well. As the Fifth Circuit noted in Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel ("Treasure Salvors I"), "[m]arine peril includes more than the threat of storm, fire, or piracy to a vessel in navigation." 569 F.2d 330, 337 (5th Cir.1978). "If [the found materials] had been resting on a reef, where they could be seen, they would undoubtedly have been in `peril' of being lost, and the `marine peril' certainly was not diminished or extinguished by the fact that [the materials] were actually lost." Id. (quoting Thompson v. One Anchor and Two Chains, 221 F. 770, 773 (W.D.Wis.1915) (internal quotations omitted)). Treasure Salvors I continues: "There is no dispute that the [wrecked ship] was lost. Even after discovery of the vessel's location it is still in peril of being lost through the actions of the elements." As this Court wrote in Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, et al. ("Santa Margarita decision"), "[i]t is established in this Circuit that a marine peril exists in an ancient, abandoned shipwreck for purposes of meeting the requirements of a valid salvage action." 556 F.Supp. 1319, 1340 (S.D.Fla.1983). As the Plaintiff has the burden to prove marine peril, in such cases the Plaintiff must show that the subject material was lost.
There is a twist to the law of salvage, however; a salvor may forfeit its rights to salvage. Judge Paul Niemeyer of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addresses such a situation in R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. Haver ("Titanic I"):
Judge Niemeyer further elaborated on this forfeiture in his 2006 follow-up opinion, R.M.S. Titanic, Inc. v. The Wrecked and Abandoned Vessel ("Titanic III"): "... [A] salvor acts on behalf of a true owner, even when that owner has not been identified.... [W]hen the salvor violates that trust, it may forfeit its salvage rights, including the right to exclusive possession and a salvage award." 435 F.3d 521, 532 (4th Cir.2006) (emphasis added).
In order to grant title, as opposed to a salvage award, the Court must apply the law of finds. "Unlike the law of salvage, the law of finds imposes no trust on the finder, who acquires the property for his own benefit." Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked, and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 727 F.Supp.2d 1341, 1344 (M.D.Fla.2010). Judge Abraham Sofaer's decision in Hener v. U.S. provides a frequently cited contextualization for the application of the law of finds in admiralty cases:
In simpler terms, the elements of a finds claim in admiralty are "(1) intent to reduce property to possession, (2) actual or constructive possession of the property, and (3) that the property is either unowned or abandoned." Titanic III, 435 F.3d at 532 n. 3.
Judge Sidney Aronovitz explained the possession aspect of the law of finds in his 1986 decision, MDM Salvage, Inc. v. Unidentified, Wrecked and Abandoned Sailing Vessel: "[T]he finder of abandoned property must continuously possess or be in the process of reducing to possession the property which he has found. With regard to the requirement of continuous possession, the law of finds is unforgiving." 631 F.Supp. 308, 311 (S.D.Fla.1986).
The third element is particularly tricky. "Unowned" implies natural materials "such as flora and fauna" that have never been owned. 727 F.Supp.2d at 1344. It seems to this Court that "unowned" further implies an object that is indigenous to the place where it was found, which logically has not yet been picked up by a person
The cases that have relied on the law of finds rather than salvage to determine claims in admiralty tend to turn on whether the finder can show abandonment. In basic terms, there have been two types of factual scenarios: cases in which original owners affirmatively (and publicly) abandoned their property (in which abandonment is fairly straight forward), and the cases in which no owner comes forward and abandonment must be inferred. See Columbus-America Discovery Group v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Co., 974 F.2d 450, 461 (4th Cir.1992). In situations where no owner comes forward, "[s]uch circumstances may give rise to an inference of abandonment ..." Id. Quoting a 1981 District Court opinion from Texas, (Hatteras, Inc. v. The U.S.S. Hatteras, 1984 A.M.C. 1094, 1097 n. 5 (S.D. Tex. 1981)), Columbus-America Discovery Group states, "[w]hile mere nonuse of property and lapse of time without more do not establish abandonment, they may, under circumstances where the owner has otherwise failed to act or assert any claim to property, support an inference of intent to abandon." 974 F.2d at 461 (internal quotations omitted).
