JAMES I. COHN, District Judge.
Plaintiff commenced this action against Defendants for overtime compensation and minimum wage under the Fair Labor Standards Act on November 11, 2013. DE 1. On February 26, 2014, Plaintiff filed an affidavit attesting that each Defendant was served with process on February 10, 2014. DE 12. Defendants' responses to the complaint were thus due on March 3, 2014. Defendants, however, did not file any timely responses. As a result, the Clerk of Court entered defaults against Defendants on March 7, 2014. DE 17. On April 25, 2014, Defendants moved to vacate the defaults. DE 29. Plaintiff opposes the Motion. DE 31.
"It is the general rule that default judgments are ordinarily disfavored because cases should be decided upon their merits whenever reasonably possible."
First, Defendants contend that their default was not willful. As support, Defendant Jose Varela, who accepted the papers on behalf of the Defendants, explains in his Declaration
DE 32-1 ¶ 7. Consequently, it was not until April 3, 2014, when the same process server returned to serve a subpoena for a deposition in an unrelated matter that he realized the gravity of the situation.
Plaintiff, however, views things differently. She argues that Defendant Jose Varela clearly received the summons and the complaint, read it and understood that there was a 21-day deadline to respond, but then failed to do so. Response at 4-5. This behavior, in her view, exhibits an "intentional or at least reckless disregard" for this proceeding such that the Court should deny Defendants' Motion.
The Court cannot agree. While the Court does not condone Defendant Jose Varela's behavior, he does declare under penalty of perjury that he was confused by the 21-day warning because he thought the deadline had already expired since the papers were dated November 8, 2013, and he did not receive them until February 10, 2014. He further attests that he believed the papers were "fake or not official" because they had been served by a plain-clothed individual, as opposed to a uniformed officer, and that the individual did not show him any identification. And, as soon as he realized the gravity of the situation, he acted promptly to retain counsel to move to vacate the defaults. In light of these sworn statements, and the general rule that defaults are generally disfavored, the Court finds that while Defendants' actions may have been negligent, they did not rise to the level of intentional or reckless disregard for this proceeding.
Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff would not be prejudiced by the setting aside of the defaults. Defendants contend that Plaintiff will still be able to pursue her claims, engage in discovery, and present her case. Plaintiff, however, contends that she would be prejudiced because she has "incurred attorneys' fees and costs due to numerous hours spent on motion practice." Response at 2. The Court disagrees. Increased litigation expenses do not qualify as actual prejudice that would justify the denial of relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c).
Third, Defendants contend that they have "several" meritorious defenses to Plaintiff's claims. However, aside from moving to quash service of process on Defendant Villamarin, Plaintiff points out that Defendants do not articulate any other alleged defenses. Without any indication as to what defenses Defendants may have to Plaintiff's claims, the Court cannot determine whether they are potentially meritorious or not. The Court, therefore, agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants have failed to meet their burden of presenting meritorious defenses.
Finally, Defendant Villamarin also moves to quash service of process. As grounds, Defendant Villamarin argues that service of process was insufficient because, although the papers were delivered to her son at 10851 N.W. 75th Street, Doral, Florida 33178, that property is only an "investment" property and not her "dwelling or usual place of abode" within the meaning of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e)(2)(B).
When a defendant challenges service of process, the plaintiff has the burden of showing a prima facie case of proper service.
In this case, Plaintiff established a prima facie case of proper service on Defendant Villamarin by filing a return of service signed by the process server, Glenville Smith. DE 11. In response, Defendant Villamarin filed a declaration that she resides in Venezuela and that, while she is the co-owner of 10851 N.W. 75th Street, Doral, Florida 33178, where her son lives, that property is only an "investment." DE 32-2. She also filed a declaration from her son that:
DE 32-1. Plaintiff, for her part, filed a declaration from the process server, Glenville Smith, that "Jose Varela advised that he and [Defendant] Villamarin (his mother) did reside at that location" and that "Jose Varela agreed to accept service on his own behalf and on behalf of C & J Sons, LLC and [Defendant] Villamarin." DE 31-1.
Based on this record evidence, the Court finds that Defendant Villamarin has failed to meet her burden of showing "strong and convincing" evidence to rebut Plaintiff's prima facie case of proper service. Although Defendant Villamarin swears that she does not reside at the property, she is a co-owner of it and her son does live there. She also appears to visit the property with some frequency.
For all these reasons, it is hereby