DARRIN P. GAYLES, District Judge.
On July 22, 2014, Plaintiff Jorge Luis Aldao filed this action seeking review of the decision by the Commissioner denying his eligibility for disability benefits under the Social Security Act. In an effort to reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") finding that Aldao is not disabled, he raised the following issues: (1) the ALJ's consideration of 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1, section 1.04B ("Listing 1.04B") was not based on substantial evidence;
(2) the ALJ's analysis of Aldao's residual functional capacity ("RFC") was internally inconsistent and otherwise not based on substantial evidence; (3) the ALJ failed to make specific findings or provide analysis of the physical and mental demands of Aldao's past relevant work; (4) the ALJ's functional assessment was not supported by either a treating or examining medical source; (5) the ALJ failed to fully and fairly develop the record; and (6) the ALJ failed to consider the combined effects of Aldao's impairments; and (7) and the ALJ's credibility analysis was not properly docu-mented or conducted at the appropriate time.
The matter was referred to Judge Turnoff for a report and recommendation on dispositive matters. The parties filed their respective cross-motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 31 & 32]. On February 29, 2016, Judge Turnoff issued his Report: addressing the issues Aldao raised, he found no reversible error with the ALJ's decision and recommended that this Court deny Aldao's motion, grant the Commissioner's motion, and affirm the Commissioner's decision. On March 14, 2016, Aldao filed his objections to the Report ("Objections") [ECF No. 39].
When reviewing an ALJ's decision, the Court's role is to determine whether substantial evidence supported that decision. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1213 (11th Cir. 1999). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but is "more than a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established; it means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988). In determining whether substantial evidence exists, the Court must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the Commissioner's decision. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). The Court is not, however, permitted to reweigh the evidence the ALJ considered. Bridges v. Bowen, 815 F.2d 319, 321 (11th Cir. 1989). The Court must reverse the decision only if the ALJ fails to "provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted." Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1991). Otherwise, this Court must affirm the decision of an ALJ that is supported by substantial evidence, "[e]ven if [the Court] find[s] that the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner's] decision." Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.3d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).
Unlike the deferential standard of review that applies to the Commissioner's findings of fact, "[n]o presumption of validity attaches to the [Commissioner's] determination of the proper legal standards to be applied in evaluating claims." Bridges, 815 F.2d at 624. "Failure to apply the correct legal standards or to provide the reviewing court with the sufficient basis to determine that the correct legal principles have been followed is grounds for reversal." McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1027, 1030 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
A district court may accept, reject, or modify a magistrate judge's report and recommen-dation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Those portions of the report and recommendation to which objec-tion is made are accorded de novo review, if those objections "pinpoint the specific findings that the party disagrees with." United States v. Schultz, 565 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2009); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). If there are no objections, the district court need only review the report and recommendation for "clear error." Macort v. Prem, Inc., 208 F. App'x 781, 784 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
Aldao advances two arguments in his Objections: first, that Judge Turnoff applied an inappropriate legal standard to the facts of this case by misconstruing the regulatory requirements of Listing 1.04B; and second, that the ALJ's decision is fatally flawed due to internal inconsisten-cies pertaining to Aldao's RFC. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn.
Social Security regulations provide that a claimant is disabled if, inter alia, he meets or medically equals a listed impairment set forth in the Listings. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii) ("If you have an impairment(s) that meets or equals one of our listings . . . we will find that you are disabled."); see also id. § 416.920(d) ("If you have an impairment(s) which . . . is listed in Appendix 1 or is equal to a listed impairment(s), we will find you disabled without considering your age, education, and work experience").
The Listing at issue in the Objections is Listing 1.04B, which provides:
20 C.F.R. part 404, subpt. P, app. 1. At the outset, the Court finds that the ALJ's determination that Aldao did not
Aldao contends that Judge Turnoff did not apply the appropriate legal standard because he did not properly analyze whether Aldao's impairment
Aldao argues that his bilateral epidural fibrosis, diagnosed in July 2008, presents "the very same signs and symptoms, as well as limitations" of spinal arachnoiditis—"[s]pecifically, manifestation by severe burning or painful dysthesia, resulting in the need for changes in position or posture more than once every 2 hours." Objections at 5. As Judge Turnoff correctly concluded, Aldao has cited no medical or other authority in support of the assertion that a finding of bilateral epidural fibrosis is medically equivalent to a finding of spinal arachnoiditis. The only evidence Aldao provides to support his argument that his epidural fibrosis "manifest[s] by severe burning or painful dysthesia, resulting in the need for changes in position or posture more than once every 2 hours" is his own testimony before the ALJ. This is insufficient. See Dean v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 583 F. App'x 645, 646 (9th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (affirming ALJ's finding that the claimant's impairments did not meet or equal Listing 1.04B where "the only evidence of severe burning or painful dysthesia resulting in the need for changes in position or posture more than once every two hours" was the testimony of the claimant and his wife). Only medical evidence will support a finding of medical equivalence. The ALJ properly rejected Aldao's subjective testimony.
