JAMES LAWRENCE KING, District Judge.
The factual and procedural history of this case, both in its Admiralty and Sanctions phases, is adequately detailed in this Court's Opinion and Order Denying Sanctions (DE #568), and will not be repeated herein. Briefly stated, and only as relevant to Sullivan's Motion for Sanctions, this Court found that by the time Motivation rested its case-in-chief in the evidentiary hearing on Motivation's Amended Motion for Sanctions, it had not presented any evidence on either Sullivan's interest in the outcome of the underlying litigation or his control over its course. DE #528 at 3. Accordingly, Motivation having failed to carry its burden of proof on those points, this Court granted Sullivan's Motion for involuntary dismissal of Motivation's claim for sanctions against him. The evidentiary hearing then continued, and the Court took evidence on Respondent Bruce Silverstein's defense to Motivation's sanctions claims.
Sullivan's Motion for Sanctions is denied chiefly because of the "American Rule" whereby parties to litigation usually bear their own costs, even when successful, unless some statutory authority allows for the assessment of fees in favor of the prevailing party. See generally, Friends of the Everglades v. South Florida Water Management Dist, 678 F.3d 1199 (11th Cir. 2012); Mayer v. Wall Street Equity Group, Inc., 514 F. App'x. 929, 932 (11th Cir. 2013) ("[L]itigants ordinarily are expected to bear their own attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the `American Rule'").
To the extent that Sullivan has invoked 28 U.S.C. § 1927
As for Mr. Sullivan's motion to invoke the Court's inherent power to sanction bad-faith litigation conduct, that Motion must also be denied. Courts have the inherent power to police themselves and those appearing before them, and to sanction bad-faith litigation conduct. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). "The key to unlocking that inherent power is a finding of bad faith." Sciarretta v. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co., ___ F.3d ___, 2015 WL 795593 at *6 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Barnes v. Dalton, 158 F.3d 1212, 1214 (11th Cir. 1998). A party seeking to invoke this inherent power must prove bad faith by clear and convincing evidence. See JTR Enterprises, LLC v. An Unknown Quantity of Colombian Emeralds, Amethysts and Quartz Crystals, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2015 WL 1208666, Case No. 1:1 l-cv-10074-KING (S.D. Fla. March 16, 2015) (holding that a movant must prove sanctionable conduct by clear and convincing evidence to invoke the a court's inherent power to sanction bad-faith litigation conduct); Barash v. Kates, 585 F.Supp.2d 1347, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (same).
In granting Mr. Sullivan's Motion to Dismiss at the close of Motivation's case-in-chief, the Court found that Motivation had not met this heightened burden with the evidence that it had presented at the hearing by that point in the proceedings. The Court previously found that evidence proffered in Motivation's Amended Motion for Sanctions on these points was sufficient both to issue an Order to Show Cause directed at Respondent Sullivan (DE #451), and to deny Sullivan's Motion to quash service of that Order (DE #488). That Motivation ultimately did not present evidence of Sullivan's interest or substantial involvement with the underlying litigation at the evidentiary hearing does not impel a conclusion that Motivation's claim for sanctions was frivolous. Indeed, the Court will note that after Motivation rested its case-in-chief and its claims as against Sullivan were dismissed, the trial proceeded on claims regarding Mr. Silverstein, where the Court heard additional evidence on both Sullivan's interest and his involvement.
Finally, and as highlighted above, in order for the Court to sanction Motivation pursuant to its inherent power, it must make a finding of bad faith. Mr. Sullivan has not shown, by clear and convincing evidence or otherwise, that Motivation's pursuit of sanctions against him was in bad faith.
Therefore, it is