This Court appreciates, as was previously noted by the Fifth Circuit in Treasure Salvors I, that the "[d]isposition of a wrecked vessel whose very location has been lost for centuries as though its owner were still in existence stretches a fiction to absurd lengths." 569 F.2d at 337. However, as pointed out in Columbus-America Discovery Group, the Treasure Salvors I decision specifically noted "that it had been stipulated by all parties involved that the original owners had abandoned the wrecks, and the district court also made mention of the fact that, `The modern day government of Spain has expressed no interest in filing a claim in this litigation as a successor-owner.'" 974 F.2d at 462 (quoting Treasure Salvors I, 569 F.2d at 337). The Columbus-America Discovery Group court closes its discussion of the law of abandonment with a clear statement of what must be shown to prove abandonment: "abandonment must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, though, such as an owner's express declaration abandoning title. Should the property encompass an ancient and longlost shipwreck, a court may infer an abandonment." 974 F.2d at 464-65. See also Adams v. Unione Mediterranea Di Sicurta, 220 F.3d 659, 671 (5th Cir.2000).
The law of salvage calls for a marine peril. This element may be satisfied by an "ancient, abandoned shipwreck." Santa Margarita decision, 556 F.Supp. at 1340. When there is a shipwreck involved, Plaintiff can provide documentation of the ship, its cargo, dates, etc. which allows the Court to make certain logical assumptions as to the owner of the material (e.g. the King of Spain). Then the Court can require the owner to provide a salvage award.
In the instant case, however, there is no shipwreck, and no proof that the stones were ever lost in the first place. The only evidence is that Jay and Steve retrieved the material from the ocean floor on and after January 11, 2010. But the genuineness of the act of retrieving the material does not prove that the material was previously lost. The material may never have been lost, if Motivation's claims are correct that Plaintiff owned the material, dropped it into the ocean, and then retrieved it. To give an appearance of
In addition to the lack of a marine peril, the Plaintiff has forfeited its rights to salvage. In providing the stones to the jeweler in Pittsburgh so that he might cut the stones and make pieces of finished jewelry from them, Jay removed property from the res for his own use. Indeed, Jay testified in trial that the jeweler produced finished pieces of jewelry that filled four gallon-sized bags (comprising "a couple hundred stones"). Testimony of Jay Miscovich, Dec. 4, 2012. Jay also testified that he was under the impression that he was allowed to cut the stones. As Judge Niemeyer instructed in Titanic I, such forfeiture applies even when the salvor was mistaken about his rights regarding the res. Testimony of Jay Miscovich, Dec. 4, 2012. In addition, an investor was given three stones, one of which was made into a necklace for his wife. Therefore, even if the Court were to apply the law of salvage, Plaintiff has forfeited any right to a salvage claim due to exploitation of the res for personal use.
In light of the above analysis as well as the Plaintiff's original prayer for the award of title to the res, the Court now addresses the case through the lens of the law of finds.
The third element calls for the res to either have never been previously owned, or to have been lost and abandoned by its owner. Never previously owned implies local flora or fauna that is indigenous to the area of retrieval. The testimony indicates that the res is comprised of stones which are not indigenous to the bed of the Gulf of Mexico. Therefore, the Court moves to the other option: whether the res has been lost and abandoned by its original owner. In other words, the Court must address the elephant in the room: how did these stones come to be sitting on the ocean floor in January of 2011?
The court in Columbus-America Discovery Group is quite firm on the requirement
When all is said and done, there are two options: Jay and Steve legitimately found lost stones on the floor of the Gulf, or Jay and Steve placed stones acquired elsewhere on the ocean floor in order to "find" them and thereby establish an ancient provenance and greatly enhance the value of the stones and the reputation of the men as treasure salvors. There is just as much support for the theory that Jay and Steve planted the stones as there is for the assertion that they found them. The Court cannot simply accept the un-contradicted testimony of Jay and Steve that they followed a treasure map to the site, dove to the floor, and found the emeralds. Each story represents one possible interpretation of entirely circumstantial evidence, and neither persuades the Court. Even if the Court could determine that Jay and Steve did indeed find the stones on the first day, the Court has no credible evidence upon which to base a finding that the material was lost or abandoned by some other original "finder" or owner.
Having forfeited their rights to salvage and failing to prove the elements of the law of salvage or finds, Plaintiff has failed to convince the Court that a salvage award or the awarding of title to the res is appropriate. The Court therefore awards no salvage award to JTR, nor any award of title to the material to JTR. Pursuant to Supplemental Rule E(5)(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court has the discretion to set the terms and conditions of the release of the arrested property in this case. Under the facts of this very unusual case, where the law precludes award of title of the res to Plaintiff JTR, and there remains in the case no other claimant as to the res, the question of proper disposition of the material gem stones remains. The Court concludes that the res should be simply returned to the parties who physically brought it to the jurisdiction of the Court, delivered it to the U.S. Marshal and who obtained appointment of substitute custodian, JTR Enterprises, LLC; namely, Jay Miscovich and Steve Elchlepp. The Court makes no finding as to the type, source, value, provenance, or origin of the stones comprising the res.
Therefore, the following is