Aldao argues that his testimony is supported by contemporaneous medical evidence that he experienced low back and lower extremity pain that worsened with sitting, standing, and walking for long periods and that was reduced by changing positions. But "while there are some objective medical findings that arguably might be minimally related to some of the requirements of Listing . . . 1.04B, . . . plaintiff has failed to offer any explanation of how these impairments
Aldao's remaining arguments regarding satisfaction of the Listing are without merit. Upon review, the Court concludes that the ALJ's conclusion here is supported by substantial evidence.
Aldao contends that the ALJ's failure to perform a function-by-function analysis neces-sarily "precludes appropriate judicial review," and any analysis by Judge Turnoff of the ALJ's determination "is, thus, beyond the Court jurisdiction." Objections at 9. The Court disagrees. "[T]he Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly rejected similar claims that an ALJ's failure to perform an explicit function-by-function assessment under SSR 96-8p is an error of law mandating reversal, so long as the ALJ's decision sufficiently indicates that he or she considered all relevant evidence in arriving at an RFC determination." Stokes v. Colvin, No. 14-0559, 2016 WL 311295, at *7 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 26, 2016) (collecting Eleventh Circuit cases); accord Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013) ("Where an ALJ's analysis at Step Four regarding a claimant's functional limi-tations and restrictions affords an adequate basis for meaningful judicial review, applies the proper legal standards, and is supported by substantial evidence such that additional analysis would be unnecessary or superfluous, we agree with our sister Circuits that remand is not necessary merely because an explicit function-by-function analysis was not performed." (citing Zatz v. Astrue, 346 F. App'x 107, 111 (7th Cir. 2009) (per curiam); Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1217 (9th Cir. 2005); Depover v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 563, 567-68 (8th Cir. 2003); Delgado v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 30 F. App'x 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2002) (per curiam))).
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's finding that Aldao has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of light work, as that term is defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). An ALJ's discussion of a claimant's medical records and citation of a regulation that defines the exertional demands of the RFC satisfies the function-by-function requirement. Castel v. Astrue, 355 F. App'x 260, 263 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). The ALJ ultimately decided that Aldao was capable of light work and was capable of performing past relevant work as a messenger. She based this conclusion on Aldao's medical records, affording considerable weight to the opinion of Dr. Kallan (Aldao's treating physician) that Aldao was able to perform light work. She also provided the citation to the regulatory definition of "light work." The ALJ, therefore, was not required to undertake a separate function-by-function analysis.
Finally, Aldao argues that the ALJ's decision should be reversed because it is "internally inconsistent." The Court finds no "internal inconsistency" in the ALJ's determination. The ALJ made a finding at Step Four of the sequential evaluation process that Aldao was capable of per-forming past relevant work as a messenger. She also made an "alternative finding" at Step Five, in which she elicited the testimony of a vocational expert, based on the proposition that Aldao's ability to perform all or substantially all of the requirements of light work "has been impeded by additional limitations." Tr. at 40. Under this finding, considering Aldao's age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, the ALJ found that he could perform the requirements of positions as a fast food worker, cleaner/housekeeper, and parking lot attendant. Under either alternative finding, the ALJ concluded that Aldao was not disabled.
Aldao argues that the ALJ contradicts herself by providing these two, allegedly internally inconsistent, findings. When the ALJ's ultimate decision is supported by sufficient evidence—as the ALJ's decision is here—there are no grounds for the district court to reverse merely because the ALJ made alternative findings. See, e.g., Richardson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 14-0703, 2016 WL 1165702 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2016) (affirming Commissioner's decision where the ALJ made alternative findings at Step Five of the evaluation process); Cribbs v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-0003, 2016 WL 1068480 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2016) (affirming Commissioner's decision where the ALJ made a finding of no disability at Step Four and proceeded to make an alternative finding at Step Five).
The Court finds that these and other objections regarding Aldao's RFC are without merit. Accordingly, the objections on this ground are overruled.
Upon de novo review of the administrative record and the Report, and considering the parties' arguments, the Court finds the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and in accord with the applicable law. Therefore, it